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America. As part of the period’s fascination with ‘new’ media and ‘big’ data, such technologies intersect
ambitious claims to better knowledge with a problematisation of uncertainty. This entanglement, I argue,
results in contextual reconfigurations of what ‘counts’ as knowledge and who (or what) is granted authority to
produce it – whether it involves proving that indiscriminate domestic surveillance prevents terrorist attacks, to
arguing that machinic sensors can know us better than we can ever know ourselves.
The present work focuses on two empirical cases. The first is the ‘Snowden Affair’ (2013-Present): the public
controversy unleashed through the leakage of vast quantities of secret material on the electronic surveillance
practices of the U.S. government. The second is the ‘Quantified Self ’ (2007-Present), a name which describes
both an international community of experimenters and the wider industry built up around the use of data-
driven surveillance technology for self-tracking every possible aspect of the individual ‘self ’. By triangulating
media coverage, connoisseur communities, advertising discourse and leaked material, I examine how
surveillance technologies were presented for public debate and speculation.
This dissertation is thus a critical diagnosis of the contemporary faith in ‘raw’ data, sensing machines and
algorithmic decision-making, and of their public promotion as the next great leap towards objective
knowledge. Surveillance is not only a means of totalitarian control or a technology for objective knowledge,
but a collective fantasy that seeks to mobilise public support for new epistemic systems. Surveillance, as part
of a broader enthusiasm for ‘data-driven’ societies, extends the old modern project whereby the human subject
– its habits, its affects, its actions – become the ingredient, the raw material, the object, the target, for the
production of truths and judgments about them by things other than themselves.
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ABSTRACT 
 
DATA EPISTEMOLOGIES / SURVEILLANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
Sun-ha Hong 
Carolyn Marvin 
 
 
Data Epistemologies studies the changing ways in which ‘knowledge’ is 
defined, promised, problematised, legitimated vis-à-vis the advent of digital, 
‘big’ data surveillance technologies in early twenty-first century America. As 
part of the period’s fascination with ‘new’ media and ‘big’ data, such 
technologies intersect ambitious claims to better knowledge with a 
problematisation of uncertainty. This entanglement, I argue, results in 
contextual reconfigurations of what ‘counts’ as knowledge and who (or what) 
is granted authority to produce it – whether it involves proving that 
indiscriminate domestic surveillance prevents terrorist attacks, to arguing that 
machinic sensors can know us better than we can ever know ourselves.  
 
The present work focuses on two empirical cases. The first is the ‘Snowden 
Affair’ (2013-Present): the public controversy unleashed through the leakage 
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of vast quantities of secret material on the electronic surveillance practices of 
the U.S. government. The second is the ‘Quantified Self’ (2007-Present), a 
name which describes both an international community of experimenters and 
the wider industry built up around the use of data-driven surveillance 
technology for self-tracking every possible aspect of the individual ‘self’. By 
triangulating media coverage, connoisseur communities, advertising 
discourse and leaked material, I examine how surveillance technologies were 
presented for public debate and speculation.  
 
This dissertation is thus a critical diagnosis of the contemporary faith in ‘raw’ 
data, sensing machines and algorithmic decision-making, and of their public 
promotion as the next great leap towards objective knowledge. Surveillance is 
not only a means of totalitarian control or a technology for objective 
knowledge, but a collective fantasy that seeks to mobilise public support for 
new epistemic systems. Surveillance, as part of a broader enthusiasm for 
‘data-driven’ societies, extends the old modern project whereby the human 
subject – its habits, its affects, its actions – become the ingredient, the raw 
material, the object, the target, for the production of truths and judgments 
about them by things other than themselves.  
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Introduction.  
 
 
Data Epistemologies studies the changing ways in which ‘knowledge’ is 
defined, promised, problematised, legitimated vis-à-vis the advent of digital, 
‘big’ data surveillance technologies in early twenty-first century America. It 
analyses the entanglement of claims to knowledge and the problematisation 
of uncertainty: new surveillance technologies are legitimated through their 
promise of new epistemic potential, but these very claims equally depend on 
the projection of grand uncertainties (both about the world ‘out there’, and 
about the self ‘in here’). Specifically, it focuses on two empirical cases. The 
first is the ‘Snowden Affair’: the public controversy unleashed through the 
leakage of vast quantities of secret material on the electronic surveillance 
practices of the U.S. government. The second is the ‘Quantified Self’, a name 
which describes both an international community of experimenters and the 
wider consumer technologies industry built up around the application of 
data-driven surveillance technology for self-tracking every possible aspect of 
the individual ‘self’. What does it mean to ‘know’ about a vast, secret 
surveillance apparatus, even as individuals remain largely cut off from 
experiencing it for themselves? What kind of ‘self-knowledge’ is gained 
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through the deployment of smart sensors and tracking devices, if it is a 
knowledge collected and analysed at a level beyond the human sensorium? 
Across both contexts, I show that the hopes and fears of data-driven 
knowledge are founded on a pack of deferred and hypothetical techniques for 
knowing. Far from its dark negation, the uncertain and the unknown are 
crucial building blocks for claims to knowledge.  
 
Surveillance and uncertainty thus constitute the central conceptual and 
empirical points, whose many connections define the scope of this work. 
Uncertainty is a familiar enough fixture in analyses of late modern societies. It 
appears with regularity in theories of neoliberal precarity (Gill & Pratt 2008, 
Giorgi 2013, Neilson & Rossiter 2008, Vadolas 2012) and cynicism (van 
Zoonen 2012). In information theory and its neighbours, uncertainty is 
typically a form of error or ‘noise’ – the lack of, or the opposite of, information 
and knowledge (Shannon & Weaver 1963; Leydesdorff 2000). Yet it is rarely 
taken up as a primary object of inquiry, and frequently passes without clear 
definition. In our context, uncertainty refers to that which surveillance discourse 
admits cannot be accounted for in its system of knowledge production. A 
paradigmatic example is found in state surveillance discourse: the idea that 
we can ‘never know for sure’ if we are safe from the next terrorist attack. This 
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uncertainty is itself repackaged into different forms to furnish partial and 
provisional bases for narratives, operational norms and political decisions. 
The allegedly unpredictable danger is thus articulated in terms of 
mathematical probability, or as a terrifying possibility that, given its 
disastrous nature, ‘must’ be treated as if real (Chapter 3). What things should 
be designated as what kind of uncertainty, and what attitudes should be held 
towards them, is subject to a constant struggle that the present work seeks to 
unpack. 
 
Surveillance, meanwhile, is used as shorthand for contemporary online 
surveillance; that is, digital, data-driven monitoring of human subjects for 
predictive purposes in the early twenty-first century. Such surveillance often 
features indiscriminate and comprehensive data collection; automated and 
persistent monitoring; autonomous, and sometimes adaptive/learning, 
machines and algorithms; identification of correlations based on quantified 
data. In other words, the present work treats surveillance primarily as a 
technology of knowledge production, rather than instrument of control or 
technological invention. To be sure, the latter remains a framing concern. My 
analysis is built on top of recent scholarship on the social meaning of code, 
algorithm and data, including the idea of surveillance as ‘social sorting’ (e.g. 
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Bauman & Lyon 2013; Gandy 1993; Lessig 2006; Mackenzie 2006; Poster 1995); 
on surveillance as control, discipline, ‘securitisation’ and criminalisation (e.g. 
Deleuze 1992; Foucault 1995; Mattelart 2010); critiques of surveillance vis-à-
vis privacy (e.g. Bogard 1996; Cohen 2013; Diffie & Landau 1999; Zimmer 
2008); and existing studies into data-driven surveillance in contexts like 
airport security and biometrics (e.g. Aas 2006; Adey 2009; Amoore 2009; Gates 
2011; Parks 2007). The focus in these pages, however, is squarely on the 
epistemic stakes and consequences of electronic surveillance.  
 
*** 
 
Such surveillance is nevertheless too wide a field to survey. New techniques 
for extraction and analysis of personal data affected a diverse array of 
practices during the early twenty-first century – from social media platforms 
to crowdsourced scientific work, from biometric surveillance at airports to e-
mail metadata collections, from prosthetic sleep quality trackers to ‘smart’ 
lights embedded in home furnishings. The present work focuses on two 
specific developments, and the debates accompanying them: the Snowden 
Affair, and the Quantified Self. 
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In June 2013, Edward Snowden, contracted by proxy to the National Security 
Administration [NSA], fled the United States with a vast cache of secret 
documents that detailed telecommunications surveillance systems operated 
by the NSA, and sometimes the FBI and the CIA, against both foreign and 
domestic populations. The leaks made an instant impact, launching a lengthy 
public debate over the virtues of electronic surveillance. Although vague 
warnings and suspicions had previously accompanied the American 
government’s expansion of surveillance operations following the September 
11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Snowden files was more or less the first to 
provide concrete and comprehensive evidence1 pointing to activities widely 
thought to be illegal – from the bulk collection of telephone and e-mail 
metadata from domestic populations, to secretly ‘tapping’ undersea data 
cables to harvest personal information on online activity. Over the next 
several months, Snowden, or rather, the journalists to whom he delegated the 
task, revealed information that claimed to show that the NSA had spied on 
foreign diplomats and national leaders; that they had monitored players of 
online video games; and even surveilled pornography consumption habits as 
                                                          
1 As we will see in Chapter 3, many parts of the NSA’s surveillance programs had been 
revealed in a series of exposés during the preceding decade, featuring whistleblowers and 
insider sources such as William Binney, a 30-year veteran of the NSA, and Mark Klein, then a 
technician for the telecommunications company AT&T. However, these whistles blown 
earlier failed to maintain visibility beyond a few days or weeks of the news cycle – perhaps 
because of the absence of ‘material’ proof like the Snowden files.  
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blackmail fodder against ‘radicalisers’. The ensuing debate would lead to 
numerous government reviews, court cases filed by civil rights organisations, 
and, to date, one piece of legislation – the USA Freedom Act.  
 
The analysis of the Snowden Affair primarily addresses the two years 
following the first leaks (2013-2015), and the public debates over the extent 
and legitimacy of state surveillance programs across the courts and Congress, 
news media of various stripes, even documentaries and fiction. At the same 
time, the Affair – and the surveillance systems it exposed – had a long tail 
stretching back at least to the beginning of the century.2 In the late 1990s, the 
NSA was struggling to assert its significance – and retain its old levels of 
funding – in the post-Cold War era. Its leadership, burned by Watergate, had 
maintained a policy of caution when it came to domestic surveillance (e.g. 
Bamford 2008, p27). September 11, and the George W. Bush administration’s 
response to it,3 kickstarted a dramatic expansion in state surveillance 
                                                          
2 To be sure, the history of electronic communications surveillance by the US government 
goes back almost as far as the history of electronic communications themselves – including 
Herbert Yardley’s ‘The Black Chamber’ of the 1920s. But the specific surveillance systems 
leaked by Edward Snowden were an outcome of the political climate following the September 
11 terrorist attacks. 
3 Following September 11, President Bush, and Vice President Dick Cheney immediately 
moved to produce a legal basis for vast expansion in domestic surveillance powers. This was 
provided by David Addington, the ultra-hawkish legal counsel to Cheney, and the Office of 
Legal Counsel, in what eventually became the “Authorisation for specified electronic 
activities during a limited period to detect and prevent acts of terrorism within the United 
States”. This memo was so secret that only several persons within the NSA could access it. 
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capacities that would culminate in the wide array of programs, from PRISM 
to XKEYSCORE to BOUNDLESS INFORMANT, that Edward Snowden 
would expose. This expansion, in many ways, wholly embraced networked 
computing technologies and the epistemological faith in ‘big’ data, resulting 
in a certain data hunger: as one anonymous intelligence official described, 
“let’s collect the whole haystack […] collect it all, tag it, store it… and 
whatever it is you want, you go searching for it.” (Nakashima & Warrick 
2013) This broader background of counter-terrorism and surveillance 
discourses throughout the early twenty-first century shapes the present 
analysis of the Snowden Affair.  
 
Beyond the state and terrorism, a similar set of technologies and epistemic 
principles were being spun around very different stakes and environments. If 
the Snowden Affair was a belated public contestation over surveillance 
systems already deployed nationwide, self-surveillance names practices of 
everyday, ‘lifestyle’ tracking that remains, at time of writing, an emerging and 
still experimental mixture of real devices and fantastic promises. These 
                                                          
Until the Snowden leaks in 2013, the legal justification for the programs then migrated across 
variously secret forms of legislation, including a 2004 opinion by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court [FISC] judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (itself secret), and then the 2008 FISA 
Amendments Act (during which period most members of Congress were denied clear 
information on how the legal provisions were being operationalised vis-à-vis American 
citizens). For more, see (Mayer 2006; PBS Frontline 2014). 
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technologies were designed to datafy aspects of the self that has traditionally 
escaped mechanisms for self-knowledge. By the mid-2010s, mass produced 
devices were promising to provide accurate, objective knowledge about sleep 
quality, mood fluctuations, steps taken, stress levels, average duration of 
sexual intercourse, and more – all through increasingly miniature and 
automated devices that would live on the skin and/or in the home, silently 
and constantly tracking their human owners.  
 
This kind of self-tracking is stretched across a number of popular labels and 
industry clusters, producing rather porous boundaries. Many self-trackers are 
also ‘wearables’ – typically sensor-equipped devices worn on the body – but 
not all wearables are primarily built for self-knowledge. Many belong to the 
broader paradigm of an ‘Internet of Things’, a wider vision of exhaustively 
connected object environments that includes infrastructural deployments like 
‘smart’ electricity meters. Here, I focus on personal devices and programs that 
stick to the users’ bodies and homes, and thereby produce formalised 
knowledge about their everyday lives – thereby aligning with the above 
definition of surveillance.4 The archetypical device, and one which played a 
                                                          
4 This demarcation is broadly in agreement with the small but growing scholarly literature on 
self-tracking / the Quantified Self. For instance, Melanie Swan defines QS as “any individual 
engaged in the self-tracking of any kind of biological, physical, behavioural, or environmental 
information” (2013, p85). 
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leading role in popularising the concept of self-tracking to the wider 
American public, is Fitbit; a fitness tracking wristband which automatically 
collects physiological signals and delivers quantified analytics on one’s health 
and exercise. Founded in 2007, Fitbit released its first iteration in 2009 – and 
by 2015, was boasting 1.86 billion USD in revenue (Fitbit 2016).  
 
Within the self-tracking landscape, the present work addresses two distinct 
but overlapping groups. The first is the self-tracking industry in general, 
which has grown from a smattering of prototypes in the mid-2000s to a 
consumer market that is still immature, but able to boast giants like Fitbit. In 
many cases, this industry developed through translations of technology and 
technological ambitions across academic science, industry R&D and existing 
commercial applications of machinic sensors and data analytics. Beddit, a 
sleep quality tracking device, was conceptualised during founder Lasse 
Leppäkorpi’s academic research into ballistocardiography; he and his team 
would turn the technology first to application in hospitals and luxury 
bedding companies, before raising funds through venture capital and online 
crowdfunding to produce the self-tracking device. Muse, a headset for 
tracking and augmenting meditation activity, is built on 
electroencephalography [EEG], one of the most common methods in early 
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twenty-first century neuroscientific research. The development of the device 
was spearheaded by Ariel Garten – an artist-cum-fashion designer-cum-
entrepreneur who had at one point worked with Steve Mann, the pioneering 
figure in the history of wearable computing (see Hansen 2014). Self-tracking 
industries thus brokered one channel for the popularisation of data-driven 
surveillance for personal use. To be sure, the exact size and characteristics of 
this market is difficult to gauge; industry metrics for sales and revenue are 
still disorganised, often folded into different categories like wearables (See 
Chapter 2 for more). Ultimately, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
assess the ‘success’ of self-tracking as a consumer good. As a product of its 
own temporal moment, this work treats self-tracking as an emerging cultural 
practice, and self-tracking discourse not as representations of an already 
enacted reality but futurist visions intended to mobilise the public towards 
new sociotechnical systems.  
 
Alongside this wider industry is the Quantified Self [QS] community – a 
decentralised network of early adopters, hackers, experimenters. QS was 
founded in 2007 by Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, two veterans of the 
technology magazine Wired, for discussing the potential of new technologies 
for quantifying and knowing the self. Following their inaugural offline 
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‘meetup’ in San Francisco – where some twenty-five individuals showed up – 
Wolf and Kelly invited those interested to organise and host local meetups 
wherever they liked; by 2015, QS boasted locally organised meetups across 
every continent on Earth and bi-annual conferences in America and Europe. 
QS is best understood as a community of practically oriented enthusiasts, 
united by the belief that new technologies can be used to deliver better self-
knowledge and thereby well-being and happiness. QS meetups emphasised 
personal ‘show and tell’s; short narratives of personal experimentation about 
how one hacked a Fitbit to track one’s exercise patterns more accurately, or 
developed a simple set of spreadsheets customised for one’s particular 
responsivity to diabetes. Gary Wolf’s unofficial guidelines (2010) 
recommended avoiding not only ‘business pitches’, but ‘general philosophical 
/ speculative discussion’ – a way to focus on specific experiments for practical 
benefits. With all this in mind, the relationship between QS and the wider 
industry might be parsed in terms of Pierre Bourdieu’s categories of 
connoisseur and layman, originally applied to the fields of sport (e.g. 1984, 
1991): a smaller group of dedicated insiders who develop a communally 
specific set of competencies and ‘schemes of perception’, whose articulated 
values and principles trickle out – in many distorted forms – to a wider and 
sporadically involved public. The connoisseur community of the Quantified 
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Self was a space for tech geeks, entrepreneurs, health industry professionals, 
journalists and self-care enthusiasts to cultivate social norms for talking and 
thinking about the future of self-surveillance.  
 
In many ways, QS’ model of an informal tinkerers’ community took after 
similar connoisseur groups in the early days of personal computing, such as 
the now-famous Homebrew Computer Club of the 1970s and 80s.5 The 
similarity was not coincidental. Kevin Kelly, fifty-five years old by QS’ 
founding, had been what Fred Turner (2006) calls a ‘network entrepreneur’; 
an individual who brokers connections across different social groups to build 
wider enthusiasm for a collective vision. Kelly was an integral part of three 
seminal mediums – the Whole Earth Network, the WELL, and Wired – that 
proselytised a utopian vision of personal computing and human 
augmentation in the latter half of the 20th century. Gary Wolf, belonging to a 
younger generation, had entered the field as a consumer of the WELL online 
community, subsequently working as a contributing editor at Wired for over 
twenty years (see Medosch 1997). This heritage, as we will see in Chapters 2 
                                                          
5 In 2011, Gary Wolf referred to QS as a ‘users group’: “informal but deeply engaged learning 
communities operating outside the normal channels of academic and commercial authority” 
(Boesel 2013). It is clear that QS was envisioned by its founders to be a haven for free-spirited 
amateurism, even as many of its participants make use of and are involved in developing 
commercial self-tracking products.  
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and 4, would be played up to present self-tracking as part of a broader 
trajectory of technological progress towards objective knowledge.  
 
One immediate consequence of this ‘looser’ structure is that the exact size and 
composition of QS difficult to pin down. Estimates of ‘members’, based on 
local meetup sizes6, ranges from 2,500 in March 2011 (Kelly 2011), to 5,000 
across some seventy local meetups in 2012 (Swan 2012). The only systematic 
account of QS’ size and growth comes from Adam Butterfield (2012), then a 
graduate student in Applied Anthropology. His report identified around 
4,800 members within the U.S. as of 2012, distributed across local meetups in 
27 locations, from Fort Lauderdale to New York City. Here, I treat QS as a 
group of dedicated amateurs, yet one whose personnel and practices overlap 
greatly with the commercial and marketing interests of the industry; a rapidly 
growing community with a strong media presence, but a distinct minority 
relative to the tens of millions of wearables purchasers across the United 
States. My analysis of self-surveillance draws from both groups – often 
                                                          
6 The very label ‘members’ is problematic, since QSers are not card-carrying members 
organised through, say, subscriptions to services or regularly paid dues. These metrics of 
‘members’ are likely to refer to records of meetup attendance, and/or informal registrations of 
interest/attendance at such meetups. I refer to anybody involved in QS’ various events 
without disavowing their relationship with the community, as well as individuals who 
explicitly relate themselves to QS, as a ‘QSer’.  
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identifying discourses and ideas common to both, and sometimes parsing the 
differences between the two (and within each one).  
 
These two manifestations of surveillance technology remain underconnected, 
especially in popular discourse. Self-tracking is rarely described as 
surveillance, and instead tends to be buoyed by narratives of empowerment, 
individualisation and self-optimisation. Accordingly, if discussions of state 
surveillance is dominated by fears over privacy and control, those same issues 
tend to be glossed over either as secondary concerns for the future – or as a 
small price to pay for advancements in self-knowledge. Yet both types of 
knowledge production are rooted in common technological capacities and 
principles, from automated data collection to the constant hunger for ‘bigger’ 
data. Along with corporate data-mining, wherein individuals’ consumption 
activity is processed into digital profiles and monetised, state and self-
surveillance constitute major sites for the emergence of data-driven 
knowledge regimes in early twenty-first century America.  
 
‘Emergence’ – because these technologies are still immature, and the moral, 
institutional and narrative foils for their normalisation are still forming in 
contingent ways. The present work analyses the Snowden Affair and the 
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Quantified Self precisely because they are two places where such emergent 
processes are most visible. In the former, state surveillance is challenged in 
the most openly public way; in the latter, self-surveillance bullishly asserts its 
own legitimacy – even as it is, as we shall see, being colonised by corporate 
interests. They are thus places and moments where the epistemic fantasies of 
new surveillance technologies are being openly debated, asserted, defended. 
Across both state and self-surveillance, the present work asks: what kinds of 
stories are being told about technology and knowledge? Where do these 
stories go to defend themselves, to what values and narratives do they fall 
back on? What we find is the resuscitation of the oldest tricks in modernity’s 
book (our enduring fixation with objectivity and calculability), wrapped up in 
narratives of novelty (of new terrorist threats, new machinic capabilities). The 
constant modulation of knowledge and uncertainty, derived into many 
subsidiary narratives of security, transparency, optimisation, freedom. Over 
the next four chapters, I present two seemingly discrete quests for data-
driven; cases which, when triangulated, depict the diverse ways in which the 
political, cultural, technological, material, economic efforts of the ‘new media’ 
society are being directed towards the glowing promise of data as knowledge, 
machines as knowledge.  
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METHODS AND AIMS 
The present analysis draws on research into the public presentation of 
surveillance vis-à-vis the Snowden Affair and the rise of self-tracking 
technologies, with a focus on the United States. By public presentation, I mean 
the ways in which surveillance was made object of debate, description, 
speculation, criticism – through media discourse, through the commercial 
introduction of technological solutions, through local community gatherings 
and nationwide conferences. My use of ‘public’ thus aligns with what has 
been called ‘publicly oriented’ (Warner 2002) or ‘publicised’ (Habermas 1991): 
discourse intended for, and circulated to, a wider community of indefinite 
strangers. This work does not seek to explain what ‘really’ happens under the 
hood with surveillance technologies, nor to discover how American citizens 
‘really’ respond to these technologies in their private thoughts and lives. 
Instead, it describes what visions of surveillance societies are presented in 
mediated, publicised discourse. It seeks to understand what kinds of attitudes 
to uncertainty are being sold to the public as normal, natural, useful, 
necessary. 
 
The present work draws on three years of research (2014-2016) across a wide 
variety of sources to sketch out the character of this publicised discourse. In 
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the case of the Snowden Affair, this meant examining the primary scenes of 
public contestation over the implications of the leaked information. Media 
coverage from a selection of prominent news publications were collected, 
classified and analysed. The selection sought reputable, prominent, high-
circulation publications with a variety of political biases, namely: National 
Review, The New Yorker, The Atlantic, The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
The Weekly Standard, Wired (online, and print where applicable). Additionally, 
I examined coverage in The Intercept, founded in direct response to the 
Snowden Affair and featuring Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras as editors. 
The Guardian (online) is also included, given its critical role in the Snowden 
Affair and the fact that it is widely read by U.S. readers (which is not true of 
Der Spiegel). Hence the scope of the sample is delimited by readership and 
influence, rather than institutions’ headquarters. From this selection, a pool of 
over 1,000 articles were extracted, then further sorted for items focusing on 
the themes of uncertainty, secrecy and proof relatively directly. This corpus 
was triangulated with speeches and official statements from actors in the U.S. 
government, including addresses by President Barack Obama and successive 
Directors of the NSA, Michael Hayden and Keith Alexander. The actual 
material leaked by Edward Snowden was also extensively consulted, sourced 
from major online archives like LeakSource, the Snowden Surveillance 
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Archive and Cryptome – as well as public appearances by Snowden and his 
‘accomplices’, Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras.  
 
For self-surveillance, the complex landscape of the Quantified Self community 
and self-tracking tout court necessitated a broader set of inquiries. First, media 
coverage of self-tracking was collected and analysed as with state 
surveillance. Here, the selected publications included more general ones like 
The New York Times, as well as major publications in the technology industries 
and computing culture spaces such as Wired and Fast Company.7 Second, I 
examined approximately fifty self-trackers on the market or in prototype 
stage, including their provenance (their creators, sources of funding, route to 
development), marketing discourse (in product websites, interviews, 
crowdfunding campaigns, and so on) and the tracking devices themselves. 
This was supplemented by research into the various online and offline 
presence of the QS community. This included the full archives of the 
Quantified Self website – maintained by Wolf, Kelly and a small number of 
collaborators – which serves as a hub for networking different self-tracking 
products, experiments and trends as well as disseminating information about 
                                                          
7 The full list of publications are as follows: The Atlantic, Fast Company, Harvard Business 
Review, Inc., National Review, The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Washington Post, Wired. 
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the QS community. I also held site visits in three meetups across New York 
and Philadelphia, each involving between ten and fifty participants, and 
analysed over a hundred QS ‘show and tell’ sessions uploaded online by the 
community. I conducted four interviews with QSers of varying types of 
involvement. This included Gary Wolf, the co-founder of QS and a key figure 
in evangelising, framing and networking self-tracking practices across tech 
communities, scholars, industry actors and the wider public; and Chris 
Dancy, a self-tracking entrepreneur and experimenter whose practices once 
earned him the moniker ‘the most connected man on earth’. Finally, I 
attended the 2015 Quantified Self Conference in San Francisco, where I was 
able to observe over forty panels, workshops and product showcases. These 
various scenes constitute a robust cross-section of the different ways in which 
self-tracking is made present for public consumption in the United States.   
 
*** 
 
The next four chapters each highlight a specific relationship between 
knowledge and uncertainty, focusing either on state surveillance and the 
Snowden Affair (Chapters 1, 3) or self-surveillance and the Quantified Self (2, 
4). Chapter 1 examines the layers of evidentiary politics surrounding the 
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Snowden Affair – a controversy where the state insists ‘bulk’ surveillance is 
necessitated by a radical evolution of unpredictable terrorism, and where the 
whistleblower’s dramatic revelation of secret truths provoked waves of 
speculation and uncertainty. What counts as ‘proof’? What does it mean to 
know ‘about’ a vast surveillance system one can rarely experience directly – 
or ever know in its fullness? To navigate this terrain, Chapter 1 traces what it 
calls recessive objects: objects which promise to extend our knowability, but 
thereby publicises the very uncertainty that threatens the claims to 
knowledge. Two such objects are examined: the evidentiary archive that is the 
Snowden files, and the ‘lone wolf’ terrorist as a figure of analysis and 
speculation. Turning to self-surveillance, Chapter 2 focuses on the claims 
surrounding machinic sensibility: the capacity of ‘smart’ machines to collect 
and analyse the kinds of data that are fundamentally unavailable to human 
subjects. Self-tracking thus positions human cognition, intuition, experience, 
as the wellspring of uncertainty – which it promises to eliminate through new 
technologies. The corollary is that in its efforts to ‘bypass’ the human subject 
and retrieve objective data, self-surveillance offers the kind of ‘self-
knowledge’ that is structurally black-boxed out of the users’ ability to know.   
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Having sketched out the lurking presence of uncertainty and its bedfellows 
(the unknown, the unpredictable, the secret…) vis-à-vis data-driven 
surveillance, the latter two chapters (3, 4) focus on how claims to knowledge 
are nevertheless constructed and defended. Chapter 3 examines how, in the 
face of ‘New Terrorism’, claims to knowledge are secured through a set of 
techniques for simulated and deferred knowing. They include subjunctivity, 
wherein it is argued that decisions must be made ‘as if’ the unknown is 
known, ‘as if’ the hypothesis is proven; interpassivity, where the ignorance of 
the public or other subjects is compensated by the hypothetical Other who 
knows in their stead; and zero-degree risk, where uncertainties’ resistance to 
traditional means for calculating risk produces a more naked turn towards a 
‘just-in-case’ politics: we must watch everyone, no matter the probability. 
Lastly, Chapter 4 analyses how self-surveillance exhorts its users to develop 
data-senses in a posthumanist adaptation to new knowledge technologies. It 
argues that self-tracking’s claim to transformation in self-knowledge is 
undergirded by a honeymoon objectivity: the reprisal of old, modernist faiths in 
linear, technological progress and absolutely objective truth, carried by the 
mythic material of ‘raw data’. 
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 ‘RAW DATA’ 
Across it all, ‘data’ is the object which embodies – an ironic expression, since 
so much of what is invested in it is potential, fictional, speculative – the 
epistemic fantasies of new surveillance technologies. Data is the indispensable 
unit at the heart of the assumed process whereby real phenomena – the 
threats of lone terrorists, the sprawling state surveillance apparatus, the 
goldilocks correlations that can optimise the self – might be formalised into 
reliable, solid, pieces of information. After all, without such raw ingredients – 
anterior to human meaning, and amenable to computation – how could one 
claim the superiority of machinic sensibility in epistemic endeavours?  
 
Raw data typically refers to data generated by the machine, but not yet 
having undergone ‘secondary’ processes of statistical analysis, cleaning, 
visualisation, aggregation, and so on. In short, data fresh out of the sensor. In 
this telling, raw data is untreated, unprocessed; it is seemingly anterior to 
analysis, classification, the attribution of meaning. Of course, to even call it 
‘raw data’ is redundant; ‘data’ itself refers literally to ‘the givens’. Today, it is 
a term that so often is accepted without question; a thing whose relationship 
to objective inquiry and observation simply dips under the radar, becoming 
“something we would not want to deconstruct” (Rosenberg 2013, p18). This 
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belief in raw data’s non-mediated nature is crucial to new surveillance 
technologies’ claims to accessing objective reality. In other words, it is 
precisely because data can be collected ‘raw’ that it can be said to impartially 
or neutrally extract from reality, from noumena. Raw data provides a concrete 
object, a presence, for the theoretical availability of objective self-knowledge. 
Consider the role it plays in discourses of self-surveillance. At meetups and 
conferences, Quantified Selfers reviewing each other’s experiments can be 
found constantly asking: where is the raw data? In 2015, one QSer suggested 
raw data access as one of the three ‘freedoms of personal data rights’:  
 
Without raw data, we are captive to the ‘interface’ to data that a data 
holder provides. Raw data is the ‘source code’ underlying this 
experience. Access to raw data is fundamental to giving us the freedom 
to use our data in other ways (Ramirez 2015). 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by a host of influential commentators, 
including QS co-founder Gary Wolf (e.g. Wolf 2016; Watson 2013). The 
valorisation of raw data is intimately connected to self-tracking’s vision of 
personalised control; data, self-trackers insist, must not be ‘siloed’, ‘hidden’, 
made ‘passive’. The irony is that at the same time, raw data is commonly 
understood to be opaque, even incomprehensible: 
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‘People aren’t really interested in raw data,’ Chang says. ‘If I just gave 
you your heart rate data, you wouldn’t know how to interpret it. In 
fact, it might confuse you, or it might scare you and say, ‘What is the 
spike? Why is it low? Why is it high?’’ (Shahani 2012)  
 
We have algorithms to break down everything. Because the raw data 
collected on the device doesn’t really mean anything, it’s the firmware 
and the software, with its intelligent algorithms that help explain what 
a movement was (Creasey 2014). 
 
Such discursive appearances exemplify a double-bind at the heart of 
surveillance’s epistemic promise. Data’s ‘rawness’ allows it to claim a 
representational purity – even as that ‘rawness’ restricts the data’s legibility to 
human sensibility. Self-trackers’ search for raw data, and the valorisation of 
access to raw data, thus mirrors the ‘data hunger’ witnessed in state 
surveillance systems: an archival fever (Derrida 1998) that seeks an orderly 
and complete accounting of natural phenomena into the ingredients of 
epistemology.8  
 
Such discourse consistently conjures the figure of raw data as the material 
proof of machinic objectivity. And yet, as Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson 
(2013) put it, ‘raw data is an oxymoron’. Every piece of data is the product of 
a sociotechnical system; if data-sense speaks of machines recalibrating 
                                                          
8 For an earlier historical episode in the database as a locus of epistemic desire, see Rebecca 
Lemov’s Database of Dreams (2015). 
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humans’ sensory equipment, it is humans that must calibrate those machines 
in the first place.9 Data is always the product of a mediative frame, and its 
presentation as unadorned information is always vulnerable to such 
‘contagion’ (Murphie 2015; also see Schwarz 2015). Indeed, every type of data 
has historically required a socialising process where its veridical authority is 
constructed and naturalised. One clear precedent for new surveillance 
technologies’ claims of advancements in machinic knowledge is the late 19th 
century gramophone/phonograph. As chronicled by Friedrich Kittler (1986), 
the phonograph heralded the privileging of auditory data over articulation; a 
mechanical division and reorganisation of sound into a data structure entirely 
indifferent to the phenomenological structure, one which ‘listens’ to noise 
regardless of meaning. Today, the same kind of transformation is being staged 
through ‘deep learning’ – a process of machine learning which seeks to 
minimise manual, human specifications of meaning, and instead let machines 
break up its object (say, an image) into literally meaningless pieces to record, 
                                                          
9 This point is particularly visible in contemporaneous concerns over ‘algorithmic 
discrimination’. As automated, algorithm-driven decision-making became commonplace in 
systems ranging from identification of terror suspects in airport security (Amoore & Hall 
2009) to visibility and voice in social media publics (Bucher 2012; Gillespie 2014) and the 
pricing of consumer goods (Kirchner 2015), the corporations controlling those algorithms 
have tended to default to the argument that a machine is incapable of racist and other forms 
of discrimination, and every perceived injustice is merely a random error within a neutral 
system. Yet it is increasingly clear such claims to neutrality serve to conceal and empower the 
humans and human decisions that undergird every such (often proprietary, black-boxed) 
technology (also see Gillespie 2010).  
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correlate and analyse.10 Deep learning thus brings a machinic, literally 
inhuman sensibility to knowledge production processes in areas like video 
surveillance and analysis of self-tracking data. Yet the epistemic process does 
not end there; if it did, there would be little left that is meaningful for human 
subjects. Kittler shows how the fragmentation of human experience into 
dividual bits is followed by a reconstitution of such machine-produced data 
into an effect of the real – the emblematic technology here being cinema. The 
ability to claim ‘rawness’ is thus nothing more or less than a historical belief 
in a given technological process as a privileged ambassador for objectivity. 
‘Raw data’ is very far from knowledge or meaning; the sociotechnical 
treatment of that data matters far more than any illusion of pristine 
information.  
 
*** 
 
                                                          
10 For instance, a deep learning system assigned to ‘recognise’ photographs’ content will not 
begin with manual designations, where the programmer might assign a certain constellation 
of pixels as ‘ears’ or ‘bugs’ before the machine begins to see. Instead, a given neural network 
might be assigned a vast set of images to analyse – and each time, also presented with the 
‘correct’ answer that it would gradually modify itself to match. This is why, as artist duo 
Shinseungback Kimyounghun (2012; 2013) show, deep learning machines will see human 
faces in clouds and cat faces in humans; the ‘face’ has no meaning as a face, only a particular 
(and, clearly, imperfect) correlation of bits of visual data. This ignorance of the computer, 
which allows it to truly learn rather than copy or memorise, replicates the Enlightenment’s 
invention of the ‘innocent’ observer as a nonsubjective and thus truly scientific subject 
(Picciotto in Gitelman & Jackson 2013, p4-5). 
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All in all, Data Epistemologies is a critical diagnosis of the contemporary faith 
in ‘raw’ data, sensing machines and algorithmic decision-making, and of their 
public promotion as the next great leap towards objective knowledge. Within 
the contexts of state and self-surveillance, it seeks to understand how 
surveillance technologies’ claim to knowledge are constructed; how those 
claims depend on the projection of vast uncertainties, and themselves often 
produce new relationships of uncertainty; and how fantasies of objective 
truth, technology as unbounded progress and the ‘rawness’ of data are 
synergised to endow these claims with legitimacy.  
 
In many ways, this means that the analysis is a product of and for the present 
moment – a moment of what we still call ‘new’ media technologies. The 
phenomena in question are very much contemporary, and their consequences 
are yet to be played out in full. Many of the legal and political contestations 
provoked by the Snowden leaks remain in progress. While the USA Freedom 
Act of 2015 promised to reform the state surveillance apparatus, its actual 
impact fell far short of the name.11 Meanwhile, the narrative of New Terrorism 
                                                          
11 Having prohibited one specific legal interpretation (Section 215) that had allowed bulk 
collection of telephone metadata from American sources, and enacted several other reforms, 
the Act left almost untouched vast areas of the state surveillance apparatus created or 
expanded during the post-September 11 era. For instance, the interception of ‘foreign’ 
Internet communications which, due to the ways in which data infrastructure has been 
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retains its rhetorical efficacy, maintaining the discursive landscape that 
pitches the vision of national security under threat against the advocates of 
privacy and civil rights. Self-tracking technologies are at the infancy of their 
life as mass-produced, mass-consumed devices. Data Epistemologies 
addresses the scholarly and public debates accompanying these formative 
developments – debates which typically parse surveillance in terms of 
political power and technological advancement, with a corresponding focus 
on objective proof, transparency of information, and the violation of rights. By 
focusing on the organisation of epistemic definitions, legitimacy and 
problems in the surveillance context, it offers an alternative, and 
complementary, analysis of the basic ground for political struggle and 
consensus that surveillance discourse is working to establish. 
 
The present work also speaks to a number of broader contexts for debate and 
scholarship. First, it provides a sustained analysis of uncertainty vis-à-vis 
knowledge and surveillance. Although uncertainty is often identified as a key 
characteristic of late modern life (e.g. Giddens 1990), it is rarely subject to 
focused, sustained and empirical analysis. Alongside broader theses about, 
                                                          
constructed over previous decades, continues to collect vast amounts of domestic 
communications as well. 
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say, the ‘persistent existential anxiety’ of the modern subject (ibid., p98-100), 
the concept of risk has often attempted to take more specific account of how 
modern societies manage and contain uncertainties. Yet figures like the 
definitionally unpredictable lone wolf terrorist and the fantasy of ‘big’ data as 
absolutely comprehensive knowledge show that uncertainty as an object for 
thought and action cannot be fully contained by risk, or other systems of 
knowing (Chapter 3). In the context of new surveillance technologies, I argue 
that uncertainty is consistently produced as the necessary counterpart of 
claims to knowledge – such that to invoke one is to thereby manage the other. 
If the typical modern narrative depicts the colonisation of the unknown 
through reason, or at least its management through probabilistic calculation, 
this is a story of the ouroboros, the serpent that devours its own tail: claims of 
knowledge and uncertainty locked in constant cannibalism, defining each in 
the context of the other. 
 
The analysis of surveillance in the Snowden Affair and the Quantified Self 
also relates more generally to how we think about technology, knowledge 
and truth. Data Epistemologies intersects two matters of concern: the 
constructed ideas of objectivity and reason, and the visions of technological 
transformation that surround the expanding reach of digital technologies. 
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(Indeed, the very fact that we have used the name ‘new media’ for over 
twenty years is an indication of this continually replenished image of progress 
and revolution.) Digital surveillance’s claim to significance thus leverages far 
older and broader ideals, often wound tightly around the most fundamental 
aspects of our lexicon: information, proof, secret, objectivity, technology, data. 
The fantasies of technological transcendence, of perfect proof, of ‘raw’ data, of 
unerring machines… behind all of these lie the constant flux of veridical 
authority and epistemic structures, the many negotiations and skirmishes 
over what should count as knowledge, as unknowable, as ‘sufficiently’ 
known, as necessary to know.   
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1. Recessive Objects. 
 
 
The Snowden Affair exhibits a curious parallelism. If the state pleads the 
necessity of total surveillance to capture unpredictable terrorists, the 
whistleblower asserts the necessity of transparency to uncover the abuses of 
surveillance. Even as NSA analysts speak of ‘analysis paralysis’12, buried in 
‘big data’ too big to render meaningful, the public is itself confronted by 
leaked information of massive proportions. These problems cut deeply into 
traditional axiologies of secrecy and publicity, knowledge and ignorance. This 
chapter examines surveillance’s claims to knowledge – and critics’ claims to 
knowledge of surveillance – and their dependency on visibilising the 
uncertain and unknown. It studies the politics of who claims to know for 
whom, what is marked out as knowable (or not), what kinds of knowledge 
are established to be necessary (for our security, our liberty). In doing so, I 
raise the concept of recessive objects: objects which promise to extend our 
knowledge, but thereby publicise the very uncertainty that threatens 
knowability. These ambivalent objects – the Snowden files, and the lone wolf 
                                                          
12 Internal NSA memos leaked by Edward Snowden (see Maass 2015) speak of ‘analysis 
paralysis’ and ‘too many choices’; some were even titled “Data is Not Intelligence” and “In 
Praise of Not Knowing”.  
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terrorist – bring into social presence the struggles over what counts as 
knowledge and how.  
 
*** 
 
The website of The Guardian blinked, refreshed. “NSA collecting phone 
records of millions of Verizon customers daily,” read the headline 
(Greenwald 2013a). The same day, the 6th of June, 2013, the print edition 
followed suit: “US orders phone firm to hand over data on millions of calls” 
(Greenwald 2013b). The Washington Post joined the fray with online and print 
pieces over the next 48 hours. The thing about news is, of course, that so much 
of it is ever so familiar – novelty and repetition in guise of each other.13 These 
reports of ‘breaking news’ featured many of the same discursive patterns 
found in previous post-9/11 revelations of surveillance. In 2002, Americans 
had already been warned about “a virtual, centralised grand database”, and 
given a beginner’s guide to the term ‘data-mining’. In 2006, they were told 
about domestic surveillance that is so secret the public can’t even be told why 
it is secret (The New York Times 2006; Page 2006), including, word for word, 
                                                          
13 Guy Debord (1990) understood well that the more novelty is mass produced, the more such 
novelty depends on an amnesiac repetition.  
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“phone call records of tens of millions of Americans” (Cauley 2006). Change 
the names, and you might well have copied half of the story off the archives. 
And yet, it was presented as a revelation with seismic consequences. Sceptical 
quotation marks framed that now-tainted word, ‘metadata’: whether the 
reader knew what it really is (and entails) or not, they were alerted to a 
certain sense of secrecy and duplicity. All of these would multiply in the 
coming weeks and months, the repetitions sedimenting imaginations about 
state surveillance and ‘Big Brother’.  
 
From what concrete, material evidence did these reports derive their 
authority? The Guardian had a rare scoop: the online article provided a copy of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [FISC] order that addressed 
Verizon by name and demanded ‘telephony metadata’ (The Guardian 2013). 
The slightly grainy text, a mysterious stamp-mark reading ‘13-80’, and the 
watermark TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN [No Foreigners] attested to the 
materiality, secrecy, and (as if this followed naturally) authenticity of this 
document. Such documents would soon flood the mediascape: slides upon 
slides, partly blacked out reports and memos, and of course, the figure of 
Edward Snowden himself.  
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Surely, then, the story of the Snowden Affair is one of leaks and revelations: a 
clear case where the public becomes ‘better informed’, and dark secrets turn 
into open facts. Snowden himself had defined his “sole motive” to be 
“infor[ming] the public” (Gellman et al. 2013); six months after the leaks, he 
declared his mission accomplished, the mission “to give society a chance to 
determine if it should change itself” (Gellman 2013). William Binney, a former 
NSA employee who had told the public much the same things Snowden did 
with much less impact, thought the documents made the difference: he now 
regrets that he didn’t take documents himself, the ‘hard evidence [that] would 
have been invaluable’ (Loewenstein 2014). Yet these documents were also 
occasions for occlusion, withdrawal, speculation, simulation. Snowden’s 
documents, despite – or rather, thanks to – their enormous volume and scope, 
make present surveillance as an uncertain and unknown world. This fixation 
with uncertainty was not mere background. The depiction of surveillance as a 
grand epistemological technology for our times, whether beneficent or 
perfidious, was achieved precisely through relentless reference to unknowns 
that cannot, by definition, be completely eliminated. It is this entanglement 
between surveillance as knowledge production and the unknowns 
surrounding surveillance as practice that this chapter traces. What our age has 
called ‘new’ media has erected its own conventions for producing and 
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circulating knowledge – conventions which were so often endowed with the 
honeymoon glow of novelty and progress. This dissertation is occasion to 
critically examine the uncertainties produced as part of this epistemic vision, 
taking for this chapter the case of state surveillance dragnets. 
 
This focus points us towards the public presentation of surveillance. What we 
seek here is neither the depth of a secret techno-political reality (how does 
surveillance ‘really’ work?) nor the depth of the public’s psychic interior (how 
do people ‘really’ feel about it?), but what Foucault (1972, p229) called the 
‘surface’ of discourse: how surveillance has been positioned and 
problematised in public, for ‘the’ public, in the public activity of words and 
things. Neither is such surface to be dismissed as the fantasies of the 
misinformed. It is my argument that the co-dependency of knowledge and 
uncertainty is not reducible to explanations at the level of ignorance, 
obfuscation or even secrecy – although all of those things do feature 
prominently. Rather, this relationship is foundational to the political 
emergence of indiscriminate, ‘dragnet’-style surveillance in the early 21st 
century. Post-9/11 American state surveillance – which is merely the leader of 
a more international trend that includes, at the very least, British and German 
intelligence agencies – was founded on the rationale that terrorism had 
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become radically unpredictable, and so anyone and everyone must be watched 
in order to produce reliable information about its threat: a narrative which I 
shorthand here as ‘New Terrorism’.14 As early as 2002, the Total Information 
Awareness program, a precursor to the NSA programs revealed by Edward 
Snowden, was trying to ‘connect the dots’ – in one case, literally connecting 
the dots on a massive graph on the wall. Just to complete the joke, they called 
it BAG – Big Ass Graph (Harris 2010). Which other terrorists was a given 
suspect communicating with? How many times did a given word appear in a 
conversation? This visualisation of the turn to ‘big’ data often produced lines 
“so dense as to be indecipherable” to the human eye (ibid., p209).  
 
In other words, the uncertainty generated by New Terrorism is directly linked 
to how the collection of everything produces its own uncertain kind of 
epistemology. By the time of Snowden’s revelations, we find this paradox in 
full bloom. Under General Keith Alexander’s directive (2005-2014), the NSA’s 
vision was not just to look for the needle in the haystack, but “collect the 
                                                          
14 The epistemic and political linkage between anxieties of proliferation and the dream of 
totalising archives, of course, is one which gained general import over the 18th and 19th 
centuries. One of the major narratives in Foucault’s work on criminality is how Western 
societies shift from inquiry (of an event, what happened, a reprisal of the singular) to 
examination: not ‘was this done? Who did it?’ but “presence or absence, of existence or 
nonexistence … ordered around the norm” – that is, the whole curve of normality, over time 
as well as over space of bodies (Davidson 2004, xxiii). In the latter model, the entire curve of 
the population, the normals as well as abnormals, must be modelled in order to properly 
identify the pathological (e.g. Hacking 1990). 
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whole haystack” (Nakashima & Warrick 2013; also see Greenwald 2014, p96) 
– a reasoning replicated in internal NSA communications (Maass 2015). In 
crude terms, the whole point of the ‘collect ‘em all’ strategy is that you don’t 
know what you’re looking for until you already have it, so you must always 
have, standing in reserve, everything you can manage to collect (McQuillan 
2015).  
 
This explicit mobilisation of the unknown as a building block for knowledge 
claims was a strategy replicated across both critics and defenders of American 
state surveillance. In early 2014, Edward Snowden and James Clapper, the US 
Director of National Intelligence, hit off an unintended symmetry in their 
public statements: 
 
You're giving up your rights. Your rights matter because you never 
know when you'll need them. People should be able to pick up the 
phone and call their family, should be able to send a text message to 
their loved one, buy a book online, without worrying how this could 
look to a government possibly years in the future. (Snowden in Rowan 
2014) 
 
Clapper compared the 215 program to fire insurance. “I buy fire 
insurance ever since I retired, the wife and I bought a house out here 
and we buy fire insurance every year. Never had a fire. But I am not 
gonna quit buying my fire insurance, same kind of thing.” (Lake 2014) 
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In both, the refrain that holds the logic together is simple: ‘you never know’. 
Semantically, of course, ‘you never know’ means just that: you will never know 
for sure whether surveillance is necessary, whether we will regret our 
surrender of privacy, whether the terrorists would have ‘got you’. Yet the 
attitude they incite is exactly the opposite: since you will never know, you have 
to do something about it. Love it or hate it, state surveillance in the post-
Snowden era certainly requires your imagination – or, more precisely, your 
willingness to project your affects and your reason forward unto the 
uncertain future.    
 
This chapter thus argues that the known and the unknown are not simple 
opposites laid out on an epistemic switchboard of 0s and 1s. Knowns are 
shaped out of unknowns (and continue to harbour uncertainties), while 
surveillance, as a technology of knowledge production, itself contributes to 
uncertainty. Snowden’s sympathisers hailed the leaks as a paradigmatic 
instance of transparency: the belief in the public aggregation of solid, stable 
facts upon which deliberation might occur. Transparency quickly became the 
axiom by which Snowden could be justified (Fantz 2013) and the state could 
be lampooned (Kravets 2013; The Washington Post 2013) – at least, when the 
state wasn’t itself admitting that the leaks indeed delivered “some needed 
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transparency” (Crawford 2015).15 Transparency discourse projects a public 
that will readily take possession of offered information, and upon digesting it, 
come to a rational consensus (e.g. as critiqued in Dahlberg 2007). But the 
many ways in which surveillance is entangled with uncertainty is not 
reducible to explanations at the level of ignorance, obfuscation or even 
secrecy – although all of those things do feature prominently. It is also a 
matter of how aspects of the world out there (or, in Wittgensteinian terms, 
states of affairs) appear into our experience, manifest a presence, call for our 
attention – or withdraw from them (and, sometimes, loudly announce their 
withdrawal).  
 
Such a story necessarily takes as protagonist not the secret reality or truth 
itself, but the objects that carry into the public the relations of exposure, of 
simulation, of uncertainty, of approximation. These I call recessive objects: 
objects whose appearance promises our access to objective reality, but in 
doing so, also serves to emphasise our removal from ‘what is really going on’. 
Objects whose informational value is undeniable in terms of their content, but 
                                                          
15 Another key group of actors were tech companies – some of which were revealed by 
Snowden to have passed personal data onto the NSA. After the initial, obligatory 
performance of shock and surprise, many companies took to championing transparency, 
issuing reports of government data requests with much fanfare and publishing open letters in 
the name of openness (e.g. Kopstein 2013; Hill 2013; Sanchez 2013). 
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which generate speculative activity far outstripping that content. Recessivity 
is not ultimately a question of the objective property of such objects, but their 
social life: how something like the Snowden files, or the genre of CCTV 
imagery (e.g. Gates 2013), presents certain things as ‘known’, signals others as 
unknown or even unknowable, and normalises certain networks of 
legitimation or standards of verification. Objects like the Snowden files, which 
we invest with a presentational power: that they reveal some aspect of truth, 
of reality. Objects like ‘metadata’, which take on a certain mystery, 
potentiality, and thereby become virtual objects in the Deleuzian sense. Some 
objects elicit perturbation, panic, indignation. Other objects become 
authoritative bastions of certainty, firm ground that we can base our opinions 
and sentiments on, objects that hold the real in place for us. So this is a story 
of how our investment in notions of objectivity, privacy, national security, 
involve taking pervasive existential and epistemological uncertainties and 
developing conventional ways of translating them into the sufficiently known, 
the ‘real enough’ (Hong 2015). 
 
Recessive objects, therefore, describe things whose appearance into the public 
domain (and thereby lived experience, if only lived experience of the mass 
media) stand in for the non-appearance of others; objects which reveal certain 
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aspects to experience and withdraw in others; objects which provide material 
anchor for the collective efforts to establish ‘known facts’. This chapter traces 
the public presentation of two different objects, tracing their network of 
references in the Snowden debate to identify their influence. The first is, of 
course, the Snowden files: an archive of unknown size whose content has 
exposed much about the NSA in a highly concrete fashion, and yet is also an 
object of speculation and mystery. The second is the lone wolf terrorist, the 
antagonist at the heart of the narrative of New Terrorism. The lone wolf is by 
definition unknowable, inexhaustible, uncontainable; a figuration of the 
irreducible uncertainty at the heart of surveillance. Both objects are figurative 
– a set of imagined properties and epistemic potential anchored onto a 
concrete object (which is now made a little larger than life). Each object makes 
a specific articulation of the problem of recessivity: what is the evidentiary 
function of proof that is technically available but so often, practically, goes 
unseen? What is the definitional and classificatory work performed by a label 
which ultimately points to the impossibility of knowing the threat?  
 
In both cases, my focus is less on purposeful strategies of obfuscation and 
concealment, or the more absolute kinds of secret that are utterly hidden from 
public view – though those things, too, enter into the analysis, and work done 
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in this area are important precedents.16 Rather, this chapter emphasises the 
ways in which the unknown is presented for the work of knowing, all the 
while retaining its unknowability. Through these objects, I ask: what are the 
social systems of knowing that rationalise and problematise contemporary 
online surveillance? How does the reason of surveillance promise to combat 
and destroy uncertainties, and at the same time relies on them to justify its 
existence?   
 
THE SNOWDEN FILES 
Let us return to where we started: the documents. The powerpoints, memos 
and reports were supposed to finally give us the unvarnished truth, a primary 
and original evidence. In a debate where critics of surveillance had 
perennially been marginalised as paranoid rabble-rousers, and tended to rely 
on anonymous whistleblowers and general descriptions, the files were 
credited as being the “first concrete piece of evidence exposing dragnet 
domestic surveillance” (Kelley 2013), the “first direct evidence of unlawful 
                                                          
16 Such ‘produced invisibility’ would include the pre-Snowden status quo, where the 
intelligence agency and the executive branch had gone to great lengths to remove even 
recessive objects of surveillance from the public eye. Surveillance, despite a series of earlier 
leaks, remained a kind of unknown unknown, pursued by writers like James Bamford (2008). 
It would also include problems like the absence of data on ‘police killings’ in the United 
States, which consists a structural disruption of the work of knowing (Gates 2015). In such 
phenomena, it is more possible to delineate knowledge work proper from practices seeking to 
disrupt and destroy that work. Meanwhile, our analysis of recessivity and uncertainty 
addresses the speculative and uncertain lurking in precisely the work of knowing.  
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NSA spying” (Gallagher 2013). Indeed, previous NSA whistleblowers – 
William Binney, Thomas Drake, J. Kirk Wiebe – have pinpointed the files as 
“documentary evidence” and “material evidence” that finally grant 
additional weight to their own allegations (Eisler & Page 2013). CCTV images, 
we know, have long permeated the popular imagination of ‘authentic’ 
surveillance, to the point where video forensic workers add in once classic, 
now obsolete features like time-codes with the sole purpose of tapping into 
this latent legitimacy (Gates 2013). Similarly, the Snowden files are bestowed 
with a certain veridical authority. The documents were treated as producing a 
more raw and authentic kind of evidence: material, concrete, ‘documentary’.  
 
Indeed, the Files’ contribution to ‘on-hand’ public knowledge is considerable, 
whichever way you cut those words. XKEYSCORE; Gilgamesh; Rhinehart; 
BOUNDLESS INFORMANT; PRISM; Project Chess… entire programs were 
dug up out of complete obscurity. Yet even as secret surveillance is brought 
into the domain of the knowable, this narrative of transparency and public 
knowledge is predicated on further emphasising the world of uncertainties 
and unknowns still to be unmasked. The files themselves not only encourage 
suspicion and speculation, but build up their veridical authority precisely 
through this encouragement. This section traces the files’ public presentation 
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as evidentiary objects, and the recessive relations contained therein. It 
considers how the files present the idea of specific, transparent information, 
but appear just as often in the form of an uncountable multiplicity, a swarm. 
It describes how, rather than eliminating uncertainty about state secrecy, the 
files give material authorisation to further speculate about what remains 
unknown: paranoia and conspiracy is here a structural condition of the 
epistemological relation, rather than psychological ailments or ‘feelings’ per 
se. In considering the co-dependent, co-productive relationship between 
knowledge and uncertainty, my objective is not to argue that such leaks harm 
democratic deliberation, or that they are not informative. It is to understand 
how the mobilisation of such ‘documentary’ evidence entails a redirection 
and reorganisation of who/what knows for the public; what is designated as 
‘must be known’ or ‘cannot be known’; and what the public is told can or 
must be done with this new knowledge.   
 
*** 
 
On 20 July, 2013, journalists at The Guardian descended into their basement, 
power drill and angle grinder in hand. Observed by two UK state officials, 
they proceeded to physically eliminate the offending laptop: the one which 
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contained secret NSA files leaked by Edward Snowden (Rusbridger 2013). It 
was, of course, a purely ceremonial gesture; Snowden’s files had already been 
distributed to a global network of journalists and activists (Farivar 2013), 
including The Guardian’s own offices in the U.S. The drill-and-grinder ritual 
reflected not only the difficulty nation-states face in combating online 
information flows, but just how distributed and multiple the once-secret files 
had become. Smuggled out through mundane USB drives (Zetter 2013), the 
exact size, scope, and location of Snowden’s digital trove captivated the 
attention of American news media (e.g. Cole & Windrem 2013; Hosenball 
2013; Borland 2013; Goldman 2013; Almasy 2013). Not that anyone could 
figure out just how many documents even existed. This was, in fact, a hotly 
contested question, because Snowden himself never deigned to supply a 
number. Glenn Greenwald, Snowden’s primary journalist contact, has refused 
to give a firm number; the closest he came was in an obscure New Zealand 
television appearance, where he referred to ‘hundreds of thousands’ of 
documents (The Nation 2014). Janine Gibson, the Editor-in-Chief of The 
Guardian US, claimed ‘over 58,000 files’, but apparently only once – at an 
event at Columbia University (Bell et al. 2014). In fact, the figure 58,000 only 
appeared in mainstream news outlets as part of the false rumour that David 
Miranda, Greenwald’s partner, was detained in Heathrow with that number 
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of documents (Greenwald 2015). Meanwhile, the U.S. government also tossed 
numbers into the air. A Defense Intelligence Agency report to Congress about 
the leaks claimed that Snowden took 900,000 files from the Department of 
Defense alone – distinct from his haul from the NSA (Leopold 2015). One of 
the most widely cited estimates was that Snowden “touched” – that is, 
accessed – 1.7 million files while contracted for NSA work at Hawaii (Kelley 
2014). This figure has sometimes been misconstrued – by media as well as 
U.S. Senators17 – as documents taken by Snowden, a conflation about which 
Glenn Greenwald has publicly expressed frustration (Greenwald 2015). At the 
end of the day, the quantity of documents remained a secret, even as 
estimates came and went with a margin of millions. 
 
It is ironic that the NSA should be more forthcoming than its critics about the 
quantity of documents. The months it took them to come up with even 
approximate figures, and the reluctance to advertise them prominently, 
suggests that the government itself does not know for sure. Indeed, this 
prevarication itself was criticised: why should we trust the government to 
keep our secrets secure, when they can’t even figure out what the thief has 
                                                          
17 Senator Susan Collins raised the figure in the 2014 hearing for the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, which is officially open to the public (U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence). 
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stolen? (Friedersdorf 2015) In fact, US state surveillance has already had this 
problem for years before Snowden. The development of the vast electronic 
dragnets Snowden has exposed required a massive boost in the NSA’s 
funding, and a corresponding boom in internal hires, new infrastructure, and 
outsourcing contracts to the private, military-industrial arm of the 
surveillance apparatus (e.g. Shorrock 2015). The consequence was that by 
2010, it lacked comprehensive and precise metrics for mapping its own 
surveillance apparatuses, or estimating the overall costs of anti-terrorism 
(Pasquale 2015, p13; Bamford 2008, p199). As if a parody of banks ‘too big to 
fail’, the landscape became littered with big data that is too big to account for.  
 
This question of numbers is not trivial. The quantity of the documents here 
becomes a proxy for asking: what is the information that we now ‘have’ but 
still cannot access? What remains secret about that which is technically 
exposed, and what wider landscape of secrets does such exposure gesture 
towards, emphasise, visibilise? Peter Galison (2008) reports that the U.S. 
government as a whole has ‘reportedly’ classified 92,064,862 documents in the 
single year of 2011. Not even 1.7 million scrapes the top of the iceberg. From a 
different angle, the secrecy archive Cryptome (2016) provides us with an 
entertaining estimation. In October 2013, it wrote: “out of reported 15,000 
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pages, The Guardian has published 192 pages in fourteen releases over four 
months, an average of 48 pages per month, or 1.28% of the total. At this rate it 
will take 26 years for full release.” Two years later, estimates had grown less, 
not more, precise: “20-620 years”. As is so often the case, the joke is the 
vehicle for the serious. We are faced with either learning more about the NSA 
until the day we die, or getting so much information so fast that we can never 
expect to read most of it – the latter route exemplified by earlier leaks from 
Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks.18 The widespread speculation over the number of 
documents illustrates how, distinct from a select few documents grasped in 
their specificity, the public impact of these evidentiary objects must be 
understood in their appearance as a multiplicity, a swarm. What becomes a 
public object of concern is the forest as much as the individual trees.  
 
The problem of large numbers was not just a problem of scale, of having too 
many documents for one individual to process, publish or read. As with the 
advent of statistical law and normal distribution models over the 18th and 19th 
                                                          
18 In fact, WikiLeaks’ files had their own correlate of the numbers problem: the ‘insurance 
file’. In July 2010, the group uploaded a 1.40gb file named ‘insurance.aes256’ – the file 
extension revealing its use of the relatively highly secure (though of course not uncrackable) 
AES256 encryption. It has been variously reported as ‘insurance’ or Julian Assange’s ‘poison 
pill’, a file which is presumed to contain as-yet unknown government secrets that would be 
revealed should Assange come to harm. Subsequent insurance releases grew in size, reaching 
a gargantuan 349 gigabytes in 2013. Again, the numbers provide not specificity, but an open 
space that attracts speculation. 
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centuries (spurred in part by massive growths in urban populations) 
(Hacking 1990), or the new hopes for total collection and analysis provoked 
by the emergence of ‘big data’ in the early 21st century (boyd & Crawford 
2012), the problematisation of large numbers entailed qualitative shifts in the 
how of knowing. In the case of the Snowden files, these numbers indicate and 
visibilise a space for speculation and estimation distinct from the documents’ 
promotion as concrete and documentary. We find an extreme illustration of 
this predicament in Borges’ The Library of Babel. “When it was announced that 
the Library contained all books, the first reaction was unbounded joy” – and 
soon after, “a similarly disproportionate depression.” (1998, p115-6) Though 
the denizens knew in theory that the Library actually contained every 
combination of letters and words, their experiential access to this world was 
only achieved through the idea that every book is potentially readable and 
findable out there. Hence “in order for a book to exist, it is sufficient that it be 
possible. Only the impossible is excluded” (ibid., p117). We must recall that the 
sheer size of the Snowden files is not only a comment on the whistleblower’s 
methodical process, but the complexity of the secret surveillance apparatus 
itself. The fascination with the number of documents contributes to and 
springs from the wider attention upon the wilderness of the unknown, a 
surveillance system that one can never claim to ‘know’ in full. In short, the 
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numbers – as one artefact of the Snowden files as a whole – present a 
recessive relation, wherein the presentation of vast quantities of evidence 
serves to emphasise the unknowns that now attract renewed attention and 
speculation.  
 
Meanwhile, the size of the documents created another problem for 
information and transparency: who has even read all the published 
documents? What does a revelation prove if nobody’s peering in through the 
unlocked vault – not even Edward Snowden himself? In a 2015 interview, 
Snowden was unable to confirm if even he himself had read all the 
documents, and was forced to dodge the question multiple times (Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver 2015). This half-admission was widely reported by 
Western news media as probable proof that he had not (e.g. Akkoc 2015; 
Kelley 2015; One News 2015). Not even Edward Snowden could give the 
public certainty that, if not they themselves, somebody has read and checked 
the proof. As for the lay public, Snowden’s decision to leak the documents in 
a gradual, journalist-mediated flow did not make life any easier. Table 1 is a 
non-complete listing of reportage based on the Snowden files from the initial 
leaks in June 2013 to the end of the calendar year, containing only what I 
considered sufficiently distinct pieces of news. Meanwhile, Table 2 lists 
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original Snowden documents released through The Guardian in those first few 
months – leaving out files handled by other publications and organisations. 
How many Americans could reasonably be expected to read every published 
document – or to maintain an accurate picture of what has been proven and 
what remains speculation? A survey, addressing news habits in the first four 
days of the Snowden leaks (6-9 June 2013), suggested that 50% of the 
Americans followed the news ‘not too closely’ or ‘not at all closely’ (Pew 
Research Center 2013); we might well expect public attention to have declined 
in the ensuing weeks and months. The public is, ever so often, a device by 
which the few can make claims about and on behalf of many. But the 
Snowden files point to an enduring ambiguity between public and publicity. 
Not only are large parts of this amorphous public unlikely to have first-hand 
knowledge of the evidence, but coupled with their awareness of the evidence’s 
availability, the leaks can generate rather than quell speculation.  
 
  
 
 
 
52 
 
 
13.12.13 NSA cracks cell phone encryption for A5/1 (2G standard) 
13.12.10 NSA uses cookies to spy 
13.12.09 NSA uses video games to spy 
13.12.04 NSA collects 5 billion phone records per day 
13.11.26 NSA spies on pornography consumption habits 
13.11.23 NSA ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ infects 50k 
networks 
13.11.14 CIA collects bulk international money transfers 
13.10.31 NSA hid spy equipment at embassies & consulates 
13.10.30 NSA attacks Google & Yahoo data centres 
13.10.24 NSA tapped 35 world leader calls 
13.10.21 NSA spied on Mexico’s then-president Felipe Calderón 
13.10.14 NSA collects US address books, buddy lists 
13.10.04 NSA can hack Tor 
13.10.02 NSA stores cell phone locations up to 2 years 
13.09.30 NSA stores metadata up to a year 
13.09.28 NSA maps Americans’ social contacts 
13.09.16 NSA ‘Follow the Money’ division tracks credit card 
transactions 
13.09.07 NSA can tap into smartphone data 
13.09.05 NSA attacks encryption standards and hacks 
13.08.29 US intelligence ‘black budget’ discussed 
13.08.23 NSA employees spy on ex-lovers 
13.08.15 NSA internal audit shows thousands of violations 
13.07.11 XKEYSCORE revealed 
13.07.10 NSA ‘Upstream’ fibreoptic spying capacities revealed 
13.06.30 Additional PRISM leaks 
13.06.19 NSA ‘Project Chess’ for Skype revealed 
13.06.17 Apple, Microsoft, Facebook release collection procedure 
details 
13.06.16 NSA spied on Dmitry Medvedev, then Prime Minister of 
Russia, at the 2009 G20 summit 
13.06.11 BOUNDLESS INFORMANT revealed 
13.06.10 Edward Snowden named 
13.06.09 NSA record/analysis tools leaked 
13.06.07 ‘Presidential Policy Directive 20’ revealed 
13.06.06 First leak: PRISM program revealed 
Table 1. Snowden's revelations, June-December 2013. 
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Table 2. Cryptome’s tally. 
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Figure 1. A typical Snowden file. 
 
Where the documents themselves were directly consulted, they often proved 
jargon-laden and requiring a great deal of technical and institutional context 
to parse. The Snowden files, after all, were primarily PowerPoint 
presentations, internal memos and instructions, designed to brief NSA 
employees about what their own organisation was doing (or wanted to 
present themselves as doing). For instance, public reports on the NSA’s 
technologies for collecting and analysing online oral communication were 
sourced from short written brief by the NSA for the NSA, promoting its own 
software to analysts that might have overlooked them (Froomkin 2015). The 
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reportage thus depended on the interpretive labour of journalists like Glenn 
Greenwald and Barton Gellman to guide the user through terms like 
“selectors detasked”, or codenames like Pinwale and Egotistical Giraffe 
(Gellman & DeLong 2013a; Rich & DeLong 2013; also see Fig.1). And each 
one, of course, opens its own set of rabbit holes: an intrepid reader might find 
themselves reaching back to pre-9/11 programs like Echelon and Stellar Wind, 
scrolling through reams of legalese that try to explain why metadata 
collection is sufficiently like retrieving call records from landline providers 
and not sufficiently like warrantless wiretapping, and so on. Even when the 
technical details are not overwhelmingly difficult (or just wearisome), every 
new revelation reignites conflicting speculations about what these programs 
could do and what they end up meaning in combination. When the concerned 
citizen learns that the NSA collects millions of texts, but they can vaguely 
recall that they also collect millions (or was it billions? Trillions?) of phone 
records and international money transfers and social media photographs and 
email address books, but it’s not necessarily any and every text or phone call, 
and then there are minimisation procedures, and … And yet, the documents, 
and what they are able to authorise as facts, exert a palpable presence upon 
the public imagination of surveillance. Evidence does not extinguish 
uncertainty, but redirects it and refocuses it. It is only because the documents 
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exist that the subject can enter into speculation, indignation, scepticism – even 
if they may not be quite sure what is and isn’t in those documents.   
 
*** 
 
None of this takes away from the documents’ public status as powerful 
evidentiary objects. State surveillance had for decades operated as public 
secrets: that which is generally known, but cannot be publicly articulated 
(Taussig 1999). With the Snowden files, the veridical authority endowed them 
now pushed the threshold of plausible deniability by an appreciable amount. 
Yet at the same time, the documents’ presence as proof, as swarm, as number, 
as indicators of further secrets and potential harm, served to open up new 
spaces for paranoia. I do not mean that millions of individuals will specifically 
feel that the government is out to get them. Rather than the content of 
subjective experience, I am describing the structure of an epistemological 
problem that the Snowden files publicises. The files’ appearance as veridical 
objects provoke a renewed focus on surveillance’s secrets; the public is thus 
presented with an urgent necessity for constructing meaning – even when, 
especially when, there are clear unknowns. The paranoid epistemology 
exhibited in the Snowden Affair may thus be considered an extension of what 
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Richard Hofstadter (1967) called the ‘paranoid style’ in American politics: a 
tradition of conspiratorial and indignant mode of expression that can be 
identified in McCarthyist America of the 1950s, and even to the moral panic 
over the Illuminati in the late 18th century.19 I also turn to Carl Freedman 
(1984), who describes Freud’s paranoia as a “ruthlessly hermeneutic logic” 
that takes more normative styles of reasoning and amplifies their tendency to 
systematically fit everything into an intelligible pattern. In applying paranoia 
to science fiction, his analysis also demonstrates the epistemological, rather 
than psychopathological, conceptualisations of paranoia: a relentlessly 
consistent and systematic grid of intelligibility used to answer every kind of 
unknown.  
 
There is an apocryphal story that some conspiracy theorists were rather put 
out when the Snowden leaks happened: now their theories had been proven 
right, they’d have to come up with some new ones! Being proven right is not 
the end of paranoia. For a more concrete example, consider a post on reddit’s 
/r/conspiracy, a hangout for conspiracy peddlers (or, as the site itself puts it, 
                                                          
19 One notable difference: while Hofstadter too refrains from the clinical meaning of paranoid 
as a sickness, he is unapologetic about describing the paranoid style as making a “curious 
leap in imagination” that ultimately departs from the world of actual facts (1967, p37-8). 
Here, I make no such assumptions about the ‘actual’ accuracy of paranoid claims; how could 
I, or anyone else, do so when the structure of secrecy and uncertainty ensures the public shall 
never know for sure one way or another?  
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‘free thinkers’): “If it weren’t for Edward Snowden conspiracy theories would 
still just be ‘theories’ … High five to the sane ones <3” (Reddit 2015). Yet even 
this is naïve, since paranoia will always point towards a greater secret behind 
appearances: “So you’re thanking a guy who at least previously worked for 
the CIA (and most likely still does) for making conspiracy theories validated, 
when it was the CIA who literally weaponised the term conspiracy theory as a 
PR campaign to cover up for the Warren Commission?” Paranoia was 
presented as an appropriate technique for intelligibility in mainstream news 
media as well. Conspiratorial language was commonplace, especially 
amongst those critical of Edward Snowden. Speculations that he was a 
Russian or Chinese double agent, or at least their gullible puppet, were 
fuelled by Keith Alexander and other high-ranking NSA officials (e.g. Cohen 
2014; Kaczynski 2014; Johnson 2014; Fox News 2013). One Washington Post 
piece suggested that Glenn Greenwald, Julian Assange and others had conned 
Snowden into risking his life for the former’s ambitions – at least, before the 
paper issued a series of corrections (Pincus 2013). Of course, there were also 
public statements seeking to quell paranoid reasoning, arguing that the 
terrorists are hoping to induce paranoia and the risk posed by terrorist attacks 
is in fact rather small (e.g. Krauss 2016). But whereas such cautions relied on a 
binary of reason and paranoia, what is most striking is the degree to which 
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paranoia can be reasonable to the information environments people find 
themselves in. The Affair exhibits not a new low in irrationality amongst the 
population, but how the deployment of ‘collect ‘em all’ surveillance strategies 
and ‘reveal ‘em all’ whistleblowing responses served to legitimate paranoid 
heuristics as practical epistemologies.  
 
Thus, the Snowden files become generative of new theories, new speculations, 
projecting ever larger shadows behind what it reveals. Indeed, one pro-
surveillance article made the case rather bluntly: “fearing the NSA… requires 
you to believe that hundreds, if not thousands, of American employees in the 
organisation are in on a conspiracy.” (Gerecht 2013) The only reasonable 
solution, they go on to conclude, is to trust in the NSA, since not trusting 
would require us to be, well, paranoid. What matters is not the information 
these documents provide, but a variant of what Tor Nørretranders (1998) calls 
exformation: the inverse of information, the bits that are ‘explicitly and 
knowingly discarded’. The bits that the available information leaves unsaid 
and unproven, but now gain a social presence in a provisional and 
anticipatory form. A paranoid epistemology is thus an apophenic one: the 
trouble is not that meaning is secret, hidden, lost, but that it is too much and 
everywhere (Steyerl 2016). This paranoid mode of sense-making is replicated 
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on the side of surveillance’s critics. Suspicion of Snowden’s motives were 
frequently met by the thought that the leaks were in fact engineered by the 
U.S. government. This was a classic case of what has since Watergate been 
called ‘limited hangout’: a deliberate admission (or even revelation) of certain 
embarrassing details in order to conceal even worse ones. The importance of 
the unknown, the unknown as must-become-known, is thus emphasised 
precisely through the presentation of knowns. Walter Benjamin wrote that 
“truth is not a process of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation 
which does justice to it” (2009, p25). Secrecy is indeed not destroyed by the 
leaks, but endowed with a new kind of presence. 
 
Paranoia, in this epistemological sense, reflects shifts in how knowns and 
unknowns become demarcated – not only in the fluid and relatively informal 
space of public deliberation, but institutionalised stages like the courts. 
Snowden’s first leaks in 2013, and their most direct predecessors by The New 
York Times and USA Today in 2005-6, spurred a series of legal cases where 
plaintiffs, typically organised by civil rights groups like the American Civil 
Liberties Union [ACLU] and the Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF], sought 
to bring state surveillance activities under public judicial scrutiny. In each of 
these legal contests, the most important issue turned out to be a basic question 
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of available facts: what kind of harm is known to be caused by surveillance? 
Despite the new availability of Snowden’s files, efforts to contest NSA 
surveillance at the judicial level struggled to gain standing due to the 
difficulty in constructing a definition of surveillance harm that is compatible 
with the existing legal conceptualisation (in the United States) of harm as 
‘concrete, particularised and actual’.20 In ACLU v. NSA (2007), the District 
Court concurred that phone/internet data collection is not only 
unconstitutional, but does count as concrete, particularised and factual harm; 
however, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the injury claimed is 
‘mere belief’ of intercepted communications, and the lack of any ‘personal’ 
harm, only a ‘possibility’, denied them standing.21 For that matter, what harm 
is known to be prevented by surveillance? Despite its voracious ingestion of 
data over the last decade, the NSA, too, have found it difficult to produce 
concrete proof that surveillance has stopped terrorist attacks. Having initially 
cited ‘54 plots’ foiled by metadata collection, NSA spokespersons were soon 
forced to admit that there was really only one case that could be presented 
                                                          
20 This definition is part of a stable chain of precedents established by Supreme Court 
decisions, including Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), Warth v. Seldin (1975) and Sierra Club 
v. Morton (1972). For instance, Jewel v. National Security Agency (2011), filed by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation on the basis of earlier leaks by Mark Klein, was judged upon these terms, 
and ultimately granted standing upon appeal.  
21 Similarly, in ACLU v. Clapper (2015), the U.S. government sought to have the case thrown 
out on precisely this lack of standing, and nearly succeeded; the case is still in process at time 
of writing.  
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with certainty (Schwartz 2015).22 Such debates reflect a fundamental problem 
with public secrets: what must one ‘know’ in order to bring the unknown into 
trial? What should and should not count as ‘known’ in the face of such 
relentless uncertainty?  
 
The potential and futuristic designation of harm – from both sides of the 
debate – exemplifies the way in which recessive objects fuel, not replace, the 
work of speculation. Its defenders and critics fight to prove the reality of a 
future which it is their mission to prevent from actualising, and this 
necessitates both sides to engage in an array of what-ifs and you-never-knows 
(a problem that we shall return to in Chapter 3). Yet to label such strategies 
irrational, and deplore them as a collective turn towards epistemological 
parlour tricks, would be to reproduce the ideal notion that information should 
lead us to proof and certainty. Rather, paranoia serves as an epistemological 
technique for integrating unknowns into reliable frameworks for 
understanding – a technique which is presented as contextually appropriate 
                                                          
22 This was the arrest of Basaaly Moalin in 2010, whose phone metadata showed him in 
contact with an Al-Qaeda member. While other cases have been connected to NSA 
surveillance, Susan Landau (2013) has convincingly debunked the idea that PRISM-style 
dragnets played a critical role in them; and a White House review of the NSA surveillance 
program wrote that “there has been no instance in which NSA could say with confidence that 
the outcome would have been different without the section 215 telephony meta-data 
program” (Clarke et al. 2013, p120).   
 
 
 
63 
 
 
and normal. It is a historical extension of what Tobin Siebers (1993) called the 
‘cold war effect’: a generalised epistemological climate where paranoia and 
suspicion were seen not as delusions or pathologies, but virtues, and to be 
paranoid was not to be ill but to be in tune with contemporary reality. 
(Indeed, there are literary and political connections between certain cold war 
tropes and Snowden-era paranoia (Melley 2012).) Merleau-Ponty (2012) 
understood this when he noted that for subjects of madness, their madness is 
not error or illusion, but a naturalised and intuitive access to truth. A 
schizophreniac experiences voices not as hallucinations superimposed over 
reality, but something as genuine as the ground beneath our feet. (Merleau-
Ponty thus describes a schizophrenic woman who believes two individuals 
with similar looking faces must know each other: a connection which ‘normal’ 
humans would dismiss as apophenia gone haywire, but for the woman is 
simply common sense.) The point is that any given system for rendering the 
world around us into intelligible pieces requires some reliance on 
presumptions about the unknown – a reliance which, to outsiders, appears 
arbitrary or nonsensical.  
 
Such reliance is necessary because not only can we never know everything in 
a general sense, but we often do not know what our epistemological 
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framework defines as important and necessary information. So it is the case 
with the problem of harms, and – as we described earlier in this chapter – the 
refrain that ‘you never know’. To be able to exclaim that ‘you never know, but 
(so) we have to do something’ is to be paranoid enough to see past the 
unknowns and connect the dots yourself. It may be technically prudent to 
wait until all the facts are in hand, but in the case of a secretive surveillance 
program and the logic of preventive prediction, nobody will ever reach such a 
privileged position. The Snowden files pair certainty with speculation 
precisely by forcing the unknown out of negligibility and into the status of 
active problem. They assert the collective need to render this entanglement of 
knowns and unknowns into a meaningful, actionable narrative.  
 
This entanglement of information and uncertainty, emblematised by recessive 
objects like the Snowden files, makes a parody of the current enthusiasm for 
transparency.23 Transparency is axiomatic for whistleblowers, of course, and 
Snowden himself framed his actions in this light (Fantz 2013), but liberal 
democratic governments have also embraced it in their rhetoric (if not always 
their practice). Buzzwords bloomed by the dozen in the wake of enthusiasm 
                                                          
23 Some of the following analysis on digital transparency have been adapted from another 
piece (Hong & Allard-Huver, Forthcoming). 
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about ‘ICTs’: e-government, e-transparency, e-democracy… In this idealised 
form, transparency frequently communicates a belief in the ‘virtuous chain’ of 
information, rational deliberation, and democratic participation – all of it 
jumpstarted by new media technologies.24 But, as we have seen, there is no 
easy connection between the theoretical availability of information and its 
uptake as knowledge (also see Vattimo 1992). Even widely reported 
information provokes mediated speculations and sentiments, not to mention 
felt uncertainties. In the Shannon-Weaver model of communication (Shannon 
& Weaver 1963), information is essentially defined as the reduction of 
uncertainty. This definition, of course, was never intended to encompass 
every definition of information, let alone knowledge. The point is in the 
contrast: with cases like the Snowden files, we find that the presentation of 
solid, reliable information can increase the public labour of speculation and 
inquiry.  
 
Alongside the gloss of ‘power to the people’, the less attractive side of the 
transparency bargain is that it levies labour and responsibility upon the 
citizen. Transparency can thus be a barrier to becoming-political. In the 
                                                          
24 As one prominent example, we might consider one of Barack Obama’s first 
communications as the President of the United States: a memorandum titled ‘Transparency 
and Open Government’ (Obama 2009). Its easy equation of transparency with accountability 
and informed citizenry exemplifies the period’s enthusiasm for the idea.  
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context of liberal, representative democratic societies, transparency mobilises 
the citizen anew with an old responsibility: not just to participate in politics in 
prescribed moments and ways (e.g. voting every four years), but to become 
an unblinking eye poring over every aspect of government. The citizen has 
been recruited as a free auditor for the state. This is to be distinguished from 
earlier forms of citizen redress, such as petitions of grievances and injustices. 
The long Western history of petitions, from written pleas to the Roman 
Emperor to the cahiers de doléances in 1789 France, were not the normal duty 
of subjects, but extraordinary actions – while the work of assessment and 
redress remained the task of the governing Prince (also see Zaret 2000, p59). 
This was also the case for the literary trope of the King who speaks with his 
subjects in disguise to hear their grievances – most famously Shakespeare’s 
Henry V, and James V of Scotland’s legend as ‘King of the Commons’.25 
Again, it remained the King who must listen, to gather data, to make his 
population legible, and to reconfigure his apparatuses of government 
according to that knowledge. In the e-transparency paradigm, the 
government (or the whistleblower) uploads, makes ‘available’ – a passive 
                                                          
25 Stories of James V’s disguised outings, recurring in various forms ever since the years of his 
reign, were themselves part of a wider folklore motif of the king-in-disguise. The accuracy of 
such stories as pertaining to a specific monarch are generally unverifiable, but they as a whole 
gestured to a popular belief that positioned the King as monitoring (benevolently) his 
subjects (e.g. see Stevenson 2004, p198). 
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position, after which it is the public’s responsibility to request, read, cross-
reference, judge, prosecute. The proof may be in the Snowden files, but the 
burden of proof is on the subject.  
 
The problem is that much of the time, it is a burden that subjects cannot afford 
to or are reluctant to bear (see Bannister & Connolly 2011). When another 
realm of online surveillance – corporate data-mining – became scrutinised for 
invasions of privacy, one popular solution was to push for greater 
transparency on the part of online platforms. Predictably, the result was an 
even greater onslaught of privacy policies that many people do not want to 
read, do not have the time to read, and do not have the background 
knowledge to fully understand. As one study showed, it would cost $781 
billion per annum in salary if Americans used their working hours to read the 
privacy policy of every site they visited (McDonald & Cranor 2008). In any 
case, scrutiny enabled by such ‘transparency’ is as often a melange of 
misunderstanding, confusion and second-hand interpretation, as evinced by 
numerous incidents where even efforts at clear and accessible policies have 
resulted in speculation and panic.26 The impossibility of fully taking up, or 
                                                          
26 One example is that of Snapchat, a social media platform where users send text/image 
messages that automatically expire after ten seconds. In 2015, news media reported on new 
privacy policies, warning for example that Snapchat “now owns the rights to all your nude 
photos forever” (Russon 2015). The irony is that Snapchat (2015) claims it only ever updated 
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‘owning’, the burden of transparency produces a new chain of deferrals and 
delegations. An act of transparency, like Snowden’s leaks, often yields secrets 
revealed but unread, and identifies new secrets now to be speculated over. 
The idea that the good citizen ought to now know for themselves can also 
produce a space, a gap, which is then filled by deferred and presumed forms 
of knowing. 
 
This is not a critique of transparency not being ‘good enough’. That would 
imply we need to try and make sure transparency ‘properly’ informs citizens 
and enable sovereign judgment and agentic action. The point is that ‘to know’ 
is a complex, mediated, and costly business, such that the injunction to know 
generates new techniques and habits by which we can avoid the work of 
knowing for ourselves. Slavoj Žižek asks: why do we only focus on the 
restrictive or oppressive dimension of Foucaultian discipline? Discipline is 
also a kind of liberation: 
 
This liberating potential of mechanical rituals is also clearly discernible 
in our modern experience: every intellectual knows of the redeeming 
value of being temporarily subjected to the military drill, to the 
                                                          
the policy “so that they’d read the way people actually talk.” This apparent attempt at 
transparency ultimately required Snapchat’s own clarifications (ibid.), and news articles 
translating those clarifications back into ‘what’s really going on’ (Howard 2015) – all in 
addition to the original 2660-word privacy policy and 4102-word terms of service.  
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requirements of a ‘primitive’ physical job, or to some similar externally 
regulated labour — the very awareness that the Other regulates the 
process in which I participate, sets my mind free to roam, since I know 
I am not involved. The Foucauldian motif of the interconnection 
between discipline and subjective freedom thus appears in a different 
light: by submitting myself to some disciplinatory machine, I, as it 
were, transfer to the Other the responsibility to maintain the smooth 
run of things, and thus gain the precious space in which to exercise my 
freedom… (Žižek n.d.) 
 
In surrendering autonomy for parts of my own body and action, I become 
‘free’ to pursue that which really matters to me. This, of course, is not so much 
a derivation of Foucaultian theory, but a faithful exegesis; from the 
Enlightenment project of discipline through (docile) bodies (Foucault 1995), to 
the voluntary optimisation of oneself by the neoliberal homo œconomicus 
(2008), and even the grand ordering and classifying devices of modern 
epistemes (2002), the bargain inherent in each regime of knowledge is that 
processes of ordering, determining, narrowing, are what enable the subject to 
exist and roam in a stable and recognisable system of meaning. Specifically in 
terms of bodily discipline, this is a principle that is more familiar to us as 
applied unto other peoples and machines (slaves, servants, secretaries, the 
role of women over the centuries). Žižek’s example of the thinker also shows 
that this is not reducible to a clean division between the ‘menial’ aspects of my 
life and the important ones. The ‘mindless work’ of a military drill actively 
organises and direct the ‘free activity’ as well. The act of delegation does not 
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cleanly remove the subject from what the Other does for it, because this 
relation itself yields its own experience, and corresponding responsibilities, 
for the subject. In the face of so many uncertainties, and techniques of proof 
that seem to build upon rather than extinguish them, one can hardly insist 
that the individual subject ‘know’ all the facts and exercise their reason. What 
matters is the constellation of people, things and processes that ‘know’ on my 
behalf, and what kinds of responsibilities, decisions and rights that effectively 
leaves for me. 
 
*** 
 
In Agatha Christie novels, we find the trope of the singular moment of 
revelation: when enough secrets (that is, objective facts) have been 
accumulated, the illusions topple all at once to reveal a perfect picture of the 
crime. The pleasure of this revelation is itself an expression of our shared 
intuition that, back in real life, things rarely seem to work out so neatly. 
Sherlock Holmes, too, insisted on a progressive and ultimately conclusive 
process: “when you have eliminated the impossible whatever remains, 
however improbable, must be the truth” (Doyle 2005, p36). Such a formulation 
is, of course, open to debate at metaphysical and meta-epistemological levels. 
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But we need not go that far. Holmes’ world is an extremely finite and 
localised one: it is rare that the suspects and other characters do not wear 
every relevant aspect of their psychology and history on their person. But 
what happens when tens of thousands of government-employed analysts 
roam the four corners of the Internet, and reside in a complex the size of a 
small city (the NSA’s Fort Meade is larger than Cambridge, Massachusetts in 
land area), when the nature of data collection mechanisms is such that 
nobody, not even the collectors, know whether your data will ever be seen by 
a human, when the very revelation of the secret involves an unknown (but 
vast) number of documents? Such linear eradication of the secret is replaced 
by an open struggle of speculative hypotheses that must all admit their 
partiality and uncertainty – even as they bid publicly for our belief.  
 
This entanglement of knowledge and uncertainty comes down to a gap 
between the document as evidentiary object and the ‘knowing’ it is meant to 
produce: a gap which defies the transmissional imagination that proving, 
verifying and informing humans can work like a Windows file transfer. This 
gap is primarily at the level of neither metaphysics nor the content of 
individual experience, but the embodied and social structures that any 
‘knowing’ depends upon. Known and unknown, transparency and secret, 
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turn out very rarely to manifest in such pure forms. The Snowden files, 
celebrated and feared in equal measure as ‘exposure’, were supposed to be as 
material and primary a proof as it gets, short of catching an NSA agent 
nibbling at your Ethernet cable. They were supposed to finally dispel 
uncertainty, and lay everything out on the table. But as we have seen, the 
documents’ public presence is often in the form of a proliferation ‘out there’, 
rather than as specific and immediately available objects; the information 
gained from them act not to eliminate uncertainty, but to authorise new 
regions for speculative ventures. What does it mean for an object to acquire 
the status of proof? What other proof must exist for this object to function as 
proof, and what are the subterranean beliefs, objects, conventions, rhetorics, 
that prop up its veridical authority? Here we start to see the paradoxical 
wiring of knowing and uncertainty, of revelation and secrecy: it is the 
recessivity of data and technology, so fundamental to surveillance’s project of 
knowing, that undergirds these phenomena.   
 
RECESSIVE OBJECTS 
The Snowden files’ social function is both to cross the gap and to render it 
newly visible. This doubling is what I describe as recessivity. Recessive 
objects are objects whose social meaning and function are predominantly to 
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announce the absence of something by making itself present. Its own 
appearance reminds and visibilises the non-/dis-appearance of that referent. 
Sometimes, as with the Snowden files, the recessive objects themselves are 
seen to prove, clarify, enlighten; but in doing so, they also call attention to the 
sheer uncertainty of surveillance. Sometimes, the object itself is considered 
mysterious, insofar as it ‘stands in’ as a visible substitute for the invisible; this, 
we will see, is the case of the lone wolf. Where certain objects might be 
designed to conceal and erase the epistemic structure’s dependency on 
uncertainty (such as the many conventions science has developed to present 
its objectivity), these objects’ ability to extend our knowing to new regions 
come hand in hand with a visibilising of the reminder that we cannot, in some 
ways, know it at all. Recessivity, at the most generic level, is a paradox native 
to all methods of knowing, and particularly permeates our relationship to 
technology of every kind. This section thus draws on phenomenology, both 
‘classical’ and contemporary, to more precisely define recessivity. It then 
describes recessivity as specifically manifest vis-à-vis the Snowden Affair. 
Knowing may always be deferred and simulated in some way, and every 
extension of our knowing may open up such ‘gaps’, but what matters is how 
different actors and values are arranged into what positions of power and 
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authority in a given context. Recessive objects illustrate and themselves help 
organise these relationships in that regime of knowledge/truth. 
 
What exactly do we mean when we say objects make things other than 
themselves ‘appear’ – especially if that appearance is joined by a gap, a 
withdrawal? Phenomenology’s basic conceptual vocabulary of presence and 
appearance allows us to sharpen the language of ‘gaps’. In the original, 
Husserlian sense, presence denotes the fundamental relation of for-us that 
phenomenology investigates; it is the basic quality necessary for anything to 
exist for the human sensorium. But such an ontologically low-level distinction 
cannot easily handle the many ways in the human individual is mediated, 
distracted, technologised. Where Merleau-Ponty (2012) emphasised an 
integral I whose conscious experience folds different processes into a Whole, 
our concern here is a distributed kind of phenomenology, where we actively 
feel that what we know, what we see, what we feel, is not quite ‘our own’ 
(Rotman 2008; Thrift 2011).27 Recessivity, after all, concerns not so much the 
                                                          
27 This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of classical phenomenology, but my point is 
that its central concern with human access to the world around them involved this double-
bind of extension and withdrawal. Heidegger (1962, I.3) famously wrote of ready-to-hand 
[Zuhandenheit] and present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit], describing the withdrawal of the object’s 
thingness relative to human experience. The problem of access itself has been central to the 
entire project of phenomenology; from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, to be human is to perceive 
the world by virtue of what we cannot perceive ourselves. In Graham Harman’s latter-day 
revival, objects are considered absolutely withdrawn – an ontology where the gap is, for 
humans, fundamentally unable to be closed (2002). 
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aspects of sensory experience that are completely naturalised, but the ways in 
which the processes of knowing are openly problematised. In this sense, we 
might borrow from phenomenologists who have spoken of ‘absent presence’, 
and other hybrid complications of Husserlian presence. Here, ‘absence’ is not 
simply the inverse or lack of presence; the absence itself can be noticed, 
perceived, made into a collective object of concern (Frers 2013; Saury 2008). 
When the Snowden files point towards the deep secrecy of the state 
surveillance apparatus, the latter becomes caught in a position that is neither 
simple presence nor absence. On one hand, the files become stand-ins for the 
absent truth, bringing it out of the forgotten category of ‘unknown 
unknowns’; on the other hand, the files cannot bring the secrets entirely to 
light, and serve to constantly remind us of that absence. To speak of absence, 
or non/dis-appearance, the unknown, the uncertain, is not to speak of being 
entirely cut off from them (an ignorance), but to describe how the problem of 
knowing is laid out for the public: what they must know, what is not possible 
to be known, what dependencies and presumptions are necessary for 
knowing, and so on.). In speaking of recessivity, we are pivoting towards the 
specific and structural relationships produced by the socio-historical 
definitions of knowledge and truth.  
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If the visibilising of uncertainty involves an ‘absent presence’, the other half of 
recessivity involves a kind of extension. As Žižek put it before, recessive 
objects are what we use to stretch our thinking, believing, opinionating far 
beyond our body, our experience, our ego. And that extension is precisely 
what creates gaps. Although objects like the Snowden files visibilise absence, 
secrecy, the unknown, they can hardly be said to have paralysed the public, 
or rendered them ignorant. This is not to simply say the human, who ‘knows’ 
the world, now knows quantitatively ‘more’, as if a hard drive that copied in 
more bits of data. It’s about how the very way we think we ‘know’ things, and 
what kind of experience ‘knowing’ feels like, gets stretched, distributed, 
rewired. Recessive objects depict a landscape of mediating objects, always 
both material and semiotic, whose ability to associate invocations, ability to 
provide a sense of presence, ability to visibilise that which is beyond itself, 
allows us to reach out into the uncertain and the unknown in these variegated 
ways. Recessive objects thus constitute one generic mechanism for 
interweaving feelings of knowing and uncertainty. 
 
Extended and distributed subjectivity has been a central trope in recent 
conceptualisations of new media. The proliferation of new technologies for 
knowledge production and sensory access has given rise to a range of 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
posthumanist ideas about how human experience is ‘engineered’ – that is, not 
merely augmented or supported, but shaped and generated prior to human 
reflection or action – by these new technologies. Thus Mark Hansen argues 
that new media, or ‘twenty-first century media’ [21CM] as he calls it, are 
distinct because their engineering of human experience entirely bypasses, occurs 
prior to, and in sensory regions inaccessible by, the human subject (2015, p37). In 
Hansen’s philosophy, media are not simply ‘tools’ to be wielded purposefully 
by humans; neither are they limited to augmenting human action and the 
senses. These technical objects observe, collect data on, indeed ‘sense’ the 
world at a level which human subjects have no access to. A galvanic skin 
response [GSR] sensor might constantly observe and record this measure as a 
proxy for stress levels, but the wearer him/herself has no access to such 
‘machinic sensibility’ (i.e. its ability to sense and collect data on the world) – 
and, importantly, could never access something like GSR in real time through 
its own sensory faculties.28 21CM yield data that is qualitatively beyond 
human experience and quantitatively beyond human grasp (something we 
typically call the problem of ‘big data’) – leading to new mediative structures 
for managing this surplus. This situation yields, Hansen argues, a “dispersed, 
                                                          
28 GSR is a part of continuous variation in skin conductance – a variation that is known to be 
sensitive to human activity (such as differences between sleeping and highly active states), 
but cannot be detected by the conscious subject except in extreme cases. 
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environmental, non-subject-centered subjectivity” (ibid., p87) whose 
conscious experience is always the product of infiltration by forms of 
technical engineering. Variations upon this theme have been floated by other 
scholars, often in terms of the (qualified) agency of technical objects. The idea 
is that media can and do function totally independent of human subjects (e.g. 
Parikka 2011; Hörl 2015); that technology is not just an extension of man, but 
produces and operates inhuman processes (Zielinski 2006, p6). The price or 
consequence of recessivity is knowing but not knowing for myself, sensing 
but not sensing for myself.  
 
Taken wholesale, such a narrative would place the Snowden Affair as part of 
a broader shift towards machinic sensibility, carried through by the massive, 
automated dragnet surveillance technologies. But we should be cautious 
about such grand historical narratives. After all, there are many pre-21st 
century, pre-electronic technologies that similarly undercut and bypass 
human sensibility. Friedrich Kittler’s famous analysis of the phonograph 
(1986) describes precisely how sound becomes recorded and manipulated as 
physical waves and noise, rather than any kind of articulation. Each 
‘primitive’ technological creation, like the hammer or the chair, is already a 
material-semiotic figuration (á la Haraway 1991) of processes, intentions, 
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power relations that offer the pharmacological bargain of extension and 
absence (also see Scarry 1985). The point is not that recessivity is entirely 
novel, but that the arrival of new media technologies entails the 
reorganisation of specific recessive process. In the context of the Snowden 
Affair, this involves the ambiguous functions pegged onto state surveillance, 
which becomes at once a breakthrough in knowledge production and a new 
source of secrets and speculation.  
 
*** 
 
And so we turn to the question of how recessivity plays out in this context of 
automated, electronic, dragnet surveillance technologies. The recessivity of 
the Snowden files is fundamental to both the object of surveillance – that is, 
what surveillance seeks to know, to predict – and surveillance itself as object – 
as problem, as something to be known. In other words, the recessivity of 
electronic dragnet surveillance is not merely an artefact of the emergent 
conditions of the Snowden Affair, but grounded deeply in how surveillance 
had been defined and problematised in the post-September 11 years.  
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
First and foremost, there is the object of surveillance: the recessive, elusive 
thing that necessitates surveillance as a technology of knowledge production. 
Surveillance is about rendering knowledgeable that which prefers to remain 
secret. In the case of NSA surveillance, this object is, of course, terrorism. 
Years before this new generation of surveillance could become something to 
be defended or attacked in public, the NSA was making its case to the rest of 
government that terrorism had become radically unpredictable and diffuse, 
and that this qualitative transformation of the danger faced by America 
required a new paradigm in surveillance as well. In October 2002, a joint 
House/Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing (which was made public) 
heard a Joint Inquiry Staff statement (Hill 2002), reflecting on counter-
terrorism efforts between 1993 and September 11. It presented a clear 
narrative of terrorism’s evolution in the 90s, from state-supported, limited 
(targeted) casualty attacks to stateless, flexible, more secret, more 
meticulously planned, indiscriminately high-casualty attacks. This “new 
breed of terrorists practicing a new form of terrorism” (ibid., p6) was already 
being identified within the intelligence community at least as early as the 
mid-1990s. The statement cites a July 1995 National Intelligence Estimate 
speaking of violent, generally Islamic, non-sponsored terrorists. (ibid., p7) The 
U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism (formerly 
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Patterns of Global Terrorism report) also indexes this shift in thinking: 
whereas state sponsorship is the key explanation for rise and fall of terrorist 
attacks in the early 1990s, the reports placed a progressively greater emphasis 
radical Islamic groups (US Department of State 1996), ‘freelance, transnational 
terrorists’ (1997), and eventually, ‘loosely organised, international networks of 
terrorists’ (2000).29 The rise of 21st century dragnet surveillance was thus 
predicated on the identification of what I call here ‘New Terrorism’ – 
although this paranoia, once again, recalled even earlier fears about the 
unpredictable and untraceable infiltration of communist threats in the mid-
20th century (see Melley 2012).  
 
The response to September 11 by many top figures in the NSA and the 
executive branch of the government catalysed this perception of ‘changing, 
increasingly elusive terrorism’ into a realist injunction to surveillance. The 
simmering, longer-term idea that terrorism was slipping out of the U.S. state’s 
predictive grasp now became a forceful statement of external, objective 
necessity for indiscriminate observation. The first major post-9/11 effort, the 
                                                          
29 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, of course, this more flexible enemy at least had a clear 
organisational designation of Al-Qaeda. But as ‘lone wolf’ attacks grew in prominence, and 
Al-Qaeda itself declined in its singular status (through the death of Osama Bin Laden, the rise 
to notice of other groups like ISIS/ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Shabaab), the enemy as perceived 
became truly granular and distributed.  
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ill-fated ‘Total Information Awareness’ program, stated as much: “there will 
always be uncertainty and ambiguity in trying to understand what is being 
planned” (Poindexter 2002), it was argued, but given the largest possible 
collection of data, the terrorist’s ‘unique transaction signature’ can be 
extracted. Knowledge is possible – as long as you have ‘all’ the dots on hand 
(Harris 2010, p147-8). The program thus promised biometrics analytics (HID); 
semantic analysis of text (TIDES); speech-to-text conversion for collecting and 
analysing auditory communications (EARS); and of course, the Big Ass 
Graph. Metadata surveillance wasn’t a luxury; it was just what you had to do 
to keep up with the reality out there.30 Knowledge production had to keep 
abreast of new uncertainties, new dangers. In the public domain, one popular 
explanation for 9/11 became the intelligence agencies’ failure to coordinate 
and ‘connect the dots’ (Hill 2002; also see Harris 2010). Although this was 
criticised by some as simplistic (e.g. the 9/11 Commission Report (2004)), such 
debriefings helped present a sense of necessity for surveillance that was more 
comprehensive, more powerful, more, more, more. The political and material 
                                                          
30 This hunger is not simply a default modality for intelligence agencies. Mike Hayden, then 
Director of the NSA, was hesitant to support metadata surveillance tools like ThinThread 
before September 11 due to an entrenched sense of caution since Watergate (Bamford 2008). 
Although metadata collection and mass surveillance of communications media existed in 
various forms throughout 20th century America, the specific rise of the kinds of tools 
Snowden has exposed came as a result of a heightened sense of uncertainty and danger, and 
correspondingly, a perceived need for revolutionary solutions.  
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consequences of this narrative included the creation of over 70 Fusion 
Centres31 nationwide; a vast monetary injection rejuvenating the NSA, which 
before September 11 had been suffering from a slow decline in funding and 
influence; and a series of ‘collect em all’ online surveillance solutions, from 
Total Information Awareness to Snowden-era programs like XKEYSCORE 
and PRISM. The American public was told that it was necessary to turn to 
bulk collection, mass surveillance, indiscriminate monitoring, more than ever 
– because there is an objective, realist uptick in the danger of terrorism, and 
its qualitative transformation to spread its seeds more pervasively and 
covertly than ever. This narrative of ‘new’ terrorism would persist in 
subsequent years, becoming increasingly centred on the figure of the ‘lone 
wolf’.32 In 2015 as much as 2001, a flexible threat, a fluid world, was seen to 
demand a totalising gaze.  
 
Such a worldview did not emerge from a vacuum. The pairing of national 
security and total surveillance has numerous predecessors on both sides of 
the Cold War, from McCarthyist America to East German intelligence. 
                                                          
31 Fusion Centres are physical hubs for consolidating CCTV, license plate reader and other 
surveillance information from local and federal, private and public sources.  
32 Consider, for example, Barack Obama’s designation of mass shootings by unaffiliated 
individuals as the direct heir to ‘complex, multifaceted attacks like 9/11’ in the wake of the 
San Bernardino shootings in December 2015 (Obama 2015). 
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Indeed, the Stasi articulated their problem of ‘too much data’ in much the 
same terms the NSA would decades later; joined by a wide network of 
unofficial informants, they took the strategy of ‘collect first, analyse later’, and 
found that too much data was interfering their ability to produce useful 
knowledge (Angwin 2014, Wensierski 2015). Alongside this political heritage, 
New Terrorism was part of a broader problem posed by the Internet and its 
upsetting of traditional boundaries for communication and public formation. 
In this same period, the maturation of the Internet as a popular technology 
produced vast crowds with communicative and informational capacity, such 
that many traditional ways of ‘knowing’ this multitude as a population was 
felt to be obsolete and inadequate. Even as data-mining technologies offered 
corporations and advertisers a new hope for knowing the population as 
consumers, the same set of technologies were being taken up by agencies like 
the NSA as a way to keep up with the networked population of potential 
terrorists. These connections are not meant to imply a centralised intention 
governing the rise of data-driven solutions across states and corporations. 
Previous studies of such broader ‘rationalities’ have shown that new 
epistemological tools and principles often emerge as little ‘islands’ (Foucault 
2006, p4) – localised solutions to local problems that, when viewed 
retroactively, turn out to ‘invent’ similar ways of doing using similar kinds of 
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techniques.33 In this case, the turn to call big data, both state and corporate, 
was intended to address a significant and new unknowability in the 
population, an unknowability that was threatening to turn the masses into a 
threatening entity (a ‘hotbed’ of terrorists and dormant lone wolves, a 
consumer population unable to be monetised). Like the fear of the urban 
multitude of strangers that inspired 19th century crowd psychology, 
perceptions of an uncontrolled and unknown proliferation was central in the 
post-September 11 evolution of surveillance as knowledge production.  
 
In short, post-9/11 electronic mass surveillance developed, and justified itself 
internally and externally, by invoking a new kind of uncertainty in the world 
out there; the upgraded, twenty-first century bogeyman of the transnational 
Muslim extremist (and, increasingly, the radicalised lone wolf). Certainly, 
terrorism’s modus operandi has always been to be unpredictable, to function 
in ways that cut underneath the system of expectations and defences erected 
by conventional warfare. But the older figure of the state-sponsored, 
organised terrorist suddenly appeared relatively stable, relatively easier to 
                                                          
33 Histories of science and technology have similarly identified many broader epistemological 
frameworks – for instance, the definition of ‘sound’ and ‘noise’ (Thompson 2002) – as 
emerging through disparate, independent efforts to solve local problems that later find 
connections and similarities. This perspective is, of course, emblematised by Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) and Ludwig Fleck (1979). 
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‘know’, in comparison with the new world order. This is the first sense in 
which Snowden-era surveillance was founded on a projection of recessivity.  
 
An important corollary is that this generation of surveillance requires an 
unknowable and amorphous terrorist threat as its object, as its raison d’être. 
An epistemological solution often impresses its necessity precisely by 
emphasising the danger of its other. As discussed in Chapter 4, the now-
familiar ideals and practices of scientific objectivity arose in tandem with a 
new conceptualisation of the scientific subject. In our case, justifications for 
surveillance’s necessity and efficacy was dominated by future-oriented, 
potentialist arguments that leveraged the seemingly inexhaustible and 
irreducible threat of New Terrorism in order to persuade the public. This is, in 
fact, a rather tricky case to make: how do you assert the increasing 
unknowability of the Al-Qaeda bomber or the lone wolf, and at the same 
time, prove that new surveillance technologies render them significantly more 
knowable and preventable? The justifications themselves took on a recessive 
quality, pointing to the unknowable as the ground for verification. The idea 
was that surveillance is justifiable not because these particular people we 
have monitored ended up trying to bomb the White House, but because 
anybody (that is, everybody) could one day decide to do so, and if such a thing 
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happened in the future, we would be able to stop them. The non-occurrence of 
a posited event thus acts as an unfalsifiable proof of surveillance’s necessity, 
while the fundamental unknowability of the new terrorist requires that 
surveillance continue indefinitely and expand indefinitely. We will encounter 
specific articulations of such reasoning in Chapter 3. For now, suffice to say 
that the unknowability of terrorism is not just the enemy against which 
surveillance forms an epistemological bulwark; this technological solution has 
built its claim to efficacy and validity upon that same attributed uncertainty. 
 
Second, there is surveillance itself as recessive object. This secret practice was 
concealed, to various degrees, from the public, from Congress, from the 
judicial branch (save the FISC34, which itself remains secret). This system was 
designed to ensure that an individual will never be able to confirm whether 
and how he/she has (not) been surveilled. Surveillance required a vast 
material stratum – server farms, tens of thousands of employees – yet these 
too were concealed in access-restricted, remote locations. And yet, as we have 
seen, the world could not stop talking about (and being told about) it. 
                                                          
34 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is a curious creature. While it exists solely to 
provide judicial oversight to surveillance activities, the court’s proceedings are held in secret 
– meaning no victim or concerned citizen may raise any kind of objection – and the court 
itself, by its own admission (Leonnig 2013), does not have the ability to audit intelligence 
agencies’ activities. The Court thus operates by the surreal logic of ‘given what the NSA have 
told us about what they are doing, we judge that it is legal/not legal’.  
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“Surveillance”, “mass surveillance”, “metadata”, “bulk collection” – these 
buzzwords index a public relationship to a secretive technological apparatus 
that continually announces (or is made to announce) its existence and 
significance, but in doing so, stresses its own fundamental unknowability. A 
part of this is down to the basic epistemological and technological principles 
that define NSA surveillance as a practice. Electronic surveillance’s claim to 
objective knowledge is founded on the subject being unaware that they are 
being watched in any specific way. The point is to capture the secret truths of 
individuals that they would conceal and mask in the eyes of others. To 
contrast this to a more ‘traditional’ form: American police surveillance, 
especially with regards to poorer black communities from the 1970’s onwards, 
have adopted strategies by which the targets are made to constantly 
encounter the naked violence of the state: house raids, summons to court, 
loud patrols, pat downs, urine tests (e.g. Goffman 2014). In that modality, 
surveillance is in your face (and all over the rest of your body): the point is 
not only to ferret out undesirable aspects of the population, but to impress 
upon you the power the police has over you. You may never know if an NSA 
agent has read your e-mail (or if their system has automatically collected its 
metadata), but you will certainly know if the police has questioned your 
family. There is no simple binary here, of course. Police violence is also a way 
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to breed docile subjects that voluntarily discipline themselves in 
remembrance of authority – and it is not inconceivable that digital 
surveillance in the future could similarly visibilise itself.35 The point is that 
electronic surveillance as we know today relies on a certain recessivity to do 
its job, and that such configurations of how surveillance appears to the public 
has repercussions for what kinds of affective and epistemological relations we 
are likely to form with it. We find a formally comparable shift in Foucault’s 
history of discipline and punishment (1995), when it documents the passage 
from the spectacular public punishment of the regicide Damiens to the 
exhaustively documented, examined, trained bodies of the carceral 
archipelago. There, one of the key differences was how punishment was 
meant to appear unto subjects’ affects and reason. With Damiens, the design 
was that subjects would carry away the gory scene with them, back to the 
streets, alleys and homes where the state could not follow (including 
Foucault’s famous ‘margins of tolerated illegality’ (ibid., p82-3)). The body of 
the condemned made appear a presence of the sovereign, and reminded 
subjects of their own vulnerability to that state sovereignty. In 18th century 
prisons and workshops, we find a structural production of docile bodies and 
                                                          
35 Indeed, there is constant speculation that now Snowden has brought so much scrutiny to 
agencies like NSA and GCHQ, the organisations are now seeking to use this new visibility to 
their advantage. For instance, the NSA has sought to control the release of some information 
on its own terms through the IC on the Record website.  
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souls across a local totality of time and space, such that the subject would 
always already be classified into deviant and normal (at least, ideally). In the 
time of Snowden, a recessivity is built into the very design of the surveillance 
apparatus, because its basic operation depends on that withdrawal. This is 
part of the reason that uncertainty persists even after the leaks. At least 
Orwell’s Big Brother had the courtesy of telling you exactly how it is watching 
you everywhere, blazoning its aesthetics all over the urban environment. 
Today, we are left to wonder. 
 
Recessivity is thus fundamental to how the Snowden Affair, and beyond that, 
state surveillance in the age of ‘New Terrorism’ has been defined, justified, 
problematised, condemned. The recessivity of documents is only one aspect 
of a general situation wherein expansive bureaucracies, automated 
technologies, ‘big’ databases too big for humans to grasp, the apparent 
unknowability of New Terrorism, and the desire for a ‘raw’, objective truth 
about the population all combine to produce felt uncertainties. What an 
incident like the Snowden Affair does is grant a heightened visibility and 
public significance to a latent and structural paradox, because involved 
parties are pushed and tested on their claims to knowledge so strongly. We 
may now proceed to the other recessive objects populating this conflict, and 
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in doing so, examine the different, contingent ways in which the public, the 
state, the terrorist, and surveillance technologies are arranged into recessive 
relations.  
 
THE LONE WOLVES 
He was a dude you could always just vibe with. He liked The Walking 
Dead and Game of Thrones. He couldn’t have been sweeter. He smoked a 
copious amount of weed. He won a $2,500 dollar educational 
scholarship. He was one of the realest dudes I’ve ever met. He was just 
superchill. He was smooth as fuck. He was not a loner. He’s not 
anybody like that. I mean, he was quiet – but not in an alarming way, he 
was just soft-spoken. He’s a Muslim, but not so religious. He was so, so 
normal, no accent, an all-American kid in every measurable sense of 
the word.  
 
He stopped listening to music. He quit drinking and smoking pot. (He 
started praying more, and visiting Islamic websites.) He became anti-
fun. (He went to Dagestan for six months.) He grew a beard. He 
criticised U.S. foreign policy. “There are no values anymore,” he once 
said. He would start failing classes. In the aftermath, we know that we 
never really knew him. The contents of his closely guarded psyche may 
never be fully understood. It’s weird, they all agree. But I can’t feel that 
my friend is a terrorist. That Jahar isn’t, to me. 
 
*** 
 
Such were the words of friends, acquaintances, investigative reporters, 
professors and police workers – the authoritative ‘experts’ in such a situation 
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– about Tamerlan and Dzhokhar ‘Jahar’ Tsarnaev.36 They were the ‘Boston 
bombers’ – two Chechen-born, long-time Massachusetts resident brothers 
who exploded pressure cooker bombs at the Boston marathon just two 
months before the first Snowden leaks. And in the wake of their actions, there 
was a frenetic public effort to narrativise, rationalise, render knowable, this 
apparent cohabitation of radical terrorism and ‘normal’ American life. Where 
Tamerlan had already become distant and conservative after the premature 
end of his boxing career, witnesses emphasised how Dzhokhar would watch 
HBO shows, smoke weed with (white, well-adjusted) mates, enrol in extra-
curricular activity – as if such things should have marked him as a normal 
American citizen, and more than that, a ‘normal’ human being whose thoughts 
and emotions we can thereby predict. As if to say: listening to the same music I do 
might not dictate his political or religious outlook, but at least I know that, by 
the broadest of brushstrokes, he will see the world as I do, that he will value 
another human’s life as I do, that he will not be fooled completely by 
conspiracy theories, that he will see September 11 as tragedy and not as farce 
(Jahar allegedly subscribed to the theory of 9/11 as an inside job). In the same 
                                                          
36 Each comment was sourced from such an ‘expert’ as reported in the media (Stout & 
Goodison 2013; CBS News 2013; Coffey et al. 2013; Henderson 2013; Reitman 2013), with 
minor grammatical corrections for consistency. Put together, they depict not a clear 
understanding of ‘Jahar’ or his brother Tamerlan, but the general contours of a question, an 
unknowability.  
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way that America’s presidential candidates stuff themselves with hot dogs on 
the campaign trail, there is an identification of a basic humanness that allows 
us to try and say this person is safe, this person is not a criminal, terrorist, 
serial murderer, child molester. This, as shown in the phenomenological 
tradition (for instance, see Husserl’s assimilative apperception (Ricoeur 1967, 
p129)), is how we try and overcome our fundamental solipsism. We can never 
truly know what people really think about Islam, America, race, war, deep 
inside; but we still try to identify this ‘basic humanity’ – to be able to say, this 
person is like us, and we can trust that he will not be this radical, terrifying, 
and in some ways, inhuman danger – not if he can sit and vibe with us like 
this, not when his English is so perfect. Except, of course, he was.  
 
Individuals like the Tsarnaevs were so problematic for security actors and 
observers because they confounded the perennial (and never quite successful) 
effort to cleanly categorise enemies from allies, threats and suspects from 
normal citizens. When the killer comes from the desert, armed with violent 
motive, but also trained, equipped, and identified by a recognised group, 
understanding comes readily: this individual’s being is entirely, and from the 
beginning, coterminous with violent terror. The category is him (and it is 
almost always a ‘him’ – statistically so, and especially in the public 
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imagination). To know ‘Jahar’, on the other hand, requires a narrative of a 
switch, a doubling. He must have begun as a benign, real American – and 
then somehow changed into a killer. Something must have made him trade 
pot for bombs. Or perhaps he had always harboured, in the schizophrenic 
folds of a duplicitous soul, a Jihadi mind. This has been called the problem of 
the Double – an ancient figure of folklore which, in this modern rendition, 
describes the infection of the unknown, the other, the dangerous, in precisely 
what we try to cordon off as safe and predictable (Szpunar 2015).37 Here, the 
problem of security – of guaranteeing the safety of certain peoples, areas, types 
– becomes intimately tied to the problem of knowing. The dogged efforts to 
resolve Jahar’s psyche into a neat narrative of belonging, or to locate the exact 
moments and incidents that might have ‘caused’ his transformation into 
terrorist, reflects this idea that a terrorist that cannot be known cannot be 
predicted, and thus presents an unknown danger with a powerful absent 
presence.  
 
But why were the likes of Jahar so difficult to know, to predict? One problem 
was that they had not belonged to any terrorist organisation, no existing 
                                                          
37 This shift is also germane to the history of how Westphalian nation-states have demarcated 
the nation from its enemies. The shift of the locus of terrorist danger from the outside to the 
inside replicates the early 19th century transition of the notion of ‘war’ from an external affair 
to a broader set of conflicts marked by the Other’s infiltration into the inside (Foucault 2003).  
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network of suspicious acquaintances. The post-9/11 period has seen a series of 
high-profile attacks by such individuals, which the media, academia, and the 
state in turn characterised as the lone wolf. While the label enjoys no single 
definition, and is often criticised as ill defined (e.g. Spaaij 2012), we might 
point to a widely used description from the intelligence firm STRATFOR: “a 
person who acts on his or her own without orders from – or even connections 
to – an organisation” (Burton & Stewart 2008). The label itself originated in 
the 1990s with Alexis Curtis and Tom Metzger, two white supremacists who 
espoused the ‘evolution’ of their struggle from organised, and therefore easily 
identifiable, groups to individuals that could ‘act alone and leave no 
evidence’, ‘act silently and anonymously’, and thereby preserve the secrecy of 
themselves and others.38 By the later 2000s, the Lone Wolf had become a 
prominent figure in narrativisations of domestic terrorism; in 2009, the US 
government announced the so-called ‘Lone Wolf Initiative’ (also see Michael 
2012). By then, the problem was already being defined in terms of ‘knowing’ 
the deepest and thus most unknowable aspects of the individual’s psyche: 
“How do you get into the mind of a terrorist?” (Fields & Perez 2009) The 
figure of the lone wolf was seen as part of a historical trajectory, part of the 
                                                          
38 For more, see (Aryan Vanguard 2012; Anti-Defamation League n.d.). This development had its 
own context: far-right leaders like Louis Beam in the 1980s had already been touting 
‘leaderless resistance’ as the next step to their struggle.  
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turn to New Terrorism: although much terrorism remained tied to clearly 
identified organisations like Al-Qaeda, the lone wolves depicted a new 
outbreak of unpredictable and solitary violence. In other words, the figure of 
the lone wolf marks a qualitative shift in imaginations of terrorist danger. As 
we can see with Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the uncertainty that plagues the lone 
wolf concerns not simply the generic threat of terrorism or violence, but a 
more viral danger: a diffused vulnerability to the smallest of human units, 
where just a single outwardly normal youth is enough (Simon 2013). The lone 
wolf, then, is a ghost, a figuration, of that which lies outside the 
epistemological systems of surveillance, security and suspicion. Like the 
residual in statistical analysis, it expresses the indeterminate danger that 
remains after every effort to predict and prevent. This fear of an 
indiscriminately distributed potential for terrorism would feed into the idea 
that state surveillance, too, must become more comprehensive, more 
indiscriminate, and infinitely data-hungry. 
 
The lone wolf thus names the apparently new and radical uncertainty 
appended to the traditional danger of terrorism. Yet at the same time, the lone 
wolf is the object of academic, state and popular effort to ‘figure it out’ – to 
fold this alien threat back into the domain of the knowable. After all, policy, 
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deliberation, or even a sense of control is difficult when one can only speak of 
unknowns. To leave the lone wolves entirely mysterious is to continue 
producing a sense of vulnerability.39 The result is that even as the lone wolf is 
a recessive object, a name standing in for the unidentifiable, it also becomes 
the locus for a belief in knowability. High-profile attacks in the early 2010s40 
have been met by studies which seek statistically significant, and thereby 
predictive, variables for the lone wolf. The kinds of questions they begin by 
asking already express the hope that surely, like other dangers and threats, we 
shall be able to render the lone wolf knowable: ‘what are the demographic 
characteristics of the lone wolf?’ What are its ideologies? How are they 
different from other groups? (Gill et al. 2014) Such questions, however, 
tended to yield results that testify to the sheer genericity and improbability of 
the lone wolf. One sampling (ibid.), for example, shows that lone wolves in 
the United States have a higher than populational norm chance of living 
alone, have changed their address and/or lost their job in the 12 months 
preceding the attack, and records of criminal behaviour or mental health 
                                                          
39 This is a structural, epistemological variant of what, in an affective register, Lauren Berlant 
calls the ‘unbearable’ (Berlant & Greenwald 2012). 
40 The most prominently covered tragedies – Andres Breivik in 2011, the ‘Boston Bombings’ in 
2013, Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan shootings in 2015, the San Bernardino shootings in 2015 – 
were joined by a series of attacks upon American military and government buildings (Little 
Rock recruiting office 2009, Fort Hood 2009), Muslim / anti-Muslim sites (an attempted 
bombing of a Florida mosque 2010), and others, such as attacks on Planned Parenthood in 
2010, 2012 and 2015.  
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problems. Yet each of these factors are possessed by less than half of these 
proven lone wolves. Should the state put under watch a man who loses his 
job and separates from his partner? Or a man whose problems with 
depression has put him out of his last job? Similarly, the studies seek to isolate 
lone wolves’ ‘unique psychological and motivational factors’ (Eby 2012, p11), 
typically founded on a ‘faulty’ – that is, non-normative – environment. Hence 
one study insists that Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph are 
united by a ‘repeated failure’ to belong (Springer 2009), while another speaks 
of a ‘difficult childhood’ and ‘changes in personal behaviour’ (Kaati & 
Svenson 2011). Of course, many criminals are retroactively analysed for 
psychological problems in order to explain their behaviour – the idea being 
that something must have been wrong with them for this to happen.41 
Following the fall of Nazi Germany, for example, the victorious Allies 
conducted Rorschach tests on the eight most ‘serious’ surviving Nazis, 
including Hermann Göring and Adolf Eichmann. There, too, the results were 
inconclusive: no ‘Nazi traits’ that could predict totalitarian depravity could be 
identified (Lemov 2015). Whatever formal and general property extracted 
from existing lone wolves (e.g. experience of poverty, divorce, crime in the 
                                                          
41 Even excessive empathy can be conceptualised as a psychological fault: one study 
(McCauley & Moskalenko 2014) suggests that individuals can go from a ‘normal’, happy life 
to violent action because their latent, invisible radical opinions were catalysed by unusually 
extreme empathy (for instance, with something they have seen in the media).   
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family during childhood) ultimately proved insufficient to identify, predict or 
explain the lone wolf.  
 
In short, the effort to know yields little in the way of tell-tale signs, only 
‘many weak signals’ (Brynielsson et al. 2012) – signals that are too weak for 
traditional thresholds of suspicion or prediction. This is also consistent with 
the public presentation of lone wolf threats as a paradox: on one hand, so 
many signs seem so obvious now, but on the other hand, they never seem to 
add up to something concrete enough for prediction. Jahar Tsarnaev was 
failing his university courses, but, the story goes, he was popular with his 
Cambridge friends. This lack of ‘clear signals’ retains the lone wolf in a state 
of nonspecificity, and visibilises the failures of efforts-to-know, and even 
raises the spectre of total randomness, total unknowability. Instead of the ISIS 
member, the Al-Qaeda operative, the card-carrying white supremacist, the 
lone wolf expresses the latent potential for anybody to become a terrorist – a 
structural paranoia that is formally parallel to the paranoia of surveillance as 
conspiracy and of New Terrorism writ large. Not needles in a haystack, but 
that every piece of hay could become a needle when you look away. (This 
‘anybody’, of course, becomes recharacterised, approximated, to rule out 
certain demographics – say, the high earning, well educated white male. We 
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will return to this paradox below.) In other words, even as studies describe 
‘weak signals’ everywhere (Brynielsson et al. 2012), a constant and pervasive 
war of ideas between terrorism and the government (McCauley & 
Moskalenko 2014, p72), they also report that many lone wolf killers remain 
mysterious in their motivations and ideological allegiances, even after the act 
(Spaaij 2012). Thus, across academic and policy analysis (Bakker & de Graaf 
2010; Eby 2012; Gill et al. 2014; Spaaij 2012) and popular media coverage (e.g. 
of Man Haron Monis, instigator of the 2014 Sydney hostage crisis), there is an 
acknowledgement that the lone wolf does not boil down into a single profile, 
personality type, or even definition.   
 
The lone wolf, then, is a figuration of a particularly diffuse unknown. A 
cipher for the inevitable uncertainty, the residuals, the margins of error, that 
defy surveillance’s vision of total knowledge. And yet, recessivity is always a 
pairing: even as the lone wolf is a figuration of the unknowable, this 
figuration is part of an extensive effort to nevertheless describe, characterise, 
classify. Assumptions and archetypes are smuggled in in disavowed form: 
‘the lone wolf is impossible to predict or identify, but even so…’ In this way, 
the ‘anybody’ of the potential terrorist is reduced down into, in this period, 
the Arab and Muslim (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko 2014; Pantucci 2011). 
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Broad geopolitical perceptions thus find their way into working 
approximations of a technically unpredictable group – to the point that ‘recent 
conversion to Islam’ alone (rather than religious fundamentalism in general, 
or specific extremist doctrines like Salafi jihadism) become cited as possible 
predictors for lone wolves (Kaati & Svenson 2011). In fact, many of the more 
prominent attacks by Muslim extremists in this period were by members of 
organised groups: September 11 was organised by Al-Qaeda, the November 
2015 Paris shootings executed by ISIS operatives. In at least one case (of Man 
Haron Monis), Islam was most likely a ploy for attention, and not the cause 
for which the attack was carried out. And until the last fifteen years, lone wolf 
attacks were more commonly by white supremacists than Muslim extremists 
(Spaaij 2012). To be sure, the threat of terrorism by Muslim extremists is very 
real for the United States. The point is that this relatively specific figure of the 
Muslim extremist starts to conflate with, and stand in for, the allegedly 
unknown lone wolf. This is exemplified by Mohamed Badguy, a fictional 
name used in NSA slides to provide examples of the targeting process 
(Gellman & deLong 2013b; see Fig.2). He is joined by a slightly less blatant 
cousin, “Mohammed Raghead”, which the NSA used as a placeholder for 
surveillance memo templates (Davidson 2014). The mainstream media has 
responded to the rising number of lone wolf attacks in post-9/11 America in a 
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similar way, though wielding a more varied set of stereotypes: Muslim 
extremists are joined by anti-Muslim extremists, while almost every lone 
killer is immediately dissected for signs of mental deviance. Scenarios, 
exemplars and simulations reveal much about what kinds of assumptions and 
provisional designations ‘stand in’ for the as-yet-unknown.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mohammad Badguy. 
 
Let us return to ‘Jahar’ Tsarnaev. The lone wolf as a problem of 
(un)knowability is central to the problem of the lone wolf as ‘double’, in the 
sense that the crisis of the threat as double is a crisis of intelligibility. As Jasbir 
Puar and Amit Rai (2002) show, the West’s discourse on the terrorist is often 
that of the human monster: an ancient frame for the disturbing entry of 
fundamentally unintelligible and strange deviance into the normal and the 
internal. The unknowability of the lone wolf is problematised precisely 
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because it threatens to collapse the erected boundaries between us and them – 
a boundary that is never perfect to begin with. Every ‘normal American’ trait 
possessed by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev challenges the epistemic techniques at 
hand. In other words, the lone wolf’s recessivity is a liminal and transgressive 
thing, because it cheats the boundaries between what is epistemologically, 
and politically, included and excluded. To speak a bit of Foucault, any regime of 
knowledge is defined by what it considers know-able and what it renders 
invisible and unsayable. This is not the distinction between what statements 
are accorded the status of truth or falsehood, but what kind of statements are 
even eligible for the claim to truth in the first place.42 Judith Butler (1997) 
derives from this a matrix of inclusion/exclusion: to be a subject is not 
necessarily to be what dominant power relations tell you to be, but to define 
your being in its terms. The price of refusing this bargain is not to become a 
resistant or alternative subject, but to become unintelligible. Neither true nor 
false, but not even a statement to begin with. As a label, an object of study, a 
category, the lone wolf describes American society’s effort to respond to the 
entry of the excluded – a being which transgresses the basic obligations of 
citizenship – by seeking ways to integrate this unknown into grids of 
                                                          
42 Though this is true of Foucault’s corpus as a whole, here I am referencing in particular his 
later efforts at ‘alethurgy’: a study of what people say that is true, but what are the conditions 
under which such speaking is seen to be possible (Foucault 2014). 
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intelligibility. With the Snowden files, we emphasised how the recessivity – 
the combination of appearance and dis-appearance – prevented a fuller sense 
of knowing, opening up space for speculation. With the lone wolf, we find 
that recessivity permits a technically unknown thing to be brought in for 
examination and analysis.  
 
In short: the lone wolf is about rendering the unknown visible, a matter of 
concern, a problem – and in doing so, using that very figuration to smuggle in 
working assumptions about what that unknown might be. This paradox of 
recessivity is precisely what renders the label useful: that is, something that we 
can make predictions with, that we can use to produce narratives, to at least 
gesture towards a future point of predictivity and thereby safety. The lone 
wolf is like a variable in an equation: the x and y could be anything, and the 
point is to try and construct a structure, a logical scaffolding, that allows this 
specifically unknown object to become usable for running calculations, 
assessing the situation, making decisions. It illustrates the ways in which 
uncertainty is not necessarily knowledge’s antithesis, but an ingredient for 
provisional and practical kinds of knowing. The unknown is not a pure void 
of meaning, but a space for filling in. 
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*** 
 
In the wake of the Snowden leaks, one of the most frequently cited arguments 
in defence of NSA surveillance was that those who have done ‘nothing 
wrong’ have nothing to fear (see Domestic Surveillance Directorate n.d.; Fig.3). 
The question is, of course, what counts as ‘nothing wrong’ in a surveillance 
epistemology which defines its enemy as a collection of ‘weak signals’ 
embedded within its citizens, and defines its mission as preventing criminals 
before they can become criminals (see Ledgett 2014; Massumi 2007) – to the 
point where agents are on record as encouraging, equipping and instructing 
individuals in order to arrest them (see Chapter 3, ‘Fabrication’)? For an 
individual to insist that they have done nothing wrong is rather besides the 
point; the politico-epistemic problem here is how, by whom, the definition of 
‘nothing wrong’ becomes modulated. Most crucially, where the debate 
revolves around recessive objects that are openly acknowledged to be partly 
speculative and uncertain, the normative assumptions governing those 
definitions can become difficult to recognise. In an analogous case, Torin 
Monahan (2010) shows how intensive surveillance in Phoenix, Arizona public 
housing units were justified – by wardens as well as some residents – by the 
same rationale of ‘nothing to hide’. And this very mode of reasoning, 
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Monahan shows, produces an implicit classification whereby certain kinds of 
foreign Others are presumed into ‘bad types’ or ‘bad sorts’, often without 
surveillance itself needing to produce any evidence. What is at stake is the 
unarticulated definition of the ‘normal’: what a normal citizen expects, what a 
normal citizen does in his/her private spaces (though of course it is supposed 
to be nobody’s business), what a normal citizen should be (un)comfortable 
with.  
 
 
Figure 3. A parody of the Utah Data Centre. 
 
Uncertainty and unknowability are, just as much as knowledge, subject to 
social processes of visibility and definition. To ‘know’ is often to forget the 
unknowns that it is founded on, or rather, to forget the conventions that have 
been erected to translate and approximate the unknown into the ‘sufficiently 
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known’. Recessive objects help us perform this task, even as they draw our 
attention to the uncertainty and the unknown, a ‘gap’ that they cannot quite 
close. But the relation of appearance/disappearance, presence/absence we 
have charted here is far from the only possible configuration. The very same 
kinds of technologies and epistemological principles can and do end up with 
a different arrangement of projected uncertainties. The next chapter examines 
how the source of unknowability shifts away from the terrorist ‘out there’ and 
inwards unto the self. While the NSA was bulking up its dragnets, personal 
experimenters and commercial start-ups were applying such technologies to 
the booming field of self-tracking. There, we find a formally comparable, but 
substantively different, configuration of knowledge and uncertainty – one 
which challenges the place of human agency and experience in the process of 
knowing. 
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2. Data’s Intimacy. 
 
 
“Walking, sleeping, talking: it’s the stuff of everyday life. Add sensors 
that track all of it, and suddenly everyday life becomes an opportunity 
for knowledge.” (Wingfield 2013) 
 
You sleep. A thin rectangular strip, slipped unobtrusively under the bedsheet, 
senses your arrival; your movement; your resting heart rate; respiration cycle; 
and more. The smart sensors on the strip collect the data and transmit 
through WLAN to the cloud for analysis (Leppäkorpi 2011). When you wake, 
your consciousness is greeted by a numerical sleep score on the smartphone 
app screen; a simple distillation of the many data points, and their estimated 
relationship to sleep quality, into a score out of a hundred.  
 
Beddit, released to the public in 2014, joined a wave of much hyped – and 
sometimes commercially highly successful – technological solutions for self-
surveillance and analysis that began to reach Western consumer markets in 
the 2010s. This device exemplifies a promise that is central to many of these 
instruments: a promise to mine the body for traces that the thinking, 
experiencing subject is incapable of sensing for him/herself. In Beddit’s case, it 
is the myriad physical signals that every body emits during sleep that are 
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automatically collected and analysed. Though older technologies also 
afforded such tracking capacities, these were cumbersome and expensive, 
often only available in clinical contexts. (A polysomnogram, typically used in 
sleep research, still requires belts around the chest and abdomen, electrodes 
over the face and scalp, and oximeter probes wound tightly round a finger.) 
Technologies like Beddit thus promise to measure what the subject cannot, 
and deliver ‘insights’ about the self beyond the reach of human intuition and 
experience. 
 
*** 
 
At one corner of the Herbst Pavilion, on the San Francisco waterfront, two 
white, blonde women were beckoning nearby flâneurs to their booth. On offer 
was a small, triangular device tied to a black strip, vaguely futuristic in its 
silver-white sheen (Fig.4). Just let it fire electrical pulses into your brain for a 
few minutes, they said; it can make you feel more active and productive, or if 
you prefer, calm and de-stressed. Several individuals were already huddled 
over the test smartphone, the device strapped to the temple. As I dialed up 
the intensity on the ‘Energy’ module, the strap seemed to fire rapid, stinging 
bursts into the head, producing a distinct ‘heaty’ sensation. One of the women 
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explained that just as you might use caffeine as a pick-me-up, this is a more 
direct and effective method of controlling and optimising your body and 
mind. My own experience, as far as I could tell, were less clear; a mix of 
novelty’s discomfort and a certain general feeling of tension. Yet if I doubted 
that this device was anything more than the snake oil of the new century, this 
proved nothing either way; after all, a device like Thync is designed to 
augment and regulate the subject beneath and before consciousness and its 
struggles. Thync promises, through new forms of data-driven surveillance, a 
self-knowledge with an immediate and practical impact over how we manage 
and control our own selves.  
 
 
Figure 4. The Thync headset. 
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Thync and Beddit, in fact, were both to be found at the Herbst Pavilion that 
day, having turned up for the 2015 Quantified Self conference. Quantified Self 
[QS], a community of self-tracking experimenters, was born in September 
2007 amongst two Wired editors; by 2015, it had spread to dozens of cities 
globally, with annual conferences in the US and Europe. While such a 
community is not coextensive with the self-tracking industry or market, the 
overlap and synergies have been significant. Crucially, QS was a breeding 
ground for an evolving set of ideals and predictions that tied tools like Beddit 
and Thync to a futuristic vision of an individualistic, objectively known, 
constantly improving, data-driven human. As Kevin Kelly, QS’ co-founder 
and a long-time evangelist for computing technologies, put it: 
 
The central question of the coming century is Who Are We? What is a 
human? […] Many seek this self-knowledge and we embrace all paths 
to it. However the particular untrodden path we have chosen to 
explore here is a rational one: Unless something can be measured, it 
cannot be improved (Kelly 2007). 
 
Even as concrete self-tracking devices were slowly making their way onto the 
market, QS was building a community of enthusiasts and do-it-yourself 
tracking experimenters that coalesced around the idea of ‘truly’ knowing the 
self through objective data. Gary Wolf, the other co-founder would make the 
case in such terms in a widely read New York Times piece: 
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Sometimes we can’t even answer the simplest questions. Where was I 
last week at this time? How long have I had this pain in my knee? How 
much money do I typically spend in a day? These weaknesses put us at 
a disadvantage. We make decisions with partial information. We are 
forced to steer by guesswork. We go with our gut. That is, some of us 
do. Others use data (Wolf 2010a). 
 
*** 
 
Uncertainty in the Snowden Affair resembled an infinitely receding horizon, a 
Matryoska doll without end. Whether it be the justification of state 
surveillance through the unpredictability of the lone wolf, or the recessive 
ways in which such surveillance itself becomes accessible for criticism, the 
problem and promise of knowing was defined precisely through the 
unknowns undergirding the logic of new terrorism, the systems of data-
driven surveillance, and the principles of state secrecy and public political 
‘participation’. But what happens to knowledge and uncertainty, to the 
distribution of veridical authority, to the definitions of what ‘counts’ as 
knowledge, when surveillance technologies are harnessed towards the 
individual’s personal quest for self-knowledge?  
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This chapter examines technological practices of self-surveillance in the early 
twenty-first century as a parallel development in data epistemologies. If state 
surveillance after September 11 directed and extended existing technological 
practices towards more heavily machine-automated, more persistent, more 
recessive systems, self-surveillance in that same period claimed two aspects in 
which they were ‘upgrading’ older technologies of self-inquiry: automation 
and intimacy. Across these tools, multiple stages of collection, archival, 
analysis and implementation would be automated through machines at an 
unprecedented scale. Heart rate variability or walking movements might be 
detected silently and autonomously; the tools might then make behavioural 
recommendations or directly send commands to home appliance of their own 
accord. This process would also cling to individuals with a new degree of 
proximity or intimacy. This meant not only devices close to the skin, but also 
devices which enter into the home or the bedroom, into the most socially 
invisible of daily habits, into the emotional and otherwise internal workings 
of the body. Hence we find tattoos embedded into the arm that senses 
physiological signals multiple times a second, or smartphone applications 
that silently monitor and extract data from sexual intercourse.  
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Contemporary discourse tended to bring all these together in a broad 
category of ‘self-tracking’ devices – or, taking the name of the movement, 
‘Quantified Self’ solutions. This category itself belongs to a loose nebula of 
emerging instruments. In this chapter, we call self-tracking any hardware or 
software solution that uses machinic sensors to surveil individual subjects’ 
everyday lives, from physiological signals to social habits. Such tools took the 
broader technological principles – ‘big’ data, machine learning, algorithmic 
decision-making – that had already transformed state surveillance and 
corporate data-mining apparatuses, and applied them to an everyday context 
of self-care. And with that technological transfer came an epistemic one. 
These new tools promised to uncover the kind of truths the human subject 
has traditionally been incapable of accessing. If state surveillance are 
leveraging new capacities for collecting and processing ‘big’ data to lay claim 
to greater knowledge and the elimination of uncertainty, today the public is 
being encouraged to surveil themselves through machines in the same way.  
 
One important difference between state and self surveillance of this period is 
that whereas the NSA had already implemented data-driven surveillance at 
an international level, self-surveillance remains a few years behind the curve. 
By the early 2010s, self-tracking was part big business, part big dreams. 
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Market estimates pegged the sale of ‘wearables’ – from fitness bands to 
smartwatches – at 15 billion USD in 2015 (CCS Insight 2015); the third quarter 
alone had seen over twenty million units shipped worldwide (International 
Data Corporation 2015; also see Lupton 2013a).43 By then, a number of high-
profile, relatively simple self-trackers had achieved millions of sales and a 
general public awareness. Fitbit, a wristband primarily based on its 
accelerometer sensor for movement detection, began to normalise a more 
data-driven and persistently surveilled attitude towards exercise. Meanwhile, 
the Apple Watch introduced a broad suite of sensor-based recommendations 
to its several million users. The Watch’s inclusion of optical heart rate sensors, 
pressure sensors and more was an extension of the important precedent set by 
the popularisation of smartphones in the late 2010s. Following the Apple 
iPhone in 2007, the spread of smartphones, stocked with an ever increasing 
number of sensors,44 helped equip large portions of the US population with a 
shared baseline of tracking functionalities at the hardware level. All this was 
catalysed by a convergence of relevant technological advancements. ‘Smart 
                                                          
43 Similarly, Deborah Lupton (2013b) argues that by 2012-13, the early frame of ‘weirdos’ and 
eccentrics in media representations generally gives way to enthusiasm about the ‘next big 
thing’ – one which is also starting to be taken up in schools, hospitals, worker productivity 
and other institutional contexts (2014). 
44 As of 2016, phones have been released, or prototyped, with accelerometers (movement and 
orientation); gyroscopes (angular rotation); magnetometers (metal); proximity sensors; 
ambient light sensors; heart rate monitors; DNA molecule detectors; air quality / gas sensors; 
barometers (atmospheric pressure); thermometers  and more.  
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sensors’, which typically include both sensors for input like light levels or 
acceleration, and microprocessors for handling signal input and algorithmic 
analysis before the data leaves the unit, had achieved the low power 
requirements, small size and affordability conducive to widespread 
deployment.45 Sensors also began to exploit the wider availability of wireless 
connections and cloud storage for two-way communications with more 
powerful machines (such as the user’s desktop). These real developments 
were understood by many contemporaries to be a long-awaited deliverance of 
their own technological imaginations. The boom in self-tracking was knitted 
into a grand narrative of the ‘Internet of Things’46 – itself a reprisal of 
ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence, and other theories of smart 
machines dating back to the 1980s and 90s.47 It was hailed as the tech trend 
                                                          
45 Discussions in the IEEE [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers] community also 
converge with this description – as going beyond representing the sensed phenomenon and 
towards the information’s integration into a network (Zhang et al. 2004). This distinction 
between ‘dumber’ and smarter sensors is widespread (e.g. Spencer Jr. et al. 2004). 
46 The Internet of Things thus designates a broader set of connected objects; our analysis is 
limited to self-trackers, insofar as their pursuit of automaticity and intimacy drives their 
particular epistemic impact. 
47 Both ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Things were coined by individuals at the 
intersection of commerce and R&D. For the former, it was Mark Weiser at the Xerox PARC 
laboratory, a major R&D centre with a history of landmark contributions to commercialised 
computing technologies; his thoughts on ‘invisible’ computing also influenced experiments 
with wearable computing in the 80s and 90s (Ryan 2014). For the latter, Kevin Ashton had 
been referred by his employer, the consumer goods giant Procter & Gamble, to the MIT 
Media Lab to work on RFIDs. Beyond the specific terms, visions of smart networks came 
hand in hand with work on what would become the world wide web during the 1980s – 
including the famous Coke machine in the Carnegie-Mellon computer science department 
building, which was coded to monitor its own stock in 1982 (Carnegie Mellon University n.d.), 
and was followed up by the Internet-connected toaster in 1990. Fictional and speculative 
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“that will define 2014” (Frog 2014); an innovation predicted to hit big time in 
2013 (Wadhwa 2013); a tech “about to go macro” (Brandon 2013), or even, one 
of the decade’s defining innovations that will have “invented the future” 
(Wired 2013). This hype was not entirely unjustified; several billion internet-
connected devices had already entered the market by 2015, and optimistic 
projections for growth (e.g. Gartner 2015; Rohling 2015; Evans 2011; see Fig.5.) 
were being backed by a majority of experts (e.g. Anderson & Rainie 2014).  
 
 
Figure 5. A CISCO Infographic in 2011. 
 
Our analysis, then, must navigate the many intersections between deployed 
practices and futurist rhetoric. If the former represents empirically concrete 
                                                          
visions of smart homes and experimental efforts at wearable machines themselves have a 
history reaching back the entire 20th century.   
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instances of public ‘uptake’ of these practices, the latter were also meaningful 
actions that sought to organise the public understanding of self-surveillance’s 
virtues and ideals. This chapter critically analyses the epistemic relations 
between ‘big’ data, ‘smart’ machines and human subjects by asking: what 
kind of knowledge becomes privileged as objective and accurate? Who, or 
what, is granted what kinds of veridical authority over the self? The object of 
analysis here is not the success and failure of this or that technology, but the 
ongoing history of what Foucault in his last works called alethurgy. 
“Etymologically, alethurgy would be the production of truth, the act by which 
truth is manifested”; not ‘what truth?’, but which actors and forms accrue the 
status of producing truth (Foucault 2011, p3). In our case, the question is how 
society organises the self’s ability to speak its truth, to make itself intelligible. 
In other words, the conditions under which individuals are encouraged to 
know themselves, and the technological design that configures their ability to 
datafy themselves, structure the ways in which we make ourselves intelligible 
to ourselves in the first place.48  
 
                                                          
48 This is what Foucault calls a regime of truth, “that which constrains individuals to these 
truth acts, that which defines, determines the form of these acts and establishes their 
conditions of effectutation and specific effects” (2014, p93). It is about the power relations and 
definitions of ‘truth’ that subjects sign up onto in order to claim ‘their’ truth (Velasco 2016); in 
other words, “every regime of truth requires the individuals who are implicated in it to 
engage in a specific self-constitution” (Lorenzini 2016). 
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This chapter proceeds in two broad phases. The first two sections examine 
dominant public presentations of self-tracking in early twenty-first century 
discourse. As we saw with Beddit and Thync, this discourse embraces a 
vision of automated and intimate surveillance, which is then promised to 
deliver superior control and objective knowledge over the self. Parallel to the 
analysis of state surveillance in Chapter 1, these sections consider what 
epistemic relationship, what definitions of knowledge and knowing subjects, 
is being presented to the public as appropriate to the new media society. The 
latter two sections take a more critical and historicised approach to explore 
alternative understandings of self-surveillance’s regime of truth. Insofar as 
this dominant vision is merely dominant and never universal, we find, both 
amongst hardcore trackers and its most vociferous critics, a ‘polytheism of 
scattered practices’ that lurk beneath the reigning interpretation (de Certeau 
1984, p48). I also address self-tracking discourse’s relentless focus on the 
present (and the future imagined by that present). Looking back to older 
technologies of self-knowledge – specifically, Antique self-writing and truth-
telling – can provide a schematic perspective over how twenty-first century 
self-tracking departs significantly from earlier efforts to ‘know thyself’. 
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DATA’S INTIMACY 
“Self-knowledge through numbers.” 
-The slogan of quantifiedself.com (Quantified Self n.d.) 
  
Yaroslav Faybishenko, a portfolio manager based in New York, was driving 
when his wife asked the most mundane of questions: had the baby wet 
herself? But that was when he realised “she was sitting in data” – data that 
could, should, and would be mined. Only a rigorous quantification of such 
data could produce objective insight, he thought; and only automated, 
machinic tracking could achieve such rigour (Hardy 2013). Such stories of 
‘awakening’, and the resulting hyperattentivity towards previously hidden 
aspects of the self, is littered throughout self-tracking discourse. This 
intersection of the personal and the objective was expressed through three 
interrelated narratives about the virtues of self-tracking. These promised 
virtues consisted of: (1) an unprecedented and empowering individualisation 
of knowledge, in part overcoming and in part supplementing the population 
as a unit of analysis; (2) an ubiquitous tracking environment that can capture 
the self and deliver objective and comprehensive self-knowledge largely 
independent from human guidance or awareness; (3) a democratised 
ownership of personal data that is currently being exploited by states and 
corporations. These narratives combined to promote a ‘healthy’ skepticism of 
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human intuition and experience, and a corresponding faith in machinic 
senses, in some of the most internal, private realms of the ‘self’.  
 
First, the advent of self-tracking was positioned as an individualising upgrade 
to the population as a unit of analysis and knowledge. The concept of 
population had developed in the 18th century as an effort to ‘know’ a human 
multitude that was threatening to grow beyond traditional means of 
approximation, especially lived intuition (e.g. Foucault 2004; Ruppert 2011). 
The data it provided for the ‘end user’ allowed the individual to compare 
him/herself to their proper category, or even to approximate one’s individual 
value when it could not be directly measured. In my fieldwork, many QSers 
framed their own motivation to self-track as arising from frustrations with 
this populational, averaging calculus.49 If people seem to respond to caffeine 
or cardio exercises in different ways, how can I figure out what ‘works’ for 
me? The idea was that self-tracking could answer, in ways that traditional, 
limited-sample populations could not (or could only roughly predict), how I 
                                                          
49 Such efforts echoed the backlash against statistical determinism as early as the 1840s – 
when, perceiving a similar ‘love of numbers’ across contemporary analyses, contemporaries 
complained that such knowledge could not answer the question of what will happen to me 
and what I must do now to better my chances (Hacking 1990, p145). That said, self-tracking 
does not sit opposite populational data, and often seeks to work together – e.g. using its 
personalised surveillance to build up a database of the ‘Quantified Us’ (e.g. Jordan & Pfarr 
2014). 
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personally would fare (e.g. Zemrani 2015). QSers frequently contrasted their 
solutions with a lifehacking technology of a previous generation: self-help 
and do-it-yourself books. They argued that whereas such techniques might 
insist on a one-size-fits all solution applied to a generalised cohort, QS would 
help you discover what protein shakes or fish oil is really doing in your 
specific, individual case (e.g. Swan 2013, p92; Wolf 2010b). The recurring 
insistence on a unique, individualised data point thus marks the promise of a 
particularly self-oriented (or, in the eyes of some commentators, ‘narcissistic’ 
(e.g. Bhatt 2011; Hesse 2008; Morga 2011)) knowledge. If Alphonse Quetelet 
had devised the average man, l’homme moyen, two centuries ago as an ideal 
fiction to understand each individual by, self-tracking practices endeavour to 
produce an individual without the spectre of that average – or, at least, 
produce an individual who is averaged within him/herself. 
 
This vision of individualisation through machines that delve deeply and 
precisely into the self was most pronounced in health and well-being 
tracking. Beddit, as we saw, offered an ability to persistently track sleep 
patterns in the individual’s natural habitat – something that existing clinical 
devices like polysomnograms could not offer. Devices designed for 
individual, consumer-level use grew in tandem with so-called ‘mHealth’ or 
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‘e-Health’ devices that would allow everyday self-tracking to communicate 
personal data to hospitals and healthcare practitioners. Sano Intelligence’s 
skin patches monitor the subject’s bloodstream for glucose and potassium 
levels, and automatically alerts his/her doctor if dangerous levels are reached; 
skin tattoos (mc10), wearable bandages (BodyGuardian) and biodegradeable, 
ingestible pills (Proteus) similarly began to extend the capacity for 
comprehensive, individualised data to the health and medicine industries. 
Here, self-tracking was seen to offer data “more ‘objective’ than the signs 
offered by the ‘real’, fleshly body and patients’ own accounts” (Lupton 2013a, 
p398). The importance of such knowledge was asserted on the basis that you 
need to know to have a ‘good’ – fitter, happier, more productive, more 
confident, self-aware, less stressed – life (also see Crawford et al. 2015; Lupton 
2012).  
 
Crucially, new technical capacities for persistent, automatic, proximity 
measurement also opened up kinds of data that were previously not subject 
to mass surveillance, from subjective ratings of mood to the exact size of each 
person’s social network (e.g. Mallett 2014). Where tracking technologies 
colonised new aspects of the human self for surveillance, its proponents 
consistently argued for the superiority of machinic accuracy and objectivity 
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over the educated ‘guessing’ of human subjects. Thus a vision of 
individualisation and ‘patient power’ intersected with a prioritisation of 
machinic senses over the human, albeit in a partial and specific sense (e.g. 
Swan 2012). If the key process in state and corporate surveillance is to extract 
highly individualised information for each and every person, self-tracking 
also seeks unprecedented frequency, immediacy and accuracy through its 
‘personalised’ observation. In Quetelet’s time, statistical norms and 
populational data evolved quickly from a method of approximation to a 
production line for ideal norms and ‘average men’ (see Hacking 1990). Today, 
self-surveillance contributes to a wider trend that has been called an 
‘unofficial resurgence’ of logical positivism (Lanier 2010, p155): a renewed 
confidence in the power of new, ‘big data’ technologies to deliver truth more 
objective than ever. 
 
 
Figure 6. The ‘universal monitoring solution’. 
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Second, self-tracking technologies increasingly turned towards an 
environmental and atmospheric form of everyday presence: a background. 
They were designed to become ‘part of the furniture’, rather than standing 
out as discrete and actively used tools, spatially bound archives, or specific 
and purposeful queries.50 By the early 2010s, devices were beginning to 
accompany users to the bed and the bathroom; in their walks up the stairs as 
well as runs in the park; in their phones and even, as we have seen, under 
their skin. Previously, measurement and its archival had typically been 
confined to specific and comparatively stable classes of objects and situations; 
the bathroom weight scale, the diary or journal, the doctor’s office, the 
desktop computer. The shift towards ubiquitous sensors and prosthetic 
devices entails a qualitatively distinct relation of surveillance. Consider 
‘Mother’. (Fig.6) This product offers small, nondescript ‘motion cookies’ that 
can be attached to domestic objects like toothbrushes and pill-boxes. The 
cookies’ motion, temperature and proximity sensors allow continuous 
monitoring of whether the keys have been picked up, or the front door has 
been opened. While each given implementation is rather nonspectacular, such 
                                                          
50 This kind of design objective was strongly influenced by commercial interests; industry 
actors commonly spoke of the importance of achieving ‘low maintenance’, ‘frictionless’ 
surveillance to win over the wider public to self-tracking practices (e.g. Holland 2013; Reeves 
2015). In another sense, the idea of background is closely tied to what we will describe as 
machinic sensibility: the production of ‘self’-knowledge by undercutting and bypassing 
human attention and activity.  
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tools point towards a domestic environment where tracking passes from a 
specific action to a general fact (also see Rettberg 2014): as one industry insider 
put it, a ‘planet with a nervous system’ (Hernandez 2012). 
 
Such environments extend the well-documented, Internet-age tendency 
towards a phenomenology of distraction and abundance (see Thrift 2011; 
Berry 2011; Wajcman & Rose 2011). By building a complexity of automated 
observations and communications across various sensors, the human user is 
positioned not as a centralised controller over each process but a responsive 
actor that is alerted, interrupted and otherwise ‘lead on’ by this ‘smart’ 
environment. No doubt each user, and each use situation, then develops its 
own conventions; some users will frequently exercise their sovereign right to 
override the analysis and recommendations, others will be habituated into 
their guidance, and yet others will simply ignore them. Yet in all cases, the 
design behind these implementations carry with them a set of epistemic 
affordances that cannot be ignored. Take another example – this time, one that 
is still slightly ahead of the curve of popular uptake, but still utilises 
technologies already being deployed across American homes in less 
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comprehensive ways. Tahl Milburn is a QS enthusiast51 who has designed and 
installed what he calls a ‘Life Automation System’ [LIAM] in his own home 
(Milburn 2015). There, USB sticks and other objects glow ambiently with a 
variety of colours – colours which correspond to a single ‘LifeScore’ derived 
from personally tailored and weighted variables. The score considers 
Milburn’s net worth; the market performance of his investments; weight; 
activity; sleep; age; and more. The colours thus act as a persistent, if 
backgrounded, reminder that he has 29 years of life remaining (estimated), or 
that his net worth has risen. In a similar vein, Ariel Garten – who appeared 
briefly in the Introduction in her involvement with Muse, the brain-tracking 
headband – put it to me terms of a “practice of noticing”; a machinic 
habituation of human attention that would cultivate the desired (in this case, 
productively focused) consciousness to begin with (2015, personal 
communication). Thus, such an environment is designed to make subjects 
forget their own condition of self-surveillance. In my fieldwork with QSers, 
many described their longer-term experience with tracking in similar terms; 
an experience where data, and its influence upon one’s habits, decisions and 
                                                          
51 Milburn is another example of the intersections between QS and the self-tracking industry, 
between personal and commercial interests. Having worked in consulting and management 
with internet technology companies, his experiments with LIAM – deliberately or emergently 
– led to a startup that was, as of writing, seeking to develop the system into business-targeted 
products.  
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interpretations, becomes backgrounded and ‘forgotten’. By the early 2010s, 
we find the commonly vocalised sentiment that self-tracking needs to 
improve its ability to hide in plain sight – easy to use, unobtrusive, hardly 
noticeable in most cases – to achieve truly widespread appeal (e.g. Hardy 
2013; Swan 2013, p88; Watson 2013b; Weintraub 2013). Even as self-
knowledge becomes more comprehensive and ubiquitous than ever, it also 
withdraws into the background and out of subjects’ conscious engagement.   
 
Finally, the individualisation of data was heavily connected to hopes for 
empowerment and ownership for self-trackers. It was not uncommon for QSers 
and self-trackers to position themselves as analogous to Stewart Brand and 
the countercultural influence upon computing between the 1960s and 1990s 
(Turner 1996; also see Sharon 2016). Just as those ‘hippies’ took a military-
industrial technology and helped produce a culture of personal computers 
and ‘digital utopianism’, self-trackers would act as vanguards for turning the 
tide of data towards empowerment and democratisation: personal computing 
‘all the way in’ to the self (see Watson 2013a, p11). In 2011, at the very first 
Quantified Self conference, Gary Wolf introduced the movement in these very 
terms: 
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We saw a parallel to the way computers, originally developed to serve 
military and corporate requirements, became a tool of communication. 
Could something similar happen with personal data? We hoped so 
(Wolf 2011). 
 
In this vein, it was argued that self-tracking could become a way to take ‘back’ 
our data that states and corporations have been using against us. 
 
…why shouldn’t you have access to the traces of your own behavior 
that you leave behind and that others collect? […] ‘It’s more of a 
cultural shift,’ she says. ‘It’s about creating a culture where we own 
this data. This data is ours.’ (Walker 2010)  
 
Such sentiments were shared across a broad coalition of actors, from QSers to 
journalists and user testimonials. One entrepreneur, whose company provides 
microbiome analysis services for individuals, depicted a trajectory whereby 
the individual was formerly left at the ‘periphery’ of the traditional health 
process, crowded out by experts: now, “I test things on myself, I know what is 
happening, I am not the body that the scientific and medical establishment 
acts upon” (Brouwer et al., 2015). Laurie Frick, an engineer-turned-artist who 
promises “a glimpse into a future of data about you” (Frick n.d.), vocalises a 
rather pragmatic attitude: “I think people are at a point where they are sick of 
worrying about who is or isn’t tracking their data […] I say, run toward the 
data. Take your data back and turn it into something meaningful” (Urist 2015) 
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– in her case, personal data diagrammed into art. It’s your data, many self-
trackers insisted, so surely you should get as much use out of it as the others 
do.52  
 
Indeed, self-tracking’s narrative of ownership was framed in terms of wider 
public debates around the exploitation of personal data. Most individuals 
sufficiently interested in their own data to attend QS meetings, or even simply 
purchase ready-made devices like the Fitbit, would have been keenly aware 
of contemporaneous controversies regarding not only the Snowden Affair 
and state surveillance, but corporate data-mining. By the 2010s, increasingly 
sophisticated techniques for extraction and analysis of online communications 
data had intersected with a thriving advertising market, leading to fears of a 
‘personalised’ web and automatised, algorithm-driven discrimination of 
customers at a mass scale (e.g. Turow 2011; Cheney-Lippold 2011; Pasquale 
2015b). With all this as background, self-tracking enthusiasts often argued 
that if everybody is going to measure us anyway, we might as well accept the 
situation and make the best of it (e.g. Finley 2013; Havens 2014, p53). The 
                                                          
52 Contemporaneously, similar sentiments were being expressed in other sites of data 
exploitation. Some musicians have argued that they should actively take ‘ownership’ of their 
data – which, in practice, means collaborating with corporate data-mining, and then finding 
ways to leverage that information to optimise their own strategies for monetisation (e.g. 
Meyer 2012). 
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rhetoric of individualised control thus left the problem of privacy on the 
periphery, even though self-tracking was already harvesting, and sometimes 
sharing, the kinds of data that corporate surveillance at the time could only 
dream of having.  
 
All in all, the dominant presentation of self-tracking – the practices and their 
interpretations offered to the public at large – intersected and conflated 
personalisation with objective truth and individual control. At the same time, 
we find the valorisation of a machinic environment that surrounds, bypasses, 
and structures a priori the very conditions of the subject’s experience of self-
knowledge and self-improvement. Key elements of Mark Hansen’s twenty-
first century media (2015), which we had identified in state surveillance, and 
the basic principles of recessive epistemic relations, thus co-habit a practice 
invested in the idea of a more rational, more independent, more 
knowledgeable human subject. This hybridisation is exemplified in the words 
of Ariel Garten: 
 
My goal, quite simply, is to help people become more in tune with 
themselves. I take it from this little dictum, ‘Know thyself.’ If you think 
about it, this imperative is kind of the defining characteristic of our 
species, isn’t it? […] I’m here today to share a new way that we’re 
working with technology to this end to get familiar with our inner 
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self like never before - humanising technology and furthering that age-
old quest of ours to more fully know the self (Garten 2011). 
 
There is an odd, more or less posthumanist sentiment here: good old humans 
need some technology to become fully human, or at least, a better kind of 
human. Within this perspective, the clichéd refrain of our age – ‘Just be 
yourself’ – no longer holds out an emancipatory vision of a sovereign 
individual unfettered by conformist norms, but a troubling epistemological 
problem: do I have the capacity to know what I ‘really’ want? Enthusiasts 
insist that self-tracking is about ‘planned serendipity’: when you surrender 
yourself to machinic collection, the data should be able to come back and 
surprise you about questions and patterns you had never even considered 
(Sterling 2013).53 Just as the NSA argue that you cannot filter anyone out 
because you don’t know what a suspect looks like until you see it, self-
tracking reserves a certain proactive role for data and algorithmic analysis. 
We will examine this tension more closely in the next section. How does self-
tracking’s vision of conquering new uncertainties, its belief in the virtuous 
                                                          
53 Like many other aspects of self-tracking, this vision of planned serendipity was shared 
across projections in Internet, Internet of Things and other data-driven technologies. Google, 
having made its name on faster and better search, envisions search to become so efficient it 
jumps ahead of the querying human; in 2010, Google co-founder Eric Schmidt made 
headlines with the claim that Google’s future is to tell people what to do (Jenkins Jr. 2010). It 
was received as marvellous, creepy, or both. The claim turned out to have a rather fast turn-
around into concrete technologies. The next few years saw predictive reasoning assistants like 
Ciri (Apple, 2011), Google Now (2012) and Cortana (Microsoft, 2014) enter, and assimilate, 
into Western societies.  
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coupling of computational automaticity and objective truth, position the 
subjects themselves vis-à-vis the epistemic process? What are the 
consequences of the increased responsibility and automaticity granted the 
machine upon the relation between the subject and his/her own ‘self’? 
 
DATA’S PRIVILEGE 
‘For a certain type of person,’ says Wolf, the Quantified Self founder, 
‘data is the most important thing you can trust. Certain people think a 
feeling of inner certainty is misleading.’ […] Computers don’t lie. 
People lie (Hesse 2008). 
 
People lie – about themselves, and especially to themselves. One dominant 
trope regularly wheeled out by both enthusiasts and skeptics (and those in 
between) is that self-tracking heralds an environment where you cannot lie to 
yourself anymore. We may knowingly tell fibs to ourselves about eating too 
much and running too little; we may not even notice that the eight-hour work 
day just included three hours of web-surfing. But the data will not filter out 
your momentary indiscretions, your corner-cutting, and it certainly will not 
parlay with your pitiful excuses. Human memory, consciousness, reason, so 
often is a cursed fog upon clear sight; data, unforgiving and unyielding, will 
scatter the confusion. Or at least, that’s the idea. As Gary Wolf puts it 
elsewhere: 
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Can our devices know us better than we know ourselves? It seems 
obvious that this must be true. Human self knowledge is plagued by 
all kinds of limits: bias, sampling error, memory failure, and lack of 
sufficient processing power to recognize complex patterns (Wolf 2008). 
 
I suspect we are in no position to stand guard over our judgments 
without the help of machines to keep us steady (Wolf 2009a). 
 
The language of trust, lies and self-rationalisation carry certain implications 
about the affects and experiences entailed by a self-tracking life. Here, 
however, our focus is strictly on the epistemic relation between subjects and 
self, mediated by machines and data. To speak of such relations 
systematically, we must differentiate between the experiencing, reflecting, 
conscious ‘I’ – which we have typically referred to as the subject – and the 
physiological, behavioural, neural, affective, and otherwise empirical ‘me’ or 
‘self’. In self-tracking discourse and its articulation of ‘lying to myself’, there is 
an epistemic gap between the I and the me; a gap which ensures that the me is 
a perennial source of uncertainty and unknowability for the I. In this 
narrative, the pre-tracking subject is one which regularly forgets, is confused, 
rationalises, narrativises, and yes, ‘lies’ to oneself. In contrast, self-tracking 
technologies can then offer an externalised and objective other – one which is 
able to intervene very particularly upon the subject’s claim to his/her ‘own’ 
truth. In that sense, self-tracking is quite literally a self-surveillance. When the 
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subject consults tracking data and its recommendations, and that data is 
socially invested with a certain value in objectivity and accuracy, the 
encounter between the I and me becomes an occasion where my self-knowing 
is tested by the epistemological framework of the tracking machine.54 To assess 
whether I have been diligent today, I must determine the standard by which 
diligence is defined; the facts of my actions on that day; any extenuating 
factors; and how they are all to be calculated towards the standard. Self-
tracking seeks to break up and externalise these various micro- or partial 
judgments, calling upon the I to consult and negotiate the machine and its 
reports to arrive at the final call (including a successful act of ‘lying to 
myself’).55  
 
Such a mediated relationship extends and qualitatively transforms the 
epistemic processes found in pre-digital forms of self-tracking. When 
Benjamin Franklin (1884) daily recorded his observance of thirteen virtues 
(Fig.7), it was a discrete and ritualised process presided over by the reflexive 
subject. Franklin had devised a simple database, whose catalogue of 
                                                          
54 For a longer history of such overcoding, see Theodore Porter (1995)’s analysis on 
quantification as a ‘social technology’ which produced new valuations of precision and 
efficiency with practical consequences for the fields it touched, like barometry and 
cartography. 
55 A roughly analogous use of ‘test’ may be found in (Boltanski & Chiapello 2007). 
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predetermined categories of virtue would ask: had he been temperate, had he 
been chaste? And he would record ‘a spot’ for each transgressive day. In other 
words, Franklin’s own interpretive faculty was central to data curation. 
Arrangements like Beddit, Mother, or LIAM make a clear departure from this 
relationship. Consider RescueTime – a web browser extension that monitors 
computer use, a relatively simple kind of tracker. It silently fills a record of 
distraction, procrastination, and that elusive ‘true productivity’, in ways that 
few humans would be able to accurately recall on their own. Do you tend to 
slack off more often on Wednesdays? Do you spend 24% of your desk time on 
social media? While all kinds of holistic reasons would have entered into such 
behaviour, it is the beauty and terror of correlational epistemology that it will 
produce conclusions purely based on what it measures, and in doing so, 
suggest that what it cannot measure pales in comparison to the correlation it 
can calculate.56 In this new breed of self-trackers, more and more of the 
knowledge production process occurs beyond the subject’s experiential access 
– such that the machines, the categories, the databases, extract relevant data 
directly from the empirical self.   
                                                          
56 An analogous development can be found in the history of the intelligence quotient [IQ]. Its 
inventor, Alfred Binet, explicitly specified that his tests could not properly represent 
‘intelligence’. The tests were instead designed to provide an internal consistency and 
comparability, such that if a child scored lower across ten or twenty tests, he or she could be 
identified as in need of special education. Thus Binet wrote, “It matters very little what the 
tests are so long as they are numerous.” (1911, p329 in Gould 1996, p179) 
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Figure 7. Franklin’s table of virtues. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, this difference, this ‘bypassing’, aligns 
closely with Mark Hansen’s notion of twenty-first century media (2015). 
Using his language, we might call this communication between machines and 
the empirical self, the communication which at least initially bypasses the 
conscious subject, as machinic sensibility: self-tracking technologies’ capacity to 
observe and collect data in ways that human sensibility cannot reach, and 
sometimes, collect the kind of data that humans cannot reach (also see Swan 
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2012, p235). Some measurements, like galvanic skin response57, are absolutely 
beyond human access; others, like steps taken, are measured with a frequency 
and precision practically unavailable to human subjects. The result is formally 
analogous to the effect of ‘black-boxed’ algorithms in social media platforms 
and state surveillance systems (e.g. Amoore 2011; Bucher 2012; Gillespie et al. 
2016; Pasquale 2015b): the many micro-judgments that go into what counts as 
a step, what counts as ‘good’ sleep, what counts as ‘excitement’ are 
increasingly placed outside the subject’s reach. The result is a powerful filter 
on what ‘counts’ as relevant towards self-knowledge, and how it is counted.  
 
In short, there was a certain investment of veridical authority upon tracking 
machines, one which prioritises machinic sensibility as the privileged route to 
objective self-knowledge. Yet this is not simply a zero-sum game where the 
subject finds him/herself alienated and powerless. Subjects are never 
guaranteed to accept that machinic authority straightforwardly, and even if 
they do, it is not necessarily at their ‘expense’. It may be more appropriate to 
say that self-tracking encourages its practitioners to step back and develop a 
certain skepticism about the I’s intuitive, experiential access to the me – and, 
                                                          
57 In most cases, human subjects are incapable of sensing, or consciously controlling in any 
direct fashion, their electrodermal activity. 
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in turn, legitimise machine-sensed data as something that more adequately 
represents the self. During the early 2010s, the stakes of such rebalancing in 
knowledge production remained ambiguous, largely because the technology 
was first and foremost understood in instrumental terms: as tools that let 
humans do what they want to do. Yet the recent history of corporate 
surveillance, which had matured well before self-tracking, indicates the 
broader structural effects of these ‘mere tools’. Over the 2000s and 2010s – 
what came to be known as the ‘Web 2.0’ era – it was the very promise of 
empowerment through online connectedness that coaxed billions of users to 
voluntarily opt into the relentless surveillance and exploitation of their own 
personal data. The convenience of ‘connectedness’ had as its price a 
‘connectivity’ to vast corporate surveillance systems (van Dijck 2013), and 
users only belatedly realised that “if you’re not paying for it […] you’re the 
product being sold” (Oboler et al. 2012). In the same way, self-tracking is 
beginning to coalesce into a wider ecosystem, interlinked webs of 
significance, whereby machinic sensibility’s primacy over human sensibility 
might be formalised at social and individual levels. In 2014, the popular 
fitness tracker Fitbit was called as a legal witness; a Canadian law firm 
invoked the client’s own tracking data to prove that a work injury had 
affected her physical activity levels adversely (Olson 2014). Although the data 
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was here summoned by the ‘I’ (or, the I’s legal representatives) to support its 
self-narrative, such cases look forward to a near future where the datafied 
‘me’ could appear in court, and establish an authority over the truth of the self 
that can override the subject’s own words and memories.  
  
 
Figure 8. The pplkpr interface. 
 
Tellingly, such a redistribution of veridical authority tended to elicit critical 
responses when they encroached on aspects of everyday life that traditionally 
were considered too private, too subjective, too emotional, and otherwise too 
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sensitive to measure and clarify. pplkpr is an app which leverages 
smartphones’ ability to collect heart rate variability and locational data, and 
combines it with users’ manual input of who they were meeting and how 
they feel. The data is used to deliver correlations about which acquaintances 
might make the user more nervous, more aroused, sad, happy. (Fig.8) As the 
promotional trailer says:  
 
See how your relations stack up, and let pplkpr find the ones that work 
for you. It’ll automatically manage your relationships so that you don’t 
have to, scheduling time with people that make you feel good, and 
blocking the ones that don’t. Forget fake friends, failed romance, and 
FOMO [Fear of missing out]. Optimise your social life with pplkpr 
(pplkpr.com n.d.). 
 
pplkpr presents user testimonies that point to the kind of veridical authority 
commanded by data’s claim to objectivity. “Using the app as a justification for 
not wanting to spend time with someone is a lot more definitive than just 
saying, I’m uncomfortable”, says one; “It made me realise the truth,” another. 
pplkpr, in fact, was created by two Carnegie Mellon artists-in-residence, who 
appeared happy to leave the app’s status ambiguously between a genuine 
belief in ‘optimising social life’ and a provocative lampooning of it (e.g. Beres 
2015). Much more earnest – and controversial – was Peeple, an app which was 
announced in late 2015 promising a fully public system for quantitatively 
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rating ordinary humans. Individuals would be broken down into romantic, 
professional and personal ‘scores’ as rated by their acquaintances – and they 
would not be able to opt out. Peeple, strictly speaking, is not a self-tracking 
app; lying on a continuum that includes pplkpr and other more self-oriented 
practices, however, it is an important case study in how quantified 
knowledge of the self can start to ‘count’ in social and institutional contexts. 
Once brought to public notice through The Washington Post’s coverage (Dewey 
2015), Peeple set off a firestorm of international controversy; the soon-to-come 
app was quickly branded a “creepy” poster child for the dangerous 
implication of a ‘rating’ society (Chamorro-Premuzic 2015; BBC News 2015) 
where humans are reduced to singular numbers (Pasquale 2015a). It would 
ultimately launch a few months later, though at time of writing, its eventual 
impact – whether as a case study in the steady march of trackers, or their 
backlash – remains in the air.    
 
From the refrain ‘you cannot lie to yourself’, to data that speaks for the subject 
in the court of law, to a data-driven audit of one’s friends and acquaintances, 
the hopes and fears surrounding tracking technologies are closely connected 
to the epistemic power invested in the process of quantification and 
datafication. If self-tracking technologies promise accuracy and objectivity in 
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all things about the ‘me’, the corollary is that it threatens to deprive subjects of 
traditionally tolerated margins of transgression, the epistemic ‘spaces’, the 
uncertainty that allow for subjective self-determination. In Chapter 1, we 
mentioned Žižek’s counter-argument on Foucaultian discipline: is not 
discipline, and its external order, a means by which individuals gain 
“precious space in which to exercise [their] freedom” (n.d.)? Now, we must 
return yet again to discipline’s more orthodox function: self-tracking’s 
promise of certain knowledge, insofar as it becomes socially legitimated, 
threatens the many ways in which subjects’ perception of themselves depends 
on what is left ambiguous, implicit, uncertain.58 
 
*** 
 
The privileging of machinic sensibility over such uncertainty is especially 
significant because many self-tracking technologies of this period were 
conceptualised as tools not only for observation and prediction, but 
recommendation, curation, nudging, habituation. This trajectory is well 
summarised by Vinod Khosla, a tech industry veteran who had co-founded 
                                                          
58 This is another take on Lauren Berlant’s point that subjects are often well versed in 
managing affective incoherence and disorganisation, defending their own contradictions in 
their own terms (Berlant & Edelman 2014, p6; Berlant & Greenwald 2012).  
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Sun Microsystems in the 1980s and is now a key figure in the QS and self-
tracking industry. “Humans look for what they know to look for. The next 
generation of algorithms will look for everything”, Khosla (2015) exclaims – 
and then tell us what we didn’t know to look for, to boot. And such a vision, 
both idealistic and commercially compelling, directs funding; Khosla’s own 
venture capital firm has invested millions into tracking technologies like 
blood pressure monitoring (Quanttus), sleep monitoring (Misfit), fitness 
tracking (Jawbone) and general health behaviour tracking through 
smartphones (Ginger.io). Other actors in the tracking business similarly speak 
of using tracking to “change the way we feel” (Siegel 2015)”, a ‘planned 
serendipity’ (Sterling 2013) where the machinic system furnishes the moment 
you are to seize (Havens 2014, p58-9). 
 
Nudging – which can include recommendations, reminders, encouragements, 
guilt-trips – is a familiar term within self-tracking discourse. Writing in the 
Harvard Business Review, one high-ranking consultant (Wilson 2012) offered a 
classification of two types of self-tracking: trackers and nudgers. But already, 
there is no clean split: a tracker “reveal[s] patterns and help[s] you set goals” 
by virtue of its measurements. As soon as the machines produce systematic, 
longitudinal data and present them to the users, there is more than ‘just 
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counting’ going on. When nudgers are described as “guid[ing] you toward 
your goals by asking questions or prompting action on the basis of the data 
they’ve received”, this is something that applies to self-tracking as a whole. 
Moov NOW, branded as a ‘personal coach and workout tracker’, combines 
sensor-based tracking with a talking personal assistant in the user’s ear, one 
which provides real-time encouragements and instructions: 
 
 
The personal trainer aspect of the Moov NOW is extremely active and 
engaging, constantly pushing you to go further and improve your 
form. I was fairly blown away with how specific an instruction it was 
capable of giving; at some points [it] would tell me to ‘land softer on 
my feet’ or ‘unclench my fists’ while jogging (Lauletta 2016). 
 
Even without tapping into the popular imagination of speaking artificial 
intelligence, the organisation and presentation of tracking activity itself plays 
a nudging role. Basis Watch, which features sensors for heart rate, daily steps 
taken, calories burnt, sleep type (deep vs. REM), and a record of daily 
activities, insists on calling its phone app ‘Habits’. Habits is a dashboard 
which asks you to set goals for, say, sleeping earlier, or walking more.  
 
In the beginning, you can only sign up for three habits, but over time, 
as you consistently practice good habits, you earn the right to add 
more. Between that and the encouraging green color-coding, I feel like 
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I’m being rewarded for good behaviour, and I feel motivated to keep 
up my winning streak (Wollman 2014). 
 
To be sure, such blatant Pavlovian conditioning can hardly be assumed to be 
a universal response. Each device will play host to a variety of emergent and 
transgressive uses, twisting the data and functions into unintended roles. Yet 
the ways in which these technologies are designed, presented, packaged into 
rhetorical gloss, organises the kinds of affordances they communicate. And 
insofar as they act automatically to recommend and ‘nudge’, self-trackers 
increasingly organise the epistemic situations into which subjects are 
positioned, even if their responses will vary.  
 
Facing what it believed was a new evolution of terrorist threat, the American 
state turned to indiscriminate, automated, machine-driven surveillance, in the 
belief that data’s objectivity and rigour would achieve the kinds of knowledge 
and certainty humans were not capable of. Only a few years late to the party, 
self-trackers are also hoping to bypass the thinking, feeling subject in order to 
arrive at the objective truth of what the self is and what is good for the self. In 
this schema, the I, and its subjective faculties of knowledge, become 
thoroughly distinguished from the objective me; and the machines, with their 
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privileged access to the latter, are increasingly designed to lead the subject in 
the auto-analytic, auto-epistemic process.   
 
I talk about the dopplegänger principle because I feel like every single 
person has a life that they believe that they lead, and then they have 
the reality track. The reality track is what we do, the data track. For 
most people, those only overlap by about 60, 65% (Mette Dyhrberg, 
2015, personal communication).  
 
DATA SKEPTICISM 
Let us recount our steps. Self-tracking technologies promise one more victory, 
one more historical advance, in the long war against uncertainties and 
unknowns that plague self-knowledge and human intuition. At the same 
time, such a promise depends on the deployment of autonomously observant 
machines on our bodies and in our everyday environments. This tension 
between the promise of knowledge and the privileging of data epistemology 
did not pass unnoticed – although it was rarely expressed in schematic terms. 
Not everyone shared in the dominant rhetoric of self-tracking’s virtues and 
benefits. Self-tracking’s popularisation prompted backlashes in the public 
sphere, a decentralised set of sceptics that typically questioned machinic 
sensibility’s pernicious influence on our ‘humanity’. Meanwhile, self-tracking 
connoisseurs in the Quantified Self community often developed a varied and 
evolving set of attitudes about what kinds of epistemic work they were 
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performing on themselves. Where the dominant rhetoric offers a monolithic 
and universalist vision of technological progress, these alternative attitudes 
reveal a certain practical flexibility and ideological bricolage. In this section, we 
focus on how the latter brings out the tension between knowledge and 
uncertainty in the form of a struggle between machinic sensibility and human 
experience. 
 
The proliferation of self-tracking technologies from the late 2000s onwards 
attracted ‘mainstream’ media coverage beyond tech-savvy circles – and, as it 
did so, a distributed but consistent pattern of backlash or scepticism. The 
sceptics tended to rehash old binaries between nature and technology, the 
human and the machine, making familiar appeals to the ‘naturally’ human. In 
a typical example, the sex life tracker and gamifier Spreadsheets provoked the 
question, ‘can the Quantified Self go too far?’ 
 
As beneficial as a trove of personal data can be, though, there are some 
things better left uncharted. Comparing our friend counts and 
vacations with others on Facebook is already making us sad. And it’s 
unlikely that comparing our lovers’ average duration and decibel 
volume to others’ is going to make us happy. Analytics are creeping 
into the most intimate and unquantifiable parts of our lives. […] “You 
can’t substitute gamification for those core things people strive for,” 
social psychologist and CEO of mental health network Psych Central 
John Grohol recently told The Atlantic. “Filling up a love tank isn’t the 
same as having a personal connection.” (Kessler 2013) 
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Such rhetoric presumes a common sense, a set of shared intuitions about what 
is ‘natural’ to humanity. Notably, such arguments were often grounded 
entirely on what they left unsaid and unspecified. How is this ‘personal 
connection’ incompatible with analytics? What makes sex ‘unquantifiable’, 
exactly?59 The public, external criticism of self-surveillance tended to 
romanticise a natural human way of being. In criticising self-tracking’s 
promises as fantastic ideals of optimised, posthuman cyborgs, they 
themselves tended to reify the figure of the pre-technical human and their 
‘natural’ relationship to themselves. Such romanticism was also frequently 
joined by doubts and criticisms about self-tracking’s efficacy. Narratives of 
technological optimism rarely consider the many ways in which technologies 
fail to be useful, or simply to function properly; when they do, such problems 
are dismissed as temporary roadblocks in the drama of progress. Yet self-
tracking technologies available in the early twenty-first century were still 
riddled with many such problems. 
 
But does this numerical ‘self knowledge’ make [Gary] Wolf healthier, 
happier or more effective? […] They believe the maxim that only the 
things that are measured can be improved. But I see a lot of measuring, 
                                                          
59 If it’s not sex, it’s vaginas: kGoal, a crowd-funded ‘Fitbit for your vagina’ that tracks your 
pelvic muscle training, was similarly criticised as “quantifying … gone too far” (Zimmerman 
2014). 
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but not much improvement […] for anyone serious about health, my 
advice is to recycle all this ‘quantified self’ junk, eat real food and go 
outside for some serious exercise every day. Instead of relying on 
consumer electronics to tell you how you feel, pay attention to your 
own body. It will be a long time before Silicon Valley invents a set of 
sensors better than the ones you were born with (Elgan 2012; also see 
Hardaway 2013). 
 
Such commentary cast doubt on self-tracking’s efficacy by arguing that good 
old solutions, and the natural body, are unlikely to be beaten to the self by 
some fancy gadgets. There is, again, the designation of a natural relationship – 
one which supposedly requires no explanation, being universally understood 
and shared by ‘serious’ folk. Of course, this very binary between authentic 
human care and machinic artifice is a fiction; humans have always been 
dissatisfied with their access to themselves in all sorts of ways; hence the 
many efforts, electronic or otherwise, to augment self-knowledge. What is 
significant is not that such a schema is historically correct, but that it was the 
standard form in which scepticism towards self-tracking was articulated. This 
vague, yet moral and normative, style reflected a certain unease not only with 
self-tracking’s rigid pursuit of quantification and precision, but the basic 
valorisation of certainty and surveillance in the first place: is it really edifying 
to ‘know’ the self in this way, and is such knowledge even ‘true’ to the 
subject? Just as the proletariat need not be versed in Marxist theory to 
produce a genuine articulation of his/her predicament, the sceptics’ semi-
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Luddite discourse is itself is symptomatic of self-tracking’s destabilising 
influence on more traditional epistemic relations between the I and the me.  
 
The nature of this destabilising influence came into sharpest relief in the 
arguments raised against numbers and quantification. Any form of 
quantification necessarily produces its residual; the decision of what to count 
and how to count it requires dividing the phenomena in question into 
discrete, measurable pieces – pieces that are now amenable to 
decontextualised circulation (Porter 1995). Criticism against self-tracking’s 
love of numbers took up two general aspects of this problem. First, it was 
alleged that the focus on numerical measurement privileges that which is 
countable over that which is not (e.g. North 2014; Ceglowski 2015). The 
majority of self-tracking solutions in this period relied on finding acceptable 
values that can serve as a proxy of the real object. For instance, some devices 
derived stress levels from heart rate variability, while others simply asked for 
a self-reported score of more composite values like ‘happiness’. To be sure, 
the mere use of a proxy does not disqualify the measurement; but sceptics 
sought to show how self-tracking’s promise of data-driven certainty produces 
its own margins of uncertainty, its own dark regions. One example concerns 
the aforementioned pplkpr:  
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McDonald[, a co-creator,] recalls a moment during testing where two 
close friends were working on a school project together. The app 
noticed that every time the two saw each other, their stress levels 
would spike. “Eventually it just blocked both of them from each 
other,” he says. This example points to how computers view data: as 
numbers and patterns, not mile markers of nuanced emotions. It’s also 
a nice reminder that for all our technological advances, there are some 
things people still do better (Stinson 2015) 
 
Such arguments warned that to see like a tracker is to lose an older, looser, 
holistic kind of perception.60 pplkpr’s provocation also touches on the second 
criticism. Self-tracking technologies’ quantification of the self provides 
discrete and manipulable correlations: I walk more, my steps count goes up. 
Where enthusiasts saw in this relation the golden gate to self-improvement, 
sceptics argued that such an interface produces a misleading sense of control: 
one does not become ‘healthier’ in the fuller sense, but does become very 
good at optimising their Fitbit numbers (e.g. Wallace 2010; Goetz 2013). They 
warned that the proliferation of data was beginning to masquerade for 
legitimate and reliable ‘knowledge’.61 Influential technology critic Evgeny 
                                                          
60 A parallel process, where a data-driven way of seeing colonised a more eclectic but thereby 
holistic and situated system of knowing, was fundamental to modern statecraft (Scott 1998).   
61 A similar argument was being raised against the use of big data (boyd & Crawford 2012) 
and increasingly complex models in other knowledge spheres. As part of the society-wide 
inquisition into the why and how of the 2008 global financial crisis, Donald Mackenzie has 
shown how finance software’s front-end of relatively simple and easily manipulable numbers 
help the human analyst feel like they understand and grasp the process (and that, by 
extension, the machine certainly must be even more infallible). (Mackenzie 2010; also see 
Pasquale 2015b). 
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Morozov (2013) also joined the fray largely on the sceptics’ side. Recalling a 
1987 slogan from philosopher Ivan Illich, the ‘imperialism of numbers’, 
Morozov argued that quantification gives us the easy, ‘low-hanging fruit’ in 
our quest for self-knowledge, and in doing so, steers us towards a passive 
solutionism: just let the machines gather, and we will eventually be better off. 
He thus warns that the human’s fate in this regime is to be nothing more than 
the enforcers of algorithms’ findings. The attack on quantification organised 
the debate surrounding self-tracking into a normative and ethical problem: 
what kind of self-knowledge should individuals strive towards, and how? If 
‘better’ knowledge is not simply a synonym of technological efficiency or 
precision, how should it be defined? If the veridical authority of the thinking 
subject should be protected in some way in the age of machinic sensibility, 
how – and why – should it be done?  
 
These critiques were developed with greater nuance and variety within 
trackers, enthusiasts, entrepreneurs and visionaries. This should not surprise 
us; as I described in the Introduction, ‘self-tracking’ refers to a constellation of 
practices and concerns sharing key resemblances, rather than a single 
community defined by dogmatic allegiance. This is particularly the case with 
the Quantified Self community. Where its early years were dominated by an 
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embrace of quantification and a relentless quest to datafy different aspects of 
human life, it has since grown into a large, international, and yet 
decentralised group – one where journalists, academics, tech entrepreneurs, 
health industry workers, college students, and other kinds of identities 
intersect (also see Butterfield 2012). This has resulted in a more diverse 
(though still very much middle-upper class and tech-savvy) ecosystem of 
attitudes, one which increasingly accommodates non-quantitative practices, 
intersections with meditation and other spiritual techniques, and indeed a 
degree of scepticism about the consequences of tracking (see Lupton 2015; 
Lupton pre-print). QS thus includes not only those who are looking for more 
data, but those who have strong opinions about how the self should be 
analysed, and are loathe to leave those decisions for others to make.62 In my 
fieldwork, many QSers openly admitted that the human is not composed of a 
discrete set of switches and sliders you can simply ‘discover’ through 
tracking. Rather, they tended to justify self-tracking by pointing to the kinds 
of attitudes, the perspectives, that the reflective I can gain by way of engaging 
                                                          
62 Consistent with self-tracking’s promise of personalisation, QSers tend to be cautious, or 
even downright critical, of conventional and/or universalising definitions. One panel at their 
2015 conference began with the joke that there’s a standard American diet, and a standard 
American doctor – the ‘SADs’ (Abramson 2015). (The joke was well received.) Outlandish 
wearables, new and weird personal habits, and other kinds of non-normative behaviour tend 
to be appreciated as worthy efforts to find such personal and unexpected answers to better 
living.  
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in tracking as an activity. At the 2013 QS Conference, Nancy Dougherty, a 
long-time tracker, discussed becoming ill, and discovering that the good old 
doctor, antibiotics and exercise were helping her health far more than her 
years of tracking: 
 
[When we track our health and our body,] there’re so many variables 
with inputs we’re not quite sure what to care about […] a lot of 
responses are time-delayed, they’re interdependent, they’re not linear, 
it’s a really awful system to actually try and characterise […] I’m really 
really bad at understanding what’s going on with me, physically and 
emotionally, yeah, I’m never quite sure if I’m tired, and fatigued, or if 
I’m just bored, maybe, or if I’m feeling good, maybe because I’ve 
modified my diet, or maybe just the weather changed… (Dougherty 
2013) 
 
Yet these thoughts did not lead Dougherty not to disavow tracking. Rather, 
she describes a transitional process by which she would stop tracking while 
holding on to a ‘QS mindset’63:  
 
The Quantified Self isn’t really about quantifying to me anymore 
[…while recovering from illness,] I wasn’t keeping track of anything, I 
wasn’t logging anything, but it still felt very much like a QS 
experiment to me […] because I had the Quantified Self mindset. The 
flexibility, exploration, even just the idea that I was in control of my 
health, and it wasn’t just antibiotics. 
                                                          
63 In my research – especially in offline gatherings in New York and San Francisco, and online 
discourse –  the language of mindfulness was commonly mobilised to talk and think about 
self-tracking, and QSers frequently reported using techniques like meditation in tandem with 
self-tracking experiments.  
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Such a narrative is oriented not towards a body of code, a body of numbers, 
or even objective certainty through machinic sensibility, but a lived 
experience of augmenting and recalibrating the conscious I. The ideal subject 
is here described as someone for whom “the data has moved inside [them]” 
(Nafus & Sherman 2014, p1788). (It is, in fact, the traditional medical 
relationship that is characterised as instrumental; we hope for the doctor’s 
prescription to just ‘fix’ us then we can go back to not worrying about – or 
‘knowing’ – our body again.) To be sure, this experience still involves using 
numbers and regular measurements to impose an order on reality. But the 
numbers are treated less as a window unto unmediated reality than an 
internally consistent set of relationships that can be manipulated.  
 
In short, these debates and criticisms consistently point towards a common 
ground: a felt shift in the status of human experience admist advancements in 
machinic sensibility. And that shift, insofar as it alters the rules of the 
epistemic, truth-telling game, raises a normative and ethical problem: what 
kind of self-knowledge is knowledge produced through self-surveillance? 
What kinds of uncertainties are concealed in order to socially construct 
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tracking data as objective and accurate? To unpack these concerns, it is 
necessary to obtain a more historical perspective.   
 
KNOW THYSELF 
Monday evening, I ate a cabbage and an omelet. Tuesday evening, I ate 
one half of the head of a kid and soup. Wednesday, fasted. Saturday, I 
went to the tavern: salad and omelet, and cheese, and I felt good. 64  
 
In January 1554, the Italian painter Jacopo Pontormo began to write. His 
topics: food intake, social calls, bowel movements, self-diagnosed 
psychological states. A few decades later, the physician and inventor 
Sanctorius of Padua would track his weight, his food (input) and excretions 
(output). Both would later be duly referenced as early precursors to 21st 
century self-tracking (Swan 2013; also see Urist 2015). Benjamin Franklin, with 
his thirteen virtues, also made frequent cameos in journalistic coverage of 
self-tracking (Kronsberg 2013). Self-trackers of the twenty-first century were 
not left wanting when it came to historical precedents, even if we limit 
ourselves to Western civilisations. Although contemporary discourse tended 
to make little more than cursory mentions65, they provide an important point 
of comparison for understanding the epistemic and subjective (that is, for-the-
                                                          
64 The quotations are selected from Elizabeth Pilliod (2005)’s analysis of Pontormo’s Diary. 
65 One exception is a lengthier discussion of weight scales, and their penetration into domestic 
spaces, around the turn of the 20th century (Crawford et al. 2015). 
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subject) stakes of self-tracking techniques. While a comprehensive history of 
self-tracking practices is well outside the scope of this work, this section 
focuses specifically on major practices and philosophies of self-knowledge in 
Antiquity, and then brings this comparative eye back to early twenty-first 
century debates about self-tracking and automation. Here we take the cue 
from Michel Foucault, who positioned these Antique techniques in terms of 
parrhesia and avowal – that is, techniques of truth-telling (Foucault 1986; 1997; 
2001; 2011; 2014a; 2014b). Rather than take the vast difference in technological 
capacity as the primary point of comparison, I emphasise the different kinds 
of epistemic relations, different distributions of veridical authority, that can 
constitute a process of self-knowledge. 
 
The Delphic maxim, ‘know thyself’ [γνῶθι σεαυτόν], is something of an 
unofficial catchphrase for the Quantified Self; Gary Wolf used it to title one of 
his own efforts to depict QS for the wider public, writing for his home 
publication Wired (Wolf 2009b). Originally, of course, the maxim was 
popularised through Plato’s writings on Socrates. In this historical context, 
γνῶθι σεαυτόν described Socrates’ methodology as much as the objective. If 
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to know myself was the ultimate objective, the second-person imperative66 
expressed the nature of the epistemic process. Briefly put, the subject would 
come to know oneself through the challenge of the speaking interlocutor, and 
in one’s dialogic, experiential encounter with that challenge. Consider Laches, 
one of the Socratic Dialogues. Here, Socrates is described as an excellent 
interlocutor – that is, a human medium and indeed ‘technology’ for others’ 
pursuit of self-knowledge. Instead of machines, he shall be the tool. But 
Socrates is qualified for such a function not due to his erudition, but a certain 
relationship he has cultivated between his actions and speech – that is, his 
conscious ‘I’ – and his self: 
 
When the life (bios) of the person speaking is in harmony with his 
discourse, when there is a symphony between someone’s discourse 
and what he is, then I accept the discourse […] Laches does not say: 
Socrates is qualified to talk about courage because he is courageous. 
[Rather, he does so] because there is this symphony, this harmony 
between what Socrates says, his way of saying things, and the way in 
which he lives. (Foucault 2011, p148)67 
 
This truthful relationship, this harmony, is encapsulated by the term basanos 
[βάσανος]. The term originally applied to a a silicon-based ‘touchstone’ 
                                                          
66 γνῶθι is the command form of knowing, learning, becoming acquainted with; σεαυτόν is 
the reflexive pronoun, ‘of yourself’.    
67 Laches says: “I have no acquaintance with the words of Socrates, but … have had 
experience of his deeds, and there I found him a person privileged to speak fair words and to 
indulge in every kind of frankness.” (Plato 1920, p64 [188e]) 
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which the Greeks used as a ‘base’ to test the purity of precious metals. In this 
context, it is Socrates who functions as a touchstone for others like Nicias and 
Laches. His questioning, and his own relationship to himself, stimulates, 
provokes, draws out, a kind of introspection and insight that they may not 
have arrived at themselves.68 The crux here is the form of the test. If 
contemporary self-tracking tests users according to its pre-designed 
algorithms and classifications, the test here is intersubjective and dialogic. 
Socrates’ subjects are not told what is right and wrong, or what the ‘answer’ to 
the question they face consists of. There is no informational transfer in that 
sense. Instead, there is a lived, communicative, asymptotic process by which 
the way one considers courage, the way one should approach such a problem, 
and the way one reflect upon oneself, is transformed.  
 
The point here is not that modern self-trackers have a different experience of 
knowing, but that the function and significance of that experience itself is 
valued differently in comparison to older processes. Socrates makes this very 
point in Phaedrus, where he inveighs against the relatively new and 
destabilising technology of writing. He warns of the dangers of writing as 
                                                          
68 Foucault (2011, p145) thus notes that basanos is derived to give basanizesthai 
[βασανίζεσθαι], the verb for a kind of being examined or tested. The latter form appears in 
Laches, most clearly in the Jowett translation: “To me, to be cross examined [βασανίζεσθαι] 
by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant” (Plato 1920, p64 [188a]).   
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technology, arguing that such a radical increase in external mnemonic objects 
will take away from people’s ability to remember ‘of themselves’. But what is 
remembering ‘of ourselves’, anyway – and what, if anything, is lost if 
remembering becomes something done ‘for us’? Once again, the problem 
comes down to the role of experience in epistemology. My recollection of a 
simple fact may be indistinguishable from a Googled result if we consider the 
end product as information. But there is all the difference in the role played by 
the subject in its own knowing. 
 
I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like 
painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and 
yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the 
same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had 
intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to 
one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And 
when they have been once written down they are tumbled about 
anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and 
know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are 
maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they 
cannot protect or defend themselves (Plato 1899, p581 [275d-e]) 
 
For Socrates, the chief sin of writing as a technology for instruction and 
knowledge is its ossifying quality: wisdom, unmoored from the process of 
becoming-wise, is abused through indiscriminate circulation. Socrates asks: 
do we not already know a better way to know and remember? “An intelligent 
word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows 
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when to speak and when to be silent”? In this formulation, writing’s 
production of stable, unchanging information is analogous to self-tracking’s 
reliable, autonomous facts: the solid, data-driven assertion that you are 
depressed, or that chocolate makes you more productive, that does not 
change and transform with the weather or the caprice of my own perception. 
But it is precisely such stability that Socrates warns against. For him, 
knowledge is nothing without the transformative struggle that is the 
experience of knowing. The contrast we witness here is a derivation of what 
Plato called anamnesis and hypomnesis: between a lived convergence of history 
and experience on one hand, and an exteriorised memory of pure, 
disembodied information on the other.69  
 
This is not to say that technological mediation pushes us from anamnesis 
towards hypomnesis in a linear fashion. Though Socrates was rather harsh on 
writing, a host of writing-based techniques for self-examination in late 
Antique and early Christian periods sought precisely to produce its own kind 
of dialogic, transformative experience. Foucault makes the point clear with 
Athanasius’ Viva Antonii (typically anglicised as ‘Life of Antony’, c.360 AD), 
                                                          
69 Also see Bernard Stiegler (n.d.) for a reading of Plato’s binary in terms of modern 
technologies and externalisation. 
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an early Christian piece on the subject: “what others are to the ascetic in a 
community, the notebook is to the recluse”. (Foucault 1997, p208)70 In writing 
as though one was reporting to another, early self-writers sought to keep a 
check on their daily living. Just as other humans or machines examine and 
‘nudge’ our conduct, writing was here designed to enable the subject to keep 
check on one’s own soul. Precisely because writing gives ‘one unvarying 
answer’, it is a technology by which my own words can speak back at me as an 
other – that is, “establis[h] a relationship of oneself with oneself” (ibid., p211). 
Accordingly, self-writing in this period was typically a rigorous, regulated, 
disciplined practice. Seneca writes in De Ira: 
 
The spirit ought to be brought up for examination daily. It was the 
custom of Sextius when the day was over, and he had betaken himself 
to rest, to inquire of his spirit: ‘What bad habit of yours have you cured 
to-day? what vice have you checked? in what respect are you better?’ 
[…] I daily plead my cause before myself: […] I pass the whole day in 
review before myself, and repeat all that I have said and done: I 
conceal nothing from myself, and omit nothing: for why should I be 
afraid of any of my shortcomings, when it is in my power to say, ‘I 
pardon you this time: see that you never do that anymore’? (Seneca 
2012, Book III, XXXVI) 
 
                                                          
70 Foucault’s commentary draws primarily on Viva Antonii §55, where Saint Antony 
[Antonius] advises others on how to maintain virtuous behaviour without the surveillance of 
others: “Let us each one note and write down our actions and the impulses of our soul as 
though we were going to relate them to each other… Wherefore let that which is written be to 
us in place of the eyes of our fellow hermit” (Athanasius 1987).  
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Such examinations were to occur regularly, at the close of each day. Foucault 
(1986, p61) notes that these sessions were held in an ‘administrative’ spirit, 
rather than guilt-wracked, emotionally overwhelmed penitence. The point 
was not to flog yourself in the eyes of God (or yourself), but to produce a 
reliable and accurate – it would be anachronistic to say ‘objective’ – form of 
self-knowledge. And so, with such self-writing, we find: the temporal and 
procedural regularity of the examinations; the model of the pseudo-rational, 
controlling I; the ‘administrative’ attitude as an affective regulator. These 
elements were designed to substitute the figure of the interlocutor with a 
relationship where I, in a specific sense, become other to myself. Where 
dialogic models provide an intersubjective other, through whom I come to 
know myself, exercises like Seneca’s instantiate a nonsubjective other in the 
form of a disciplined, regulated relationship. Again, the emphasis is squarely 
on cultivating a subject that is then in a position to properly perceive and 
internalise their own truths; whether in Socratic dialogue, Seneca’s 
examinations, or the alleged superiority of oral over written communication, 
there is no meaningful self-knowledge outside the subject’s experiential 
relationship with his/her own self. Again, it is not the specific content of the 
experience that is conserved across these cases, but experience’s centrality to 
the epistemic process. The experiencing I – as basanos, as ‘administrator’ – acts 
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as a clearing house for producing, curating, and analysing data about the self. 
It is this function that contemporary self-tracking attempts to bypass and 
undercut in its promise of automated objectivity. 
 
*** 
 
And so we return to one of self-tracking’s two distinct ‘selling points’: 
automation. Even as utopian visions surrounding ‘smart’ machines and 
persistent sensing construed the bypassing of human sensibility as an 
advantage, QSers and other practitioners of data-driven surveillance were 
beginning to caution against the dangers of defaulting to automation. All 
technological objects involve some degree of automation, of course. From 
Heidegger’s hammer to voice-activated personal assistants in 2010’s 
smartphones, each technological achievement is the result of human effort to 
set up an objective arrangement – machinic, algorithmic, material – that 
allows us to defer some part of the desired process, and all the information 
and skills and labour required therein, to the objects. The problem is that even 
as these autonomous sensing technologies promise to shine new light upon 
the unknown aspects of the self, the technological objects – data included – 
themselves become a black box.  
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…what do we want to make more automatic? What do we not want to 
make automatic? What happens when things become automatic is, all 
the decisions that were in [that thing] sort of disappear [sic], and they 
become objects for the world that just feel like, they sort of landed in 
the world, and they do what they do. And it's hard to unravel it and 
unpack it, and make it do something different. And I think in our own 
lives, we have a lot of things like that, and we just say, I don't want to 
think about that, I'm just gonna do it. If it works for me, you know, 
and... and when do we say, you know what, I don't want to be on 
automatic pilot, I want to think about this? (Gary Wolf, 2015, personal 
communication) 
 
Other ethnographic accounts point to similar discussions amongst QS 
members. For instance, Nafus and Sherman (2014, p1789) cite a 2012 QS 
conference discussion about the importance of manually entering data: “when 
it’s all automatic, you aren’t really aware of what it is saying”. Such concerns 
recognised that automation often entailed a gradual evacuation of the 
experiencing I from the epistemic process. One response amongst tracking 
connoisseurs was to cultivate an ethic of DIY experimentation. Even as more 
and more automated devices entered the wider consumer market, many 
Quantified Selfers continued to cobble together their own tracking systems, or 
simply hack existing ones to their own particular purpose. These 
individualised solutions were sometimes as basic as manually recorded excel 
spreadsheets, or even sporadic entries in a paper journal about critical events 
and thresholds. This comparatively less rigorous form of recording was not 
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necessarily seen as a problem; it was accepted that self-tracking’s well-
documented goal of personal knowledge and personally owned knowledge often 
required a degree of practical know-how on the part of the tracking subject. 
Those who spoke of the importance of manual data input, or of a ‘QS 
mindset’ that can survive the cessation of actual tracking, thus understood 
that this lived struggle with different kinds of tables, variables and sensors is 
the modern correlate to the experience of knowing in Socratic dialogue or 
Seneca’s self-examination. The tacit knowledge of the tracking subject thus 
became one way in which the vision of personal and agentic control sought to 
cohabit with the push for more powerful technologies.  
 
Yet such experimentation was not expected to translate into the wider 
populace. By the mid-2010s, some QSers and QS observers were warning that 
mass-produced, mass-promoted versions of self-tracking tools would eclipse 
this experimental and experiential dimension. Thus Natasha Dow Schüll, an 
STS scholar that has studied both QS and self-tracking more widely, sounds a 
warning in The New York Times: 
 
‘There is this dumbing-down, which assumes people do not want the 
data, they just want the devices to help them,” Ms. Schüll observes. ‘It 
is not really about self-knowledge anymore. It’s the nurselike 
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application of technology.’ In the move to the mass market, it seems, 
the quantified self has become the infantilised self (Singer 2015). 
 
We began this chapter by noting that self-tracking technologies typically 
made two major claims to superior value: automation and intimacy. Yet these 
minoritarian views raised significant challenges against the theory of a 
virtuous synergy between the two. The utopian vision of self-tracking 
idealises an autonomous and machinic extraction of objective truth from the 
empirical ‘me’. In stark contrast to Antique practices, this focus on what one’s 
sleep really is like or how one really feels about one’s friends increasingly 
positions the experiencing subject as a consumer of his/her own self-
knowledge.  
 
This ‘consumption model’ of self-knowledge sets up a telling parallel between 
corporate surveillance online and self-surveillance. In the 2011 QS 
Conference, Kevin Kelly’s plenary talk acknowledged that “there is a thin line 
between the quantified self and ‘intimate surveillance’”.71 If self-tracking 
promises deeper knowledge of ourselves through prosthetic machines that 
accompany us to meals, runs and sex, this very ‘intimacy’ is opening up new 
                                                          
71 The quotation comes from Ethan Zuckerman (2011)’s liveblogged notes; Kevin Kelly 
confirms the accuracy of the notes in (Kelly 2011).   
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vulnerabilities for the subject’s right to speak for his/her own self. In the case 
of corporate data-mining, such intimacy has already resulted in a ‘Faustian 
bargain’: the very means by which individuals are able to ‘upgrade’ their 
access to knowledge is the means by which their personal data is collected, 
monetised, and used to profile them (Zimmer 2008; also see Van Dijck 2013). 
In the Web 2.0 ecosystem, personal intimacy and economic intimacy are 
tightly intertwined, a conflation that dates back to mid-20th century 
computing discourse (Hu 2015). It is too early, and too sweeping, to declare 
that self-tracking is the latest trick up neoliberalism’s sleeve, a way to turn us 
all into optimising and learning machines. As we have seen in this chapter, 
the meaning and uses of this technology remains very much contested. What 
is already visible, however, is a powerful directionality towards machinic 
sensibility as the alleged harbinger of objectivity – and, as its ‘side’ effect, an 
epistemic process that shunts intuition and experience into the periphery.  
 
In Chapter 1, we characterised the epistemic relations in the Snowden Affair 
as ‘recessive’: a proliferation of objects which materially anchor a promise of 
data-driven knowledge, but in doing so, visibilise the uncertain and unknown 
elements undergirding those new epistemic techniques. While it does not 
roam quite so openly, uncertainty is just as central to self-surveillance’s claims 
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of ‘better knowing’. Here, uncertainty clings as the necessary inverse to the 
grandiose rhetoric of objective truth, of certainty achieved through machinic 
sensibility. Even as self-tracking imagines, and increasingly deploys, a system 
of automatic and intimate surveillance, the knowledge it produces - and the 
process through which it does so – is externalised away from the subject, 
rendering his/her own self-knowledge increasingly inaccessible. Meanwhile, 
the scattered complaints and anxieties against quantification, datafication, 
automation are syptomatic of another problem: the quest to eliminate 
uncertainty in the truth of the individual risks also eliminating a kind of 
freedom, a freedom for self-determination and transgression. Having thus 
identified the entanglement of knowledge and uncertainty in the social life of 
new surveillance technologies, the next two chapters ask: what kind of 
knowledge is nevertheless made to count, and is promised as possible? What 
kinds of techniques, beliefs, heuristics, are developed to ensure the legitimacy 
and possibility of knowledge? And although self-tracking discourse insists on 
bypassing the thinking I, ultimately, the subject and his/her responsivity is 
always at the end of every epistemic and communicative chain. In Chapter 4, 
we will come back to the demands that the ideals of machinic sensibility make 
of the human subject.  
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3. Knowledge Simulations. 
 
 
‘We knew already’. Or at least, that was the frequent refrain in the immediate 
aftermath of Edward Snowden’s leaks on NSA surveillance. Did he tell us 
anything we didn’t know? Asked journalists (Milner 2013). “They didn’t feel 
much like revelations”, said a director (Laskow 2013). It was as if this young 
man had risked his life to deliver shocking new revelations, only to find it 
was in fact rather predictable and dated. Snowden himself expressed the 
thought: in his encrypted communications, even as he invited journalists to 
Hong Kong for the now-famous exposé, he wrote of the fear that the public 
will simply ‘shrug’ and say, “we assumed this was happening and don’t 
care.” (Greenwald 2014a, p19) But what is meant by this curious phrase, we 
knew already?  
 
‘Knew’ – yes, some of the information really was public knowledge. The New 
York Times had blown the whistle on warrantless eavesdropping as early as 
2005; USA Today followed up with the story of MAINWAY, a domestic phone 
call records collection program, in 2006. John Poindexter, a key figure in the 
notorious Iran-Contra affair in the 80s, simply showed up to a DARPATech 
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conference in 2002 and publicly introduced state initiatives towards ‘Total 
Information Awareness’. Even the entirely new aspects of state surveillance 
were, the discourse went, not very surprising: surely we expected things like 
PRISM as well, and Snowden just confirmed what was virtually known. But 
who is this ‘we’? The discourse designates a depersonalised hivemind: the 
knowledge of NSA surveillance was stored in our collective archive, though 
the proof is in nonhuman documents rather than what individuals can 
‘remember’. Specific persons might well be surprised by the Snowden 
revelations, the idea goes, but the amorphous, collective ‘we’ did have the 
information available. Sometimes, the ‘we’ does become more specific. It 
designates the journalist the director, the activist: the we in the know who 
pens these commentaries, the we that is less gullible than the average Joe, the 
we of the ‘we told you so’. A ‘we’ that is certainly very different from the 
‘public’, even as such texts invite the public to agree that ‘we knew already’. 
Satire, as it so often does, brings these ambiguities into the open: ‘We already 
knew the NSA spies on us. We already know everything. Everything is 
boring’, opines a spoof news article on the subject (Clickhole, 2015).  
 
The vagaries of this one cliché exemplifies the various practical ways in which 
a sense of sufficient knowledge is secured in the surveillance context. The first 
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two chapters had described the proliferation of uncertainties amidst the 
promise of total archival and objective truth. Recessive objects give the 
uncertain and unknown a public presence – a presence invested with a 
promise of knowability, a necessity for calculation, collection, datafication. In 
this chapter and the next, we turn to recessivity’s regulation of what kinds of 
knowing might be considered legitimate and useful, and to produce 
techniques or heuristics that human actors may use to establish a sufficient 
sense of knowability. In the context of state surveillance, the interplay of 
surveillance’s secrecy and terrorism’s unpredictability produces a host of 
deferred and simulated knowledge practices. Beneath the utopian banner of 
totalising archives and unprecedented predictivity, such techniques seek to 
fill the epistemic gap between the public and the secret surveillance system, 
between the fantasy of total prediction and the unpredictability of the twenty-
first century terrorist. Here, the question is how recessivity’s epistemic gap is 
sutured to enable a set of ‘sufficient knowns’: that ‘we knew already’ (even if 
many subjects, individually, did not) about state surveillance, or that the 
efficacy of surveillance can be ‘reasonably’ assumed (even if, in many cases, it 
cannot be proven). 
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In this chapter, we examine three knowledge techniques, three heuristics 
prevalent across both sides of the Snowden Affair: subjunctivity, 
interpassivity, and zero-degree risk. Subjunctivity describes an ‘as if’ form of 
reasoning, whereby knowledge and proof is deferred to a future or otherwise 
hypothetical state. Although a surveillance program may not yet have caught 
a terrorist, or brought about an Orwellian dystopia, subjunctive logic posits 
that the very absence of certainty requires the public to act on uncertain 
evidence. One particularly consequential rendition of subjunctive reasoning is 
in what I call fabrications: a post-September 11 tendency in surveillance and 
counter-terrorism to support and encourage suspects until the suspicion is 
coaxed into tangible proof of wrongdoing. The chapter then describes 
interpassivity: the idea that one does not know, or has not done anything 
wrong, but ‘someone else’ – or even something else – has in my stead. If 
subjunctivity leverages potentiality to actualise uncertain claims to 
knowledge, interpassivity looks to the human and nonhuman Other – from 
the vast depths of the NSA database to secret courts that supposedly know in 
the public’s stead. Finally, zero-degree risk returns to the fixation with 
numbers and statistics that we had observed in Chapter 1. In the Snowden 
Affair, the difficulty of rendering surveillance and terrorism calculable has in 
fact coincided with a proliferation of numbers and probabilities; in other 
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words, the performative quality of risk discourse and statistical reasoning 
contributes to the normalisation of ‘acceptable levels’ of uncertainty and 
speculation. 
 
These techniques describe, respectively, three sources of epistemic authority 
that ‘fill in’ for the proliferation of uncertainty in the surveillance context: 
potentiality, the Other, and numerical empiricism. To be sure, modern 
epistemes have always entertained a host of heuristics to stabilise claims to 
knowledge. The simulations described here are well recognisable in other 
contexts, from the authority granted experts in modern societies (e.g. Giddens 
1990; Debord 1990, VII) to similarly uncertain problems like climate change. 
The chapter’s focus is not on introducing entirely novel phenomena, but 
understanding their function vis-à-vis the constantly shifting distribution of 
epistemic authority and the boundaries of knowability. From the FBI’s turn 
towards actively manufacturing terrorist suspects (a practice which they had 
not previously engaged with such frequency and enthusiasm) to surveillance 
discourse’s shedding the pretense of calculable risk and probabilistic 
reasoning, these techniques detail a visible turn towards increased 
dependency on simulated knowledge by state surveillance actors. And as 
with the recessive objects in Chapter 1, this increasingly explicit entanglement 
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between ‘sufficient’ knowledge and the unknown is not limited to a particular 
political position, but replicated across both the advocates and critics of 
surveillance. Subjunctivity, interpassivity and zero-degree risk are thus 
crucial operators in surveillance’s bid to both project massive uncertainties 
and the technological promise of better knowledge. They are best understood 
not as irrational and deceptive manipulations of knowledge processes, but 
part of the constant redrawing of normative rules that govern what relations 
of deferral, simulation, speculation, come to ‘count’ as knowledge.  
  
SUBJUNCTIVITY 
Your rights matter because you never know when you’re going to need 
them. People should be able to pick up the phone and call their family, 
should be able to send a text message to their loved one, buy a book 
online, without worrying how this could look to a government 
possibly years in the future.  
-Edward Snowden (Rowan 2014) 
 
I buy fire insurance ever since I retired, the wife and I bought a house 
out here and we buy fire insurance every year. Never had a fire. But I 
am not gonna quit buying my fire insurance, same kind of thing. 
-James Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence (Lake 2014) 
 
The distilled formula: you never know, so you have to do something. Both the 
whistleblower and the public face of NSA surveillance speak the language of 
loomings: threats that are nothing yet, but are already very much real in their 
existence as potential (Massumi 2005, p35). They invoke the Orwellian future 
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where you might be punished for the ordinary actions taken today; the 
apocalyptic scenario when terrorism happens to you with a ruthless 
individualisation. That which by definition cannot ever be made certain is 
invoked as presumptively real in order to legitimise action, whether for or 
against state surveillance.  
 
This is the as-if, the subjunctive. Grammatically, the subjunctive mood 
invokes a statement that it explicitly acknowledges as hypothetical or 
unproven: ‘if I were…’ It joins the explicit acknowledgement of a given thing 
to be unproven or presently non-actualised, and nevertheless gives it an 
operational reality for decisions, sentiments and predictions. Does James 
Clapper believe there is going to be a fire, or not? The subjunctive 
construction dismisses such binarism, and invites participants to accept that 
even if the fire may never happen, it is sufficiently disastrous that we must 
consider it a real basis for judgment and action. Uncertainty here is not 
counted as a penalty upon the quality of the proof, a negative lack of 
information, but an aspect of social reality in and of itself which demands a 
(rather certain) response.  
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The as-if is a common fixture in our language use across multiple media. In 
news photography, for example, the frozen image of a conflict, a wound, a 
death, serve to – provoke an emotional and speculative relationship to the 
information at hand, to consider: what might have happened after the 
photograph was taken? What could be happening in that conflict zone right 
now? (Zelizer 2010, p12-15) Entire genres of communication engage in the 
business of concretising the non-actual, rendering them affectively, 
discursively, available for operationalisation. In science fiction studies, 
Samuel R. Delany defines subjunctivity more broadly as “the tension on the 
thread of meaning that runs between” words; a “blanket indicative tension (or 
mood) [that] informs the whole series”, infusing the situation with a 
hypothetical presence. In these terms, the as-if of the Snowden Affair 
constitutes a kind of science fiction – a fiction that concerns itself with ‘events 
that could have happened’, whereas fantasy, for instance, concerns things that 
‘could not have happened’ in our universe (Delany 1971 p10-11). And despite 
science fiction’s traditionally low position in the cultural hierarchy, there are 
numerous historical linkages between its speculative theorising of our future 
and the real social history of computing and the Internet. Spacewar, MIT’s 
1962 video game that emblematised the move towards personal, real-time, 
‘free’ cultures of computing (Hu 2015, Chapter 1), was at the time strictly 
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envisioned as a nonorthodox attempt at applied science fiction (Milburne 
2015). The hacker-troll-activist collective Anonymous hit upon the ‘Guy 
Fawkes’ mask as its symbol through the Hollywood blockbuster V for 
Vendetta (Coleman 2014, p64), as well as the ‘Laughing Man’ from the 
Japanese sci-fi manga Ghost in the Shell (which, in turn, derived the figure 
from J.D. Salinger’s The Laughing Man). We shall see throughout the chapter 
how narrativisations of totalitarian surveillance, of ubiquitous terror threats, 
of suspects that just had to be stopped before they could conclusively prove 
their own guilt, all entail such leveraging of ‘fiction’ to render a mysterious 
and dangerous reality meaningful.  
 
In other words, subjunctivity often produces grey areas for bestowing 
speculative and hypothetical reasoning a disavowed form of veridical 
authority. Timothy Melley (2012) points out that the many secret institutions, 
practices, policies that make up the dark side of the US government – 
surveillance included – are often leaked into the public sphere through 
fictional literature and the use of speculation in official public discourse. He 
argues that the result is a public sphere of ‘structural irrationality’: as truth 
becomes regularly accessed through fictional detours (that are again explicitly 
known to be fictional-but-serious), there is contamination of the public use of 
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reason, or rather, a public faith in rational proof. But I do not want to speak 
the language of irrationality, if only to avoid a different kind of ideal fiction: 
that of the ‘normal’, properly rational knowledge purged of speculation. The 
point is that subjunctivity brokers the manifold connections between 
speculations about the explicitly uncertain and nonactual on one hand, and 
the operationalisation of knowledge – that is, turning knowns and certainties 
into judgment and action – on the other.  
 
These characteristics mark deployments of subjunctivity as highly ritualistic. 
Rituals have been called ‘time out of time’ (Rappaport 1999, p216-222), or 
liminal (Turner 1982) zones. They are moments which say, wait: let us step 
out of our rules and rhythms of life for a moment, so that they may be 
renewed and reaffirmed, or undergo localised changes (such as the change in 
status of an individual member in a rite of passage). In the Snowden Affair, 
we find subjunctive constructions that allow the audience to ‘play out’ 
totalitarian futures and next terrorist attacks – constructs where the boundary 
between such speculation and reality is even more porous. The simple refrain 
that ‘you never know’ thus invites the public to suture scenarios and 
simulations back into their assessment of ‘reality’. In context of the 
proliferation of unknowns that characterise early twenty-first century 
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electronic surveillance, subjunctivity offers the public one way to reconcile its 
enduring uncertainty about what it is supposed to have ‘known already’. 
 
*** 
 
As with recessive objects, the basic uncertainty underlying the Snowden 
Affair as an epistemological problem is that the individual can never be sure 
if he/she has been surveilled. This is the first as-if. The recessive juxtaposition 
of an apparently enormous and pervasive surveillance system, and the fact 
that the surveilled subject will rarely know if they have ever been ‘watched’ 
by a human agent, means that the public is essentially asked to generate 
outrage over something they cannot find any individualised trace of. 
Snowden and other opponents of NSA surveillance consistently attacked this 
recessivity – ironically, by projecting and combating another kind of as-if. 
Anti-NSA discourse consistently interpellated an imagined public which 
presumably thinks it is safe as long as it has not done anything ‘wrong’. A 
New York Times op-doc, “Why Care About the N.S.A.?” opened with a stern 
warning from David Sirota, a well-known political commentator: 
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Narrator:  I want to get your response to a few things people 
typically say who aren’t concerned about recent 
surveillance revelations.  
David Sirota: Nobody is looking at my stuff anyway, so I don’t care? 
My argument for that is if you don’t speak up for 
everybody’s rights, you better be ready for your own 
rights to be trampled when you least expect it. First and 
foremost, there are so many laws on the books, there are 
so many stat-utes out there, that you actually probably 
are doing something wrong… So when you start saying 
I’m not doing anything wrong… you better be really sure 
of that. (Knappenberger 2013) 
 
 
Figure 9. Legalese in flight. 
 
Sirota’s lines were accompanied by a dizzying array of legalese in flight 
(Fig.9). By shifting the subject’s gaze onto the bureaucratic and technological 
depths which almost entirely lie beyond everyday experience, the subject is 
divested of the ability to confirm or deny his/her own safety. This is distinct 
from the simple claim that the public is not safe. Rather, it is argued that the 
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public does not have the ability or resources to tell in the first place. The 
projected ‘common sensical’ subject is appealed to through an indeterminate 
what if. The reality of surveillance is emphasised not by recovering concrete 
surveillance practices from their recession, but by expanding their virtual 
dimension into an enormous, totalitarian as-if.   
 
This same technique is applied to the threat of terrorism. James Clapper 
quipped that PRISM is no different from fire insurance. But insurance 
developed its appeal by quantifying fearful indeterminacy into percentages 
and premiums. The strategic use of disaster statistics and risk percentages 
could claim to provide a stable and objectively factual knowledge of danger 
and vulnerability. As we shall see later in the chapter, such calculations are 
difficult to produce with respect to terrorism. In the face of a radically 
unpredictable threat, state surveillance has practiced, and justified itself on 
the basis of, a subjunctive reasoning: everybody72 needs to be watched, 
treated as if they are suspect. One key metaphor for NSA surveillance 
programs is the dragnet – a term traditionally used to describe police activities 
                                                          
72 As we noted in Chapter 1, this ‘everybody’ rarely means literally everybody. There is a 
general tendency to over-imagine the threat of the black, Muslim, male and mentally deviant 
– a tendency which is reflected in some state / local government operations. We might point 
to the NYPD’s multi-year surveillance of Muslim neighbourhoods and Muslim-owned shops, 
seemingly purely for reasons of demographic, that ultimately yielded no solid leads and two 
lawsuits (See Associated Press 2012; Calamur 2016). 
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like location-wide stop and frisks. The dragnet indiscriminately collects data 
on the innocent as well as the suspicious, highly relevant data as well as 
irrelevant ones. After all, the innocent can always turn out to be the criminal, 
and the most irrelevant piece of data may help triangulate his/her identity. 
Within this rationality, surveillance is not, strictly speaking, proven to be 
necessary by past terror attacks or present identification of concrete dangers. 
Proof is always deferred: we must act as if the efficacy of this program has 
been proven by a danger which, if we are right, we will prevent from ever 
actualising. It is no surprise that many commentators have taken to Minority 
Report – more often the Steven Spielberg film adaptation than the original 
Philip K. Dick story – as a glossary for parsing the juridical and civil rights 
consequences of the NSA and its UK counterpart, the GCHQ (Burris 2016, 
Anthony 2015). 
 
Subjunctivity is one name for how public figures present the world of 
surveillance. Importantly, this presentation is also a part of public subjects’ 
epistemic relationship to that complicated and distant world. The public is 
enjoined to engage in subjunctive readings of media discourse on surveillance 
in order to navigate this tangle of complex and often contradictory claims. 
Consider the efforts to assess the legality of surveillance from the public end. 
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Snowden’s revelations were, at least, generally accepted in the media as solid, 
reliable information about the technical process of NSA surveillance. 
However, the precise legality of each given practice, and indeed, the question 
of who actually knows about and guarantees each practice, was often 
explicitly designated as uncertain. As one headline put it: ‘You’ll Never Know 
if the NSA Is Breaking the Law’ (Bump, 2013). On one level, it is suggested 
that there are so many different programs, legal decisions, secret courts and 
procedures involved, the public will ‘always’ be left uncertain as to its 
legality. On another level, we cannot presume that the reading public is a 
homogeneous mind with full access to every piece of information made 
available to them. The ‘we’ of ‘we knew already’ simply does not exist in such 
a simple form. Most subjects are likely to experience a partial picture, based 
on their limited reading and recall, of conflicting arguments and claims made 
in public. One may not keep up with every Snowden leak, tell apart 
XKEYSCORE from PRISM, or even understand exactly what counts as 
metadata and what doesn’t. But it is more than possible to take away a 
general picture: the idea that the legality of surveillance is uncertain, and that 
any opinion or action we take will have to happen in abeyance of that 
knowledge.  
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All of this resonates with the paranoid structure of recessive relations. 
Chapter 1 showed how even as Snowden provides new information to the 
general public, his leaks also provoke further speculation – and for some, 
downright conspiracy. Media, in its constant exposés, cultivate in the public a 
“persistent feeling that ‘there is always something” (Horn 2012, p118). In this 
context, subjunctivity is not just something we defer to when we feel that we 
are in the dark; it is also a way of making use of the information that we 
consider to be ‘fully known’ to further speculate upon what remains 
unknown. The US state surveillance system is vast – and it is far from being a 
singular system at all, comprised as it is of tens of thousands of employees 
and private contractors. Since such a complex and secret apparatus cannot 
ever be fully accounted for in public, subjunctivity becomes a way to 
constantly approximate the dark side of the known. In this way, one journalist 
applied the lessons of the Snowden leaks to speculate on the presidential 
contest between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in 2012: 
 
Did the Obama Administration ever spy on Mitt Romney during the 
recent presidential contest? Alex Tabarrok, who raised the question at 
the popular economics blog Marginal Revolution, acknowledges that it 
is provocative. Until recently, he would've regarded it as a ‘loony’ 
question, he writes, and he doesn't think that President Obama ordered 
the NSA to spy on Romney for political gain.  
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Let's be clear: I don't think so either. […] But I agree with Tabarrok that 
today, ‘the only loonies are those who think the question 
unreasonable.’ Most Americans have a strong intuition that spying and 
electoral manipulation of that kind could never happen here. I share 
that intuition, but I know it's nonsense: the Nixon 
Administration did spy on its opponents for political gain 
(Friedersdorf 2013). 
 
The rhetoric goes: no, Barack Obama probably did not spy on Mitt Romney; 
but yes, the threat is real, and the threat is to be communicated in the form of 
this spying that did not happen. Paranoid epistemology is thus recommended 
as a realistic and timely response to the available facts. In 2015, The Atlantic 
ran an exemplary piece named “If you’re not paranoid, you’re crazy”: 
 
Not long ago, my wife left town on business and I texted her to say 
good night. ‘Sleep tight and don’t let the bedbugs bite,’ I wrote. I was 
unsettled the next morning when I found, atop my list of e-mails, a 
note from an exterminator offering to purge my house of bedbugs. If 
someone had told me even a few years ago that such a thing wasn’t 
pure coincidence, I would have had my doubts about that someone. 
Now, however, I reserve my doubts for the people who still trust. 
There are so many ghosts in our machines – their locations so hidden, 
their methods so ingenious, their motives so inscrutable – that not to 
feel haunted is not to be awake. That’s why paranoia, even in its 
extreme forms, no longer seems to me so much a disorder as a mode of 
cognition with an impressive track record of prescience (Kirn 2015). 
 
The anthropologist Mary Douglas once asked: why do experts insist on 
educating the public about issues like climate change? Don’t they realise that 
the more information becomes available, the more possible interpretations 
 
 
 
188 
 
 
arise, and the more intractable a sensitive topic becomes? (2001, p. 146) The 
proliferation of subjunctive reasoning is one way in which information and 
uncertainty enters into a mutually generative relationship.  
 
*** 
 
Subjunctive reasoning was popular not only in the media conversation and 
the challenges faced by intelligence agencies, but in the everyday techniques 
offered to citizens as a way to protect themselves from surveillance. Since the 
initial leaks, Edward Snowden embraced his new name recognition with the 
wider public by dispensing advice on how to stay safe in this newly 
dangerous (Or rather, newly realised to have been dangerous) digital world: 
 
Micah Lee:  What are some operational security practices you 
think everyone should adopt? Just useful 
stuff for average people. 
 
Edward Snowden:  […] The first step that anyone could take is to 
encrypt their phone calls and their text messages. 
You can do that through the smartphone app 
Signal, by Open Whisper Systems. It’s free, and 
you can just download it immediately. And 
anybody you’re talking to now, their 
communications, if it’s intercepted, can’t be read 
by adversaries […] You should encrypt your hard 
disk […] Use a password manager […] The other 
thing there is two-factor authentication (Lee 2015).  
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Operational security, or OPSEC, in fact originates from the US military. The 
US Department of Defense defines it as “the process by which we protect 
unclassified information that can be used against us” (US Department of 
Defense Education Activity n.d.). In effect, Snowden is adding to our already 
lengthy list of practices that constitute our ‘digital hygiene’: the things the 
individual user must do to “kee[p] her data from mixing with others, for 
avoiding infection with computer viruses, and so forth.” (Hu 2015, p57) But 
these practices themselves enact a recessive, simulational relationship. 
Consider AVG PrivacyFix (Fig.10), one of many simpler tools which promise 
to protect against state and/or corporate surveillance. It is all too easy: a few 
clicks, yellow and white symbols flashing into a reassuring green, and one is 
allegedly safer. Certainly, there is no doubt that, say, opting out of Google’s 
peer-recommended ad system (where your reviews and comments are used 
to sell the product to your friends) restricts the commercial exploitation of 
your personal data, of your trace-body. But when privacy tools proudly 
inform you that 42,787 trackers have been blocked so far, or that your worth 
to Twitter has declined from $30 to $25, such feedback emphasises the fact 
that the user cannot directly perceive the myriad of threats they are exposed 
to. This is also the case with examples like alternative webmail or instant 
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messaging services (Greenberg 2014). ‘Digital hygiene’ begins to replicate our 
modern relationship to health and hygiene: just as ‘health’ is merely a 
temporary and relative freedom from pathologies, into which we may slip 
back at any moment and therefore require our unending vigilance, there can 
be no escape from the threat of surveillance (Hacking 1990, p160). Edward 
Snowden himself acknowledges the impossibility of becoming ‘clean’: 
 
 
Figure 10. AVG PrivacyFix. 
 
You will still be vulnerable to targeted surveillance. If there is a 
warrant against you if the NSA is after you they are still going to get 
you. But mass surveillance that is untargeted and collect-it-all 
approach you will be much safer [with these basic steps] (Inside.com 
2014). 
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In other words, the subject’s feeling safe enough is predicated on his/her 
ability to live on as if whatever tools chosen (including none) has provided 
sufficient protection against this unknown and silent risk. While we can 
generally never know if someone has hacked into our email and read its 
contents, subjects are invited to prepare as if the worst will happen – and 
then, proceed with our life as if we know we are now safe. It is significant that 
Snowden and other activists view the difficulty and complexity of most 
privacy tools as the primary barrier against their wider uptake, and look 
forward to a future where they become unobtrusive, backgrounded. There is 
a clear parallel between self-surveillance devices and privacy tools for digital 
hygiene: in both cases, the pressure to achieve widespread ‘buy-in’ ends up 
promoting a black-boxed understanding of the battle over data. Good 
hygienic citizens, just like good self-caring, self-managing citizens, are 
educated towards not a radical break with data-driven epistemology or 
genuine expertise, but an allegedly ‘healthier’ mode of engagement and 
dependency.   
 
Edward Snowden: We should armor ourselves using systems we can 
rely on every day. This doesn’t need to be an 
extraordinary lifestyle change […] It should be 
invisible, it should be atmospheric, it should be 
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something that happens painlessly, effortlessly. 
This is why I like apps like Signal, because they’re 
low friction. It doesn’t require you to re-order your 
life […] You can use it right now to talk to your 
friends (Lee, 2015). 
 
This is not to say that more radical forms of resistance are ideal. Consider the 
practices of camouflage, protest and reverse-watching that have sometimes 
passed under the name of sousveillance: sous (below) + veiller (to look).73 Artist 
Leo Selvaggio (n.d.) has produced a variety of mask kits – 3D printed 
photorealistic, paper cutouts, or in the form of software that maps the mask 
onto the user’s face in video feeds – modelled after his own face as a way to 
resist CCTVs and facial recognition software (Fig.11). Such solutions join a 
larger group of non-practical demonstrations: the anonymous Surveillance 
Camera Man (n.d.) roams the streets, public spaces and private buildings of 
Seattle with a camcoder, raising the question of why many citizens respond so 
viscerally to his camera but passively accept top-down CCTVs.74 Yet these 
practices, often staged by artists, clearly are not intended to replace digital 
                                                          
73 Sousveillance need not be defined as political or resistant, and some have attempted to 
subdivide the practice through terms like ‘inverse surveillance’. Here, we focus on strategies 
of watching back / surveillance-avoidance clearly designed to resist the proliferation of state 
and corporate surveillance. 
74 Such projects stylise surveillance resistance in a way that has been criticised as merely 
spectacular and fashionable ‘aestheticisation of resistance’ (Monahan 2015). While I do not 
entirely disagree, here I am concerned with highlighting their role in the broader imaginary 
of ubiquitous, hyperobjective surveillance.  
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hygiene and other ordinary habits. Even as such performances seek to ‘raise 
awareness’ about surveillance and ‘provoke debate’, they work to further 
visibilise surveillance as a kind of ubiquitous miasma. 
 
 
Figure 11. Leo Selvaggio’s face mask. 
 
In Chapter 1, I had referred to ‘public secrets’: something which is widely 
‘known’ but not articulated, such that one must actively ‘not-know’ (Taussig 
1998). Public secrets essentially smuggle secrets into the public realm; by 
‘knowing what not to know’, savvy actors can participate in the benefits of 
knowledge without giving the game away. Subjunctivity follows a similar 
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mechanism. It deploys what is formally hypothetical and unproven in the 
form of a disavowed knowledge. The as-if leverages the receded, virtual 
enormity of ‘surveillance’ to furnish an expanded field of what counts as 
knowledge. 
 
FABRICATION 
Subjunctive relations were not confined to media rhetoric, or even to the 
public’s positioning vis-à-vis knowledge and secret. Subjunctivity’s 
popularity in the public presentation of surveillance reflected a parallel turn 
towards potentiality and ‘sufficient’ proof in the American government’s 
effort to mobilise surveillance for counter-terrorism purposes.  
 
One key aspect of subjunctivity in counter-terrorism has already been subject 
to extensive research and commentary: the growing linkage of 
simulationionist and otherwise ‘hypothetical’ analysis for the purposes of 
anticipatory and pre-emptive interventions. From simulations of terrorist 
networks based on computational models (e.g. Moon & Carley 2007) to 
elaborately designed, physically enacted scenarios training civilians to 
respond to terror attacks (e.g. Adey & Anderson 2012), the US and numerous 
other states have expanded old techniques and developed new ones to 
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actualise and ‘play with’ the possibility of every kind of terrorist attack. These 
strategies sometimes directly enrolled the public, enjoining them to internalise 
and practice a form of ‘lateral surveillance’ (Andrejevic 2005) that some have 
described as banalisation of insecurity (Monahan 2010; Bauman & Lyon 2013). 
At other times, the state’s simulations of dangers might intersect with the 
media and public imagination of dangers and of state simulations themselves, 
further normalising a subjunctive ground for debate and opinion. In 2015, a 
map used in the US military’s ‘Jade Helm’ training exercises – which were 
already controversial –  was leaked to the public, provoking commentary, 
speculation and conspiratorial interpretation. The map, detailing one of Jade 
Helm’s mock scenarios, showed Texas as a ‘hostile state’, which friendly 
(labelled ‘permissive’) states like California and Colorado might help subdue 
(Davidson 2015). At the same time, a different rumour made the rounds – that 
concrete ISIS terrorist bases had been discovered in Texas. Senator Ted Cruz, 
“fresh from his Jade Helm inquiry”, and in a few short months about to run 
for President on promises of being tough on Islamic terrorists, accused the 
incumbent government of failing to connect the dots. A mock military 
scenario and an unconfirmed rumour had mutually reinforced each other’s 
status as half-truth, or rather, operationalisable fiction. One poll of registered 
Republican voters immediately following the leaks pegged 32% as “think[ing] 
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that the Government is trying to take over Texas” (Public Policy Polling 2015). 
The linkage between virtues of ‘preparedness’ and predictivity, and the 
practice of simulationist and otherwise hypothetical epistemologies, has 
emerged as a key facet of counter-terrorist strategies in early twenty-first 
century America (also see Adey 2009; Aradau & van Munster 2012; Anderson 
2012; Massumi 2007, 2010). 
 
This section focuses on one specific practice that intersects electronic 
surveillance and counter-terrorist efforts – one which exemplifies the 
subjunctive epistemology at the heart of practical operations. What I call 
fabrication is the deliberate, planned, and increasingly systematic practice of 
producing what sufficiently ‘counts’ as evidence in counter-terrorism 
operations. Here, surveillance combines with traditional human intelligence 
work to cajole, instruct, encourage, coax a suspected danger into something 
that can legally count as ‘real enough’ and thereby legitimise action. Such 
strategies have come to occupy a central role in the FBI’s counter-terrorist 
operations since September 2001 – a shift which was accompanied by a belief 
that the uncertainties surrounding Lone Wolves-to-be had to be pre-
emptively dispelled, and by a contemporaneous establishment of online 
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communications infrastructures75 and large scale databases for informants 
(Aaronson 2013). While sting operations have been part and parcel of FBI 
operations for decades, fabrication blurs the distinctions separating sting ops 
from downright entrapment.76 Assisted by telecommunications surveillance,  
and motivated by political pressure to prevent ‘all’ threats, strategies of 
fabrication exemplify the ways in which subjunctive reasoning is mobilised to 
legitimate specific practices for producing truth and certainty. The word 
‘fabrication’ today applies a pejorative judgment to the original meaning – 
fabricatus, to construct, to build, to make. But it is not my intention to imply 
that all of this is a farce. In the context of New Terrorism, where one must 
grapple with inexhaustible unknowns and nevertheless force through a 
sufficient basis for knowledge and action, fabrication emerges as an eminently 
sensible and risk-conscious practice appropriate to a paranoid epistemology.  
 
                                                          
75 The classic distinction between sting operations / agent provocateurs and entrapment is that 
in the latter, the subject is judged to have been predisposed to commit the crime regardless of 
government encouragement or facilitation – a distinction which in the United States is 
typically tested through both ‘subjective’ (was the subject predisposed?) and ‘objective’ 
(would the government’s actions have pushed a ‘normal’ citizen to crime?) standards. I do 
not present fabrication as a third category in this general typology of law enforcement 
strategies. Rather, it constitutes a concrete example of subjunctive knowledge production at 
work in the state surveillance context, in the form of a localised derivation of existing 
production strategies in counter-terrorism and law enforcement institutions.  
76 As Aaronson (2013) recounts, the FBI had been so averse to computerisation on the 
operations side that before September 11, most agents could not search the Internet from their 
office computers, and informants were managed locally through personal relationships with 
agents.  
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*** 
 
In 2011, an FBI sting operation began to form around Sami Osmakac. A 
Kosovo-born American and Muslim, his trusted Muslim friend had 
introduced him to a man named Dabus, an FBI informant who in turn 
connected Osmakac to an undercover agent named ‘Amir Jones’. To that 
point, Osmakac’s record of suspicious activity included a tendency to verbally 
criticise democracy, argue for his religion in combative and fundamentalist 
terms – and one streetside fisticuffs with a Christian street preacher that had 
recently gotten him arrested. In other words, little in the way of convictable 
behaviour. After meeting Dabus and Jones, however, Osmakac was supplied 
with money, with which he could purchase (fake, prepared) weapons and 
explosives; he was trained in their use; and he was even given money for a 
taxi so he could show up to his own attack spot, where he was finally arrested 
by the FBI. During the process, the FBI agents spoke of Osmakac as a 
‘retarded fool’ who needed the FBI’s support to turn his ‘pipe-dream scenario’ 
into any semblance of a real threat – a result which they referred to as a 
‘Hollywood ending’ (Aaronson 2015). The FBI provided material and 
psychological encouragement that allowed Osmakac to become ‘dangerous 
enough’ to be legally and operationally eligible for arrest. Of course, this also 
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means that it becomes impossible to ever confirm whether Osmakac would 
have acted without such encouragement; the price of a pre-emptive certainty 
is the absolute unconfirmability of justice. A similar strategy has been 
employed with numerous other American suspects.77 One report estimates 
that around 30% of counter-terrorism convictions between 2002 and 2011 
were fabricated through stings (Human Rights Watch 2014). In the case of José 
Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah al-Muhajir, this subjunctive reasoning was sufficient 
to approve three years of detention without formal charges – and, possibly, 
torture (a claim made by Padilla and his lawyers and denied by the 
government). Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense at the 
time, made it clear that the state stands behind this new standard in 
preemptive action: 
 
There was not [that is, Padilla did not yet have] an actual plan. We 
stopped this man in the initial planning stages, but it does underscore 
the continuing importance of focusing particularly on those people 
who may be pursuing chemical, or biological or radiological or nuclear 
                                                          
77 Osmakac thus joins other (predominantly, but not always, Muslim and/or of Arab descent) 
Americans whose antisocial, delusional or otherwise mentally non-normative conditions 
were relentlessly manufactured into apparent proof of violent intentions and the capacity to 
carry them through. Matthew Llaneza, for instance, was an American of Filipino, Anglo-Irish 
and Hispanic descent who was later described by an FBI informant as having ‘the mind of a 
little child’. Having converted to Islam and grown a beard, his drunk ravings of Allah Akbar at 
a house party, combined with wild boasts about knowing how to build guns (despite being 
unable to rake leaves in the back yard as instructed), were treated very seriously in 
assembling charges against him. Eventually, he too was contacted by an undercover agent, 
encouraged to plot in words a bombing attack, and duly arrested (Bergen 2016). 
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weapons. This is one such individual (Kozaryn 2002; also see Adey 
2009). 
 
Subjunctive reasoning has been central to the justification of fabrication 
strategies both internally and externally. The two dimensions come together 
in the case of Basaaly Saeed Moalin, a Somali American arrested in 2013. 
Moalin was a crucial case for the ability to publicly ‘know’ the benefits of 
surveillance. Although one or two other cases, like Najibullah Zazi’s, had 
been cited as having prevented through dragnet surveillance, Moalin was – at 
the time of writing – the single known case, the single point of certainty, that 
could show the benefits of spying to ordinary Americans (Schwartz 2015).78 
Yet the construction of this claim to certainty was also predicated on 
strategies of fabrication. Arrested on charges of conspiracy and material 
support for terrorism – specifically, posting $8,500 to a Somali contact 
associated with the jihadist group al-Shabaab – the prosecution argued that 
Moalin’s frequent phone calls and money transfers supported terrorism. Once 
again, Moalin had to be apprehended before he could produce any further 
certainty or concrete knowledge; it was argued that to wait for ‘proper’ proof 
would be unacceptably negligent of real dangers posed by the suspect. 
                                                          
78 Moalin’s case, at the time of writing, remains the only specific case where the American 
government has publicly cited a ‘critical’ reliance on NSA metadata surveillance. Of course, 
the qualifier is ‘publicly’; the public has consistently been reminded, often by the state itself, 
that there must be additional proof that must remain secret.  
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In court, the defence directly contested this interpretation of available 
evidence – and in doing so, publicy exposed the fabrications as a set of 
uncertain and primordial indices oriented towards certainty. Picking apart 
Moalin’s phone calls collected by telecommunications surveillance, the 
defence argued that his comments about ‘jihad’ referred to a local jihad in his 
native Somalia against the Ethiopians; that his money transfers to his 
homeland had gone to projects for schools and orphanages; and, indeed, that 
no record showed any definitive statement in support of terrorist attack 
(Nakashima 2013). The defense went as far to submit to the court alternative 
transcriptions to Moalin’s Somali calls, and even enlisted cultural 
interpretations. Moalin’s cousins argued that his talk was a well recognised 
form of fadhi ku dirir (literally ‘sitting and fighting’), a bullish and aggressive 
but ultimately noncontroversial form of argumentation common amongst 
Somali men (Schwartz 2015). Since Moalin was apprehended before he could 
supply further certainty in the form of a violent attack or concrete statements 
referring to one, surveillance and arrest had to be justified through 
subjunctive and paranoid readings of relatively cryptic comments like the 
following: 
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BASAALY [Moalin]:  We are not less worthy than the guys 
fighting. 
ISSA:  Yes, that’s it. It’s said that it takes an equal 
effort to make a knife; whether one makes 
the handle part, hammers the iron, or bakes 
it in the fire (from Schwartz 2015). 
 
The palpable gap between Moalin’s words and the eventual charges (of 
conspiracy and material support for terrorism) echoes the recessive 
relationships in the Snowden Affair. Fabrication thus fulfils the crucial role of 
constructing a rationality for subjunctive judgment and action. While some 
degree of fabrication is by definition a necessary part of any preemptive 
measure, this period saw a visible embrace of more speculative forms of 
knowledge that could license more actively interventionist efforts – largely 
because it was thought that the threats of New Terrorism did not permit the 
luxury of greater proof and certainty. If these suspects were being directed 
and shaped on the basis of potential rather than actual danger, operatives and 
politicians argued, so be it: such pre-emption is the only way to ever ‘know 
enough’ in time to stop the next attack. This attitude was founded in the 
recriminatory, zero-tolerance climate established by America’s heightened 
sensitivity to terrorist threat in the wake of September 11.79 Here we may turn 
                                                          
79 We return to this doctrine, and its connection to the new conceptualisation of risks, later in 
the chapter. The idea that America “can’t afford to wait”, riding the crest of public concern 
over September 11, spread in this period to many areas of intelligence and military activity, 
including R&D funding for preventative measures in biological warfare (Cooper 2006).  
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to a third case: Ehsanul ‘Shifa’ Sadequee. In 2005, Sadequee, 19 years old, was 
arrested and sentenced to 17 years in prison for suspicious activity that 
largely comprised of translating jihad-related texts, talking big online, and 
producing a ludicrously amateur ‘casing video’ in Washington D.C. In 
Sadequee’s case, there was no active fabrication, at least none that has been 
disclosed publicly; but it was another instance in which highly primordial 
activities and discussions, which might at most be said to ‘encourage’ 
terrorism, was mobilised to eliminate the target from social existence. In a rare 
moment, Sadequee’s family journeyed to meet Philip Mudd – the man who 
had, as deputy director of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre at the time, 
had a direct hand in the case. Mudd, while courteous and sympathetic to 
Sadequee’s family, insisted on the necessity of such an action: 
 
People like me are in a difficult position. We cannot afford to let 
dozens of innocent people die because a youth makes a mistake […] If 
we switched roles, what would you do? What would you do? Would 
you let him go? (Barker 2016) 
 
The ‘zero-tolerance’ policy renders epistemic uncertainty intolerable. It is far 
less acceptable to respect the rights of suspects, because one cannot write off 
any attack as an ‘acceptable’ or unavoidable loss. And yet, in so many cases, 
especially that of lone wolves and ‘home-grown’ terrorists, the possibility of 
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crime remains uncertain until it is too late to intervene. Fabrication fills this 
gap, ensuring that uncertainties are coaxed into the realm of sufficiently 
known. Thus zero risk, worst case scenario, and the changing status and 
nature of ‘proof’ are all arranged to follow rationally from each other. 
 
These trends within intelligence agencies and surveillance-driven counter-
terrorism practices were complemented by a wider political and military of 
fabrication. Indeed, the problem of fabricating sufficient knowledge out of 
Moalin’s communications is formally analogous to the most infamous case of 
speculative proof in the period: the alleged presence of weapons of mass 
destruction [WMD] in Iraq, which functioned as a crucial casus belli 
domestically and internationally for US invasion. In February 2003, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell famously presented the US administration’s case for war 
to the UN Security Council. Amongst the ‘facts and conclusions based on 
solid intelligence’ (Powell 2003) he offered were foreign communications data 
intercepted by the NSA. In the first excerpt, an Iraqi colonel vaguely referred 
to “this modified vehicle … what do we say if one of them sees it?” In the 
second and third, there were equally broad references to “forbidden ammo” – 
and then, in a rare moment of relative specificity, an order to “remove the 
expression ‘nerve agents’ from wireless instructions.” (Bamford 2008, p144) 
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From arresting Muslim American teens to justifying regional war, the 
accepted standard of what constitutes ‘sufficient’ certainty was undergoing a 
significant adjustment to meet an allegedly more uncertain reality. 
 
Another key case in this trend was the emergence of drone warfare as a major 
player in military counter-terrorist operations. The Barack Obama 
administration (2009-2016) enthusiastically embraced drones – or, technically, 
unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV]. The language of a ‘clean’ war expressed the 
vision where hi-tech surveillance and its predictive knowledge production 
would erase enemy combatants – and only enemy combatants – before the 
messy and contagious violence of traditional warfare could begin (e.g. 
Gregory 2011; Singer 2009b). Of course, no technology is guaranteed an 
infallible claim to ‘effectiveness’, but rather must socially construct standards 
and measures like accuracy and precision (Gates 2011, p7, 48). Since the first 
confirmed use of UAVs in a ‘kill operation’, variously pegged as late 2001 or 
early 2002 (Sifton 2012; Woods 2015; also see Singer 2009a, p33-5), drone 
warfare has been dogged by public consternation over how this complex, 
human-nonhuman system (see Asaro 2013) ‘knows’ to kill. In a parallel to the 
state defense of NSA surveillance, the justification of drone strikes have often 
fallen back on secret proof and publicly unverifiable knowledge. What the 
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Snowden files show in this regard is the state’s active production of the right 
numbers, the right categories, the right standards, that would allow the 
construction of sufficient certainty for each drone strike, and sufficient proof 
for its justification. Leaked files on drone operations in the Hindu Kush 
between May and September 2012 thus show a tendency to label unknown 
casualties as ‘enemies killed in action’ [EKIA]; the victims of drone strikes, 
eviscerated from afar, thus ‘count’ towards the justice of their own deaths 
until proven otherwise. Ultimately, the said operations – dubbed 
HAYMAKER – report 54 drone strikes yielding 157 EKIA, but only 19 
‘jackpots’, or specific targets known to be dangerous (Devereaux 2015; also 
see Greenwald 2016). Often, the victims’ basic demographic identity as 
“military-age males [MAM] in a strike zone” was sufficient to mark them for 
a speculative and deindividualised death (Becker & Shane 2012; also see 
Dasse & Kessler 2007, p420). Speaking about the case of Basaaly Moalin, Keith 
Alexander, then director of the NSA, explained the logic at work: to find the 
‘bad guys, “I need to know who his network of friends are, because chances 
are many of them are bad, too.” (Schwartz 2015) Where Arab Muslims in the 
Middle East were fabricated into targets – and then killed – based on physical 
proximity, Arab Muslims in the United States were fabricated into threats, 
and sometimes arrested, based on communicative proximity. Across the 
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knowledge production work in drone warfare and sting operations, we find 
the same problem: the ethical consequences of a system of classification and a 
standard for sufficient proof (see Ananny 2016). The proliferation of 
subjunctive reason and its fabrication strategies legitimises an environment 
where being ‘close enough’, physically and metaphorically, is increasingly 
enough to count as guilty. 
 
INTERPASSIVITY 
If the only people qualified to hold opinions are those who ‘have all the 
facts,’ then politics is not our responsibility. Politics is something that 
other people do, but not us […] The public exists elsewhere, not in our 
town, where regular people live (Eliasoph 1998, p134) 
 
We do not ‘really’ believe that politics may deliver everything it 
promises […] Nevertheless, as noticed, we do feel an intense 
connection to the political process and we do expect it to ‘deliver’ (Van 
Oenen 2006, p53-4). 
 
If subjunctivity was about pulling in potentiality and the future to ‘count’ for 
the work of knowing, then interpassivity is about pulling in others, human 
and machinic, to fulfil some part of the knowing ‘for me’, ‘in stead of me’. We 
have seen many aspects of this already in Chapter 1, though from a different 
conceptual vantage point. It is the NSA’s Michael Hayden (2006), assuring the 
public that he absolutely trusts the NSA analysts with our personal 
information, and so we should his their trust in the NSA. It is Edward 
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Snowden, or Glenn Greenwald, the court, activists, or even the nonhuman 
documents, standing in for large sections of the public that lack access – 
practical or absolute – to the ‘full information’ for judgment. And it is even 
the idea of a general uproar over surveillance, the sense that ‘the public’ or 
‘American society’ is working themselves up about it, that justice is being 
served (or worried that its ‘national security’ is being compromised). 
Interpassivity thus describes the modality of knowing proper to the 
distributed and recessive characters of knowledge production in the 
surveillance society.  
 
Interpassivity originally arose from art and media theory as a converse to the 
cliché of interactivity, and then was developed as a theory for a wider range 
of social process primarily through the writings of Slavoj Žižek, Robert Pfaller 
and Gijs van Oenen (Pfaller 2003; Scholzel 2014; Van Oenen 2002). Though 
each articulation is distinct, they tend to revolve around one general relation: 
‘not me, but another for me’. Someone else believes, so that even if I do not, it 
remains a kind of ‘truth’ (Žižek n.d.). I Xerox a book or VCR a television 
show, and become satisfied that I have nearly consumed it – almost as if the 
machine has ‘watched it for me’ (Pfaller 2003). This subjective ‘outsourcing’ 
(Van Oenen 2002), has numerous practical uses. Interpassivity allows subjects 
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to ‘know’ that which may not be supported by their own behaviour, identity 
and environment in any immediate sense. This is the idea that ‘I’ may not 
believe in a conspiracy theory, but others do; that although I am not offended 
by a bad joke or violent footage, other people might.80 In such cases, the 
interpassive articulation partially excuses the subject from being bound to the 
belief in question – even as that belief is hypostatised into assumed reality, 
thereby forming a concrete basis for opinions and actions. Indeed, “delegating 
one’s beliefs [can make] them stronger than before” (Pfaller 2001, p37); the 
claims about states of affairs are externalised from the speaker’s own 
experience, becoming more difficult to dismiss as a mere flight of fancy. We 
are familiar with this mechanism, of course, in the work of rumour. The 
conceit ‘I have heard it said elsewhere’ holds the truthfulness of the rumour in 
constant suspense, adding to its resilience. And such interpassive 
characterisations have been particularly important to mediated ideas of the 
public. The modern notion of the public has ever been predicated on the 
                                                          
80 This aspect of interpassivity intersects with what communication literature more typically 
recognises as the third-person effect. The latter focuses specifically on the imagined impact of 
mass communications: i.e. the belief that violent rap music or sensational misinformation 
would affect a broad category of ‘others’ more than they do myself. Interpassivity, as I use it 
here, includes and goes beyond the third-person effect. Here, the other is not simply the 
gullible or otherwise weaker party, but often provides functions that the self or his/her 
immediate environment is incapable of fulfilling. Hence the other can ‘know’ in my stead, or 
politically participate for me – and the other can also include nonhuman actors, like 
technological objects or institutional systems.  
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ability to imagine silent majorities and other ‘Others’ behind each singular 
spokesperson or representation (see Hong 2014). 
 
One prima facie reading of interpassivity is that it is a kind of divestment; a 
disempowering alienation of the subject from his/her own activity (including 
‘knowing’). Intersecting with contemporary critiques of participatory politics, 
Žižek calls interpassivity a form of ‘false activity’ where upper-middle-class 
academic may celebrate (or condemn, it matters not) the revolutions of others, 
and where the VCR will record the television show while the subject labours, 
as if rest and relaxation has been had (Žižek 1998, p6-7). Yet interpassivity is 
not simply a problem where the ceaseless activity of deputising machines 
masks the absence of the real thing. To be passive, and to have others do in 
one’s stead, takes a different kind of work on the subject end. If digital 
activism is a mere simulation of real protest, and social media platforms a 
diluted form of meaningful sociability, the likes, retweets, emails constitute a 
kind of maintenance – the labour required to stay connected to others, 
intelligible as a public subject, countable as data (also see Matviyenko 2015)81. 
                                                          
81 Such ‘maintenance work’ is at a more general level than the problem of ‘free labour’ in the 
digital economy, where subjects are enrolled into unpaid, immaterial forms of work to 
support the allegedly free circulation of information and culture (e.g. Terranova 2000; 
Andrejevic 2010). Rather, I am referring to the ways in which allegedly ‘passive’ forms of 
consumption and public citizenship in new media societies nevertheless occupy us in 
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Interpassivity cannot be isolated onto a single side of the active/passive coin. 
Where Žižek and others tend to perceive the divestment of activity and the 
blooming of ‘secondary’ activity as duplicitious and disempowering, I focus 
on the ways in which interpassivity is leveraged as a mechanism for 
knowledge and meaning. 
 
*** 
 
Here’s the rub: the instances where [NSA surveillance] has produced 
good – has disrupted plots, prevented terrorist attacks, is all classified, 
that’s what’s so hard about this. 
-Dianne Feinstein (in Knowlton 2013) 
 
Such was the public defence raised by Dianne Feinstein, itself a part of a 
broader public relations effort by state actors in the wake of the Snowden 
leaks. Feinstein had been Chairman of the US State Select Committee on 
Intelligence (also called Senate Intelligence Committee), a major oversight 
body for state intelligence activities. This external auditor to the NSA’s 
surveillance programs was now joining the fray to defend intelligence 
agencies’ right to remain shielded from public oversight. The form of this 
                                                          
interpassive engagement, engagement that has been criticised as ‘mindless frenetic activity’ 
(Žižek 1998, p7). (also see Crary 2013; Han 2010) 
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apology is a simple one: if only you knew what we know, you would feel as 
we do – provided, of course, that you believe us that we even know anything. 
Of course, such appeals to the secret, the publicly unknown, is so often paired 
with a controlled leak, an open secret (Melley 2012). Even as one insists that 
the proof of surveillance’s efficacy is secret, something about that secret is 
described, characterised, with impunity (literally, without the ability to be 
validated). Hence Feinstein was joined by General Keith Alexander, then 
Director of the NSA; Mike Rogers, a Republican senator and part of the House 
Intelligence Committee; and, presumably advised by them, President Barack 
Obama. All three insisted that a very specific number of fifty-four terrorist 
attacks had been thwarted, “saving real lives” (Elliott & Meyer 2013; Sterman 
2014), as a result of the surveillance programs in question. As we have already 
seen, it was not long until Alexander and others had to backpedal to just one 
concrete case: the 2009 bombing plot by Najibullah Zazi (Clarke et al. 2013; 
Angwin 2014). Yet the idea that surveillance ‘saves lives’ continued to 
circulate in public debates; interpassive knowledge, like rumour, often 
develops a distributed and resilient network of veridical authority. 
 
These kinds of claims do more than simply claim the public’s ignorance of ‘all 
the facts’. They also demand that public deliberation take place in full 
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awareness of that ignorance. Feinstein’s apology asks the reading public to 
actively hold their judgment in abeyance. More than that, they ask that public 
knowledge is constructed by simulating the judgment, the affects, of another. 
Just a few weeks after Snowden’s initial leaks, Keith Alexander made an 
appearance at Black Hat, a major information security conference well known 
for its hacker contingent. (The very name ‘black hat’ references hackers that 
attack secure systems, and although many conference attendees have 
traditionally been closer to ‘white hat’s working to protect such systems.) 
Undeterred by some skeptical and angry catcallers (O’Harrow Jr. 2013), 
Alexander pitched his appearance as a no-nonsense presentation of the facts, 
an occasion for setting the record straight: 
 
[NSA analysts’] reputation is tarnished because all the facts aren’t on 
the table. But you can help us articulate the facts properly. I will 
answer every question to the fullest extent possible. And I promise you 
the truth (LeakSource 2013). 
 
This promise, of course, was couched by repeated reminders that there are 
things that the audience cannot be told, and that some things would have to 
remain secret. This PR strategy was not new to the NSA; the organisation had 
already practiced similar rhetoric on its occasional briefings to journalists and 
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other outsiders (Fig.12).82 Alexander’s ‘facts on the table’ often consisted of 
tautological value judgments: he knows the analysts are great people, he 
knows that the NSA has great oversight – so those are the facts! In effect, the 
tech community gathered at Black Hat were being asked to become public 
advocates for the NSA’s truth while being barred from full access to that truth 
themselves. The assertion that ‘this is no bullshit’ simulated the presence of 
facts and sought to produce an interpassive mode of verification. 
 
A year later, little had changed in the demarcations of secret and public 
knowledge, open proof and simulated proof. In January 2014, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee – still chaired by Feinstein – held one of its annual 
open hearings. It was covered widely by the media, as well as being streamed 
online (The Washington Post 2014; Senate Intelligence Committee 2014). Feinstein 
now had occasion to lead the overseers’ questioning of individuals like James 
Clapper. This hearing – a public affair that is nominally supposed to grant 
                                                          
82 The NSA held ‘SIGINT 101 Seminars’ for journalists in the early 2000s. One ‘course outline’, 
first retrieved through a Freedom of Information Act by the New York Sun (Gerstein 2007), 
describes the NSA’s stated objective as not “about controlling what you write”, but that the 
journalists “leave today with an understanding of [the NSA’s] concern about ‘the fact of’ 
leaks – that is, the content of the material disclosed” (NSA 2002). Here we find the same 
appeal to ‘real facts’ as opposed to leaked ones, and the request that journalists become 
convinced of the justice of surveillance while still being on the dark side of secrecy: “We need 
your help, and the Nation needs your help.” The journalists were even presented with a 
school-like exercise to produce ‘an innocuous rewrite’ of a leak-based article about Osama bin 
Laden.  
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transparent access to the states of affairs and enable democratic deliberation – 
featured exchanges like the following: 
 
 
Figure 12. ‘SIGINT 101’ 
 
Senator Heinrich: OK. Let me move on to Director Clapper and 
change gears a little bit to Edward Snowden. The 
revelations by Edward Snowden regarding U.S. 
intelligence collection have obviously caused some 
tensions with our European allies. Have our 
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European allies ever collected intelligence against 
U.S. officials or business people, or those of other 
allied nations? 
Director Clapper: Yes, they have. I could go into more detail on that 
in a classified session. 
Senator Heinrich: That's fine, Director Clapper. Russia recently 
announced that it would extend Edward 
Snowden's asylum and not force him to leave their 
country. Do you believe that the Russians have 
gained access to the documents that Edward 
Snowden stole […] ? 
Director Clapper: I think this might be best left to a classified session 
and I don't want to do any – say or do anything 
that would jeopardize a current investigation. 
Senator Heinrich: That's fine, Director (The Washington Post 2014). 
 
It is good that we have public hearings to tell us which particular things are 
not public! To be less glib: certainly, one can hardly expect nothing to be 
classified in even an open hearing on national security threats. Full 
transparency is an impossible ideal. Yet here, the public is not simply denied 
access to information; it is also exposed to a particular experience of deferral, 
one which again draws public attention to the secret beyond as the domain of 
truly consequential facts and evidence. All this was compounded by 
admissions that even the special court tasked to know in the public’s stead – a 
court that is itself secret – also judges in ignorance. Reggie Walton, the 
presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [FISC] at the 
time, explained:  
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The FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is 
provided to the Court… the FISC does not have the capacity to 
investigate issues of noncompliance, and in that respect the FISC is in 
the same position as any other court when it comes to enforcing 
[government] compliance with its orders (Leonnig 2013). 
 
The public is thus deprived of even the knowledge that the law or the 
government ‘knows’ in its stead. Rather, it is an indistinct other, dispersed 
and elusive, which guarantees the secret proof of surveillance’s efficacy and 
justice. By brute forcing this kind of public scrutiny on the NSA, FISC and 
other branches of the American government, the Snowden leaks provoked a 
crisis of confidence not only in the state surveillance apparatus itself, but the 
interpassive relations governing its verification. In An Inquiry into Modes of 
Existence (2013), Bruno Latour recalls witnessing a ‘shocking question’ 
addressed to a climatologist at a conversation on climate change: “but why 
should we believe you, any more than the others?” The reply: “if people don’t 
trust the institutions of science, we’re in serious trouble.” Latour suggests that 
this very answer reflects a fragility in such a trust; were the interpassive chain 
between Science (with a capital S), experts and the public secure, the 
climatologist could have confidently brushed off the question by virtue of a 
shared certainty in that epistemic relation (also see Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). 
Both climate change and surveillance / terrorism are what Timothy Morton 
(2013) calls hyperobjects: things which are too vast and unknown to be fully 
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accounted for by existing mechanisms for knowledge and, yet appear almost 
ubiquitously, in myriad individual instantiations. In such cases, the public is 
enjoined to ‘know’ a problem so distributed and remote that interpassive 
processes gain a special relevance. Yet it is precisely that interpassive process, 
that ability to trust in institutions and experts and specialised logic, which is 
challenged in both cases.  
 
This state of affairs precedes individual subjects’ decision to think this way or 
that about the insiders’ claims. Even a cynical stance, which assumes that 
Feinstein and others are lying and there is no proof at all, requires some 
presumptive position to be taken against the knowledge that another has in 
one’s stead. Similarly, to abstain from a firm opinion on the basis of 
insufficient knowledge can still leverage interpassive projections. Nina 
Eliasoph’s ethnography of Americans’ everyday discussion of politics 
describes communities which consistently shy away from talking politics. 
When Eliasoph herself brought such topics up, it was seen as ‘an inert, 
distant, impersonal realm’ too hard to get a handle on. It was a shame that 
political problems happened, and the ‘public’ should do something about it, 
they would say; but that ‘public’, the people who ostensibly knew enough to 
debate the problem, was invariably somebody else, somewhere else (Eliasoph 
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1998, p131-135). Even the refusal to have an opinion was qualified by the 
interpellation of an other who participates in publics in my stead. The 
recourse to interpassivity is not predetermined, but neither is it an entirely 
free choice. It is a responsivity provoked and encouraged by a situation – a 
situation consisting in this case of the recession of surveillance, including the 
logic of secrecy and security folded into the debate.  
 
Not only can the other know for the subject, but they can also do and 
experience in one’s stead. Since surveillance’s pervasiveness far outstrips the 
highly infrequent occasions on which it intrudes tangibly into individual 
lives, interpassivity became a key technique by which a given political and 
affective orientation becomes fleshed out into ‘known’ reality. In the wake of 
the Snowden leaks, commentators often fell back on projected others – 
ignorant, outraged, afraid, and so on – to populate this verisimilitude. 
Consider one journalist’s anecdotal example: 
 
My older, conservative neighbour quickly insisted that collecting this 
metadata thing she had heard about on Fox was necessary to protect 
her from all the terrorists out here in suburbia. She then vehemently 
disagreed that it was okay for President Obama to know whom she 
called and when, from where to where and for how long, or for him to 
know who those people called and when, and so forth (Van Buren 
2013). 
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One might read this as typical liberal snarkiness about the cognitive 
dissonance of a stubborn conservative – intertwined with a certain 
patronising dismissal of the less educated. But the general sentiment that 
there are people out there, ‘bad things’ happening out there, that need to be 
watched and stopped is far from an abnormal one. The proliferation of 
interpassive relations in surveillance discourse thus enables the neighbour’s 
imaginations of her own safety or danger to emerge from a situation where 
someone else is surveilling someone else. When interpassively simulated 
claims are presented as knowledge, the judgment and action that follows 
from it also becomes amenable to such deferral.  
 
As with subjunctivity, the pattern was replicated on the other side of the 
debate. For many critics of surveillance, Edward Snowden, the heroic truth-
teller, and his media proxies – primarily Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras 
– formed the authoritative others who might ‘know’ in their stead. We have 
already considered in Chapter 1 how, faced with the sheer flood of technically 
available information, it was often a necessary strategy to defer to such 
situational experts to read, understand, interpret in the public’s stead. 
Figuratively speaking, we’ve all xeroxed those top secret memos; most of us 
will probably never touch them again, but there they are, glowing in their 
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potential ability-to-inform. A probably unintended gesture to Snowden’s 
interpassive function appears in the final scenes of Citizenfour, Laura Poitras’ 
Academy Award-winning documentary on the leaks. Having released his 
cache of secret files to the world, Snowden has fled the Hong Kong hotel 
where it all began and found asylum in Russia. In the scene, he is visited by 
Glenn Greenwald, who would like to update Snowden on a new source, a 
new whistleblower. Possibly as a precaution against eavesdropping, 
Greenwald scribbles every critical term – the source’s name, their means of 
communication – on a piece of paper. The audience is denied this key 
information even as Greenwald and Snowden discuss the revelations on 
camera. A New Yorker review, christening Snowden the ‘Holder of Secrets’, 
was not happy with this choice: 
 
Several times, Snowden reacts to disclosures that we are not allowed to 
see; it’s as if the viewer were supposed to accept his judgment literally 
at face value. Poitras has closed a curtain around her main characters, 
leaving the audience out (Packer 2014). 
 
As a criticism of the scene itself, this is vacuous; the film has a clear moral 
obligation to protect the identity of this new whistleblower. But the complaint 
illustrates the relationship that has been established between Snowden the 
truth-teller, the public upon whom he wishes transparency, and the truth 
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itself. The business of revealing secrets must be a secret affair, in exactly the 
same sense that surveillance must itself operate in the dark while hoarding 
and trading in the unknown. The secret’s incitement to discourse (Foucault 
1998), and the constant need to characterise and operationalise the secret and 
the unknown, is mirrored across both ‘sides’ of the Affair. In fact, within the 
small community of whistleblowers on 21st century American state 
surveillance, Snowden should be considered unusually frank: other publicly 
named figures, such as former State Department official John Napier Tye, 
consistently fell back on a interpassive relation where the whistleblower must 
know and the public must simulate. 
 
‘Based in part on classified facts that I am prohibited by law from 
publishing,’ Tye wrote, ‘I believe that Americans should be even more 
concerned about the collection and storage of their communications 
under Executive Order 12333 than under Section 215.’ I wonder what 
he saw but isn’t revealing (Friedersdorf 2014). 
 
Similarly, if on the state side judicial bodies like FISC were forced to rule on 
surveillance’s legality through interpassively acquired information, those 
contesting that legality from the civil society side faced the same problem. As 
we saw in Chapter 1, an earlier set of revelations on domestic phone call 
records collection had spurred a coalition of civil society organisations and 
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individuals to seek legal injunction against the NSA. One case clearly 
anticipated the state’s argument for secrecy: 
 
Defendants argue that the state secrets privilege bars Plaintiffs’ claims 
because Plaintiffs cannot establish standing or a prima facie case for 
any of their claims without the use of state secrets. Further, Defendants 
argue that they cannot defend this case without revealing state secrets. 
(ACLU v. NSA 2007, p.3) 
 
This strategy was replicated in other legal challenges brought against US state 
surveillance in this period; for instance, Jewel v. NSA (2008), led by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, saw the NSA make an identical attempt to 
have the claims dismissed. Of course, it is unlikely that the ‘full’ facts of 
intelligence activity and surveillance procedures could ever be articulated 
publicly. The practical impossibility of eliminating secrecy from public 
knowledge and transparency thus resembles, and collaborates with, the 
persistent presence of uncertainty and the unknown in surveillance as an 
epistemic problem. 
 
*** 
 
The other that knows, does, decides, for the subject… this other is not limited 
to human individuals, or even aggregates of individuals, but extend to the 
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machinic. Dianne Feinstein defended the mass, automated collection of 
communications data with an apparently self-explanatory quip: “Part of our 
obligation is keeping Americans safe … Human intelligence isn’t going to do 
it.” (Bohan 2013) It was self-explanatory to a particular community, at least. 
Feinstein was referring to a widespread classification within the intelligence 
community between HUMINT [human intelligence] and SIGINT [signals 
intelligence]: between the human business of managing individual sources, 
and the scalable, automatable, machine-dominated collection of electronic 
communications signals. While the classification can be more variegated (for 
example, GEOINT, the use of geospatial data, and OSINT, the collection of 
publicly available information), the balance of emphasis between human 
sources and intercepted electronic signals has been a major narrative frame 
within the intelligence community83 and in popular cultural representations. 
Thus a NSA strategy statement in 2012, leaked by Edward Snowden, 
references the present as a ‘golden age of SIGINT’ (Risen & Poitras 2013). In 
such articulations, SIGINT is the inevitable protagonist to the age of the 
                                                          
83 The Snowden files show that the NSA was bullish in pushing SIGINT as “THE decisive edge” 
for US national security in the Internet age, and indeed claims a ‘golden age’ of SIGINT 
(Risen & Poitras 2013; The New York Times 2013). Of course, the NSA in particular has been a 
leading player in SIGINT for decades (Laprise 2016). However, the NSA’s success in 
achieving a drastic increase in funding and prominence after September 11 – which we 
narrated in Chapter 1 – has been a part of a renewed emphasis in the powers of SIGINT. 
Other examples of this narrative include (The Economist 2015; Margolis 2013). Snowden 
himself has framed his criticism as the problem of overrating SIGINT programs “that do not 
work” at the expense of HUMINT (Snowden 2016; also see Silverstein 2015). 
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Internet and global communications infrastructures, a necessary shift dictated 
by the flow of history. The narrative of SIGINT’s necessity thus forms a 
certain parallel with self-surveillance’s vision of automated and autonomous 
data collection. Both interpellate a world of knowing machines that can 
produce meaningful knowledge prior to or in excess of human intervention. 
 
Machines that know in our stead loomed even larger in the explicitly fictional 
and hypothetical. Interpassivity does not stop at projecting what is known by 
others or realised in secret, but also leverages more speculative literature to 
render intelligible reality that is so often occluded by secrecy and uncertainty. 
Although the vast majority of the NSA’s SIGINT activities, down to the names 
and existence of programs like PRISM, have been top secret, there is also a 
long tradition of intentional leakages to the public via ‘strategic fictions’, 
penned by literature students and writers in the CIA’s employ (Melley 2012). 
Literature from DeLillo to Burroughs and Pynchon, and Hollywood films like 
Enemy of the State (1998) and Echelon Conspiracy (2009) have acted as sites to 
play with ideas of reality. In other words, they are platform for thinking 
through surveillance if not as a presently deployed set of practices, then a set 
of principles, power relations, technical paradigms, that flit between merely 
plausible and believably probable. Indeed, when Snowden first began to leak 
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government secrets, one of the first points of reference for the media and the 
public was George Orwell. A few months after his flight from Hong Kong, 
Snowden himself saw fit to reference the writer: 
 
Great Britain’s George Orwell warned us of the danger of this kind of 
information. The types of collection in the book – microphones and 
video cameras, TVs that watch us – are nothing compared to what we 
have available today. We have sensors in our pockets that track us 
everywhere we go. (Snowden 2013) 
  
Yet the comparison was rather redundant. Sales of Orwell’s 1984 had already 
rocketed by some 6,000% after his initial leaks in June (Hendrix 2013). Of 
course, one cannot claim that the public flocked to Orwell, Dick and Huxley 
in order to take them literally as prophecy. But such fictional work clearly 
served as resources for making sense of the confused present and the 
uncertain future; Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Philip K. Dick’s The 
Minority Report (or, more often, the Steven Spielberg film adaptation) became 
staple references for communicating the just-unveiled reality of state 
surveillance (e.g. Burris 2016; Greenwald 2014a). Indeed, in some cases, such 
writings were explicitly understood by their creators as fiction which combats 
the deception of the state: that is, fiction is a work of ‘true lies’ which finds its 
own ground to resist the lies that roam dressed as fact (Melley 2012, p115). 
Meanwhile, state actors, also participated in this detour through fiction; in 
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March 2014, the high-profile TED Conference invited Snowden and the NSA 
to speak in succession, and the latter’s defence included an uncanny reprisal 
of the technological fantasy in The Minority Report: 
 
If you think about a television murder mystery, they start with the 
body and work to solve crime. We’re starting well before then, before 
the bodies, to figure out who the people are and what they’re trying to 
do. That involves a massive amount of information (Ledgett 2014). 
 
The machines that know for humans, and machines that know beyond what 
humans can know: both run amok in this speculative space, fleshing out the 
skeletal outline featured in more ‘serious’ and prudent discussions of the 
Snowden files. The narrative of historical shift from HUMINT to SIGINT 
received its doppelgänger in popular cinema of the 2010s: in Spectre (2015), 
James Bond, that archetypical hero of face-to-face spy work, is threatened not 
by Soviet-affiliated agents (as he was in Dr. No (1962) or From Russia With Love 
(1963)), nuclear weaponry (as in Thunderball (1965) and Octopussy (1983)) or 
even nation-specific, organised terrorism (Casino Royale (2006)), but an 
ubiquitous surveillance system coordinated across nine national members of 
the ‘Nine Eyes’ – an obvious derivation of the real-life ‘Five Eyes’ alliance that 
has evolved since 2001 to extensive surveillance cooperation. Sherlock 
Holmes, the figure which exemplified a pre-digital sensitivity towards 
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physical traces and surveillance through human sensory equipment, was 
reprised as a contemporary detective in a highly successful BBC series 
(Sherlock, 2010-). There, as Cory Doctorow (2016) points out, Holmes remains 
the arrogant and mercurial master of HUMINT, but clearly contrasted by his 
brother Mycroft that functions as a superhuman clearing house for a vast web 
of SIGINT. And while Holmes may be the hero of that story, it is made 
perfectly clear that Mycroft and SIGINT are the domains through which 
everything of political and governmental consequence is run. Even the 
American superhero genre has yielded Captain America: The Winter Soldier 
(2014), a film which consciously worked in a critical depiction of pre-emptive 
strikes as determined by data-mining algorithms (see Lovece 2014).  
 
These fictions provided speculative spaces for public engagement with 
realities that often remained too secret and too uncertain to otherwise attain a 
firm grasp of. And if the cultural industries were simply reacting to political 
controversies in a bid to render themselves topical, they were also capable of 
presaging the Snowden leaks in the public consciousness. It has been argued 
that Hollywood has ‘softened’ the public up for the shock of 21st century 
electronic surveillance for years (Patterson 2013), such that the cliché ‘we 
knew already’ references fictional ‘play’ as much as serious investigative 
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journalism. Most directly, the US television show Person of Interest has been 
credited as the ‘TV show that predicted Edward Snowden’ (Rothman 2014). 
The popular US series presented the public with ‘the Machine’ – an NSA-style 
dragnet which ‘spies on you every hour of every day’, and which the 
protagonist would use to track down individuals before they became 
perpetrators or victims of violent crime. Person of Interest’s prophetic powers 
had rather mundane sources: the series was conceived through extensive 
consultation of U.S. state surveillance practices as was known and estimated 
at the time (Gan 2013). If the Machine is not quite an ‘accurate’ picture of the 
present day capacities of NSA surveillance systems, the vision of ‘connecting 
the dots’, of predicting crimes before they happen, of profiling individuals 
based on populational patterns, are all played out in Person of Interest’s 
dramatic scenarios. In other words, the technically available information 
about state surveillance was percolating as much through fiction as news – a 
circulatory context which favours the fermentation of ‘half-legitimate’ 
epistemic techniques like interpassivity and subjunctivity.  
 
Some of this imaginative media also intersected the contemporary 
surveillance debate with an older tradition of representing crime and police 
work. On one hand, ‘The Machine’, Person of Interest’s mass surveillance 
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program, is clearly based on and evocative of U.S. state surveillance, 
providing the public with a simulation of hypotheticals. On the other hand, 
the show crafts a verisimilitude where urban crime of every kind proliferates 
and may strike any individual without notice. Cultivation theory (Gerbner et 
al. 1980; also see Romer & Jamieson 2014) suggests that media can have long-
term, sedimented effects – that it can train people into presuming phenomena 
that lie beyond their own lives in order to, say, develop a heightened fear of 
criminal victimisation. This is not to say that Person of Interest is alarmist. The 
point is that insofar as terror and crime are not everyday realities for many 
(not all) of the population, fiction becomes a key supporting resource in the 
ongoing efforts to close the epistemic gap. 
 
ZERO-DEGREE RISK 
Catalysed by September 11, early twenty-first century America – its 
politicians, its media, its public – affixed terrorism as a powerful presence in 
its social imaginary. During the Snowden Affair, some voices cautioned that 
all this might have been blown a little out of proportion; after all, the actual 
chance of dying from a terrorist attack in America was 1 in 20 million between 
2007 and 2011 (Barrett 2013). Barack Obama was known for assuring both the 
public and his own staff that “the odds of people dying in a terrorist attack, 
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obviously, are still a lot lower in a car accident” (Vickers & Leno 2013), or 
even falls in bathtubs (Goldberg 2016). Indeed, as The Washington Post pointed 
out, “you’re more likely to be fatally crushed by furniture than killed by a 
terrorist” (Shaver 2015). Yet the invocation of such statistics (which hardly 
dampened the discourse) illustrates the troubled relationship between 
surveillance, terrorism, and statistical or probabilistic knowledge. On one 
hand, what knowledge can statistics deliver about an event like September 11, 
a devastation of a singular significance in the context of American history – or 
a figure like the lone wolf terrorist, a figure that hides in the many residuals 
left by quantified demographics? On the other hand, the play of correlations 
and probabilities is precisely how data-driven surveillance promises to render 
such events predictable and preventable – and, even, how the benefits and 
harms of such surveillance are assessed . The impossibility of statistical risk 
calculation is intertwined with a renewed vision of total calculability. 
 
This tension consistently broke out into public discourse over the course of 
the Snowden Affair. We saw one aspect of this tension in Chapter 1: a 
fascination with numerical representation as a way to grasp the distribution 
of knowns and unknowns vis-à-vis surveillance. More pointedly, the question 
of terrorism’s probability – and the calculation of surveillance’s effectiveness – 
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became a key site for claiming and contesting the legitimacy of surveillance 
practices. An overarching frame was furnished by the frequently expressed 
notion that the problem of surveillance is to find the right ‘balance’, to strike 
the right ‘bargain’, between the conflicting values of security and privacy. 
Soon after September 11, in a statement to the US Congress (and available to 
the public), NSA Director Michael Hayden insisted on this framing: 
 
What I really need you to do is talk to your constituents and find out 
where the American people want that line between security and liberty 
to be […] We need to get it right. We have to find the right balance 
between protecting our security and protecting our liberty. If we fail in 
this effort by drawing the line in the wrong place […] the terrorists win 
and liberty loses in either case (Hayden 2002). 
 
He would repeat the idea of ‘balance’ repeatedly – to the National Press Club 
as a Deputy Director of National Intelligence (2006), and later in his 
autobiography as a retired general (2016). Barack Obama’s defence of 
surveillance programs also invoked a similar bargain:  
 
But I think it’s important for everybody to understand, and I think the 
American people understand, that there are some trade-offs involved 
[…] And the modest encroachments on privacy that are involved in 
getting phone numbers or duration without a name attached and not 
looking at content – that on, you know, net, it was worth us doing 
(Obama 2013). 
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The idea of a grand ‘bargain’ asks the public to weigh the pros and cons of 
state surveillance, and to balance the equation towards a Goldilocks point 
where harms might be minimalised and benefits maximised. It is a classic case 
of risk-oriented, actuarial thinking. Yet efforts to deliberate towards this 
balance expose a deeper epistemic problem: how can surveillance be 
‘balanced’ if its effects cannot be assessed in meaningfully quantifiable terms? 
What kinds of statistical reasoning and risk calculus can be enacted, with 
surveillance and with terrorism, when it involves the collection of literally 
uncountable pieces of data with the aim of preventing even a single attack 
(under the full awareness that absolute security is impossible)? Consider 
contemporary efforts to ascertain the value of surveillance. As we have 
already mentioned, only a single case – of Basaaly Moalin – is publicly 
available to prove, exemplify, or otherwise indicate surveillance’s 
performance with respect to the terrorist threat writ large. The imbalance of 
numbers struck numerous contemporary observers. The New Yorker asked:  
 
the N.S.A. has [collected] records from hundreds of billions of 
domestic phone calls […] the government has not shown any instance 
besides Moalin’s in which the law’s metadata provision has directly led 
to a conviction in a terrorism case. Is it worth it? (Schwartz 2015) 
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The question reveals the powerlessness of numerical estimations when the 
objective is supposed to be absolute prevention. This tension between ‘zero 
tolerance’ and the probabilistic nature of modern risk can be found across 
other counter-terrorist efforts. Harvey Molotch (2012) describes a multi-
million dollar surveillance system installed in New York’s subways over the 
mid-2000s, a project where the political demands for concrete action overcame 
the transport authority’s own skepticism. As of 2012, the system had yielded a 
small number of arrests for misdemeanours, and not a single lead related to 
terrorism; in other words, its ‘cost’ in the form of money and civil rights had 
yielded no tangible ‘benefits’. Meanwhile, actors continued to manipulate 
numbers and statistics as a way to shape the epistemic field. ‘1944 New 
Yorkers saw something and said something’, insisted an iconic poster 
produced by the transport authority, though the number has yet to be traced 
to any actual documentation (Molotch 2012, p54). Yet the point of a 
subjunctive knowledge environment is that the absence of proof does not 
authorise certainty one way or the other; after all, unknown terrorists may 
have been deterred from attempting terrorist attacks by the presence of 
cameras. Or the system may yet live to catch a terrorist red-handed – if not 
tomorrow, then next month, next year… Andrew Liepman, who had been 
Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre from 2005 to 2012, 
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described the political climate in that period as a “zero failure, zero attack 
threshold” (Barker 2016; also see Aradau & van Munster 2007, Cooper 2006). 
As we saw with strategies for fabrication, terrorism had become an epistemic 
problem not so much concerned with minimising probabilities and 
constructing acceptable models of risk, but a politically charged search for 
absolute certainty in a context where a degree of unknowability is inherent. In 
this formulation, the benefits of a surveillance system remain formally 
unfalsifiable precisely because no calculation of ‘bargain’ or ‘balance’ between 
security and privacy can be properly achieved. 
 
The efforts to understand surveillance and terrorism in terms of risks, 
probabilities and cost/benefit analyses produced an air of calculability, but in 
practice reinforced the dilemmas of trying to know the unknowable – whether 
that be the risk of terrorism, the preventive benefits of surveillance, or even its 
harms. Like subjunctivity and interpassivity, we find a practical heuristic 
which does not seek to erase the presence of uncertainties, but leverages them 
as a way to justify and operationalise its claim to sufficient knowledge and 
certainty. We can schematise and situate this heuristic more appropriately by 
examining its relationship with more ‘orthodox’ understandings of risk. 
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*** 
 
Before September 11 had hyper-charged surveillance with political relevance, 
theories of risk had already begun to respond to what it saw as new trends – 
emerging gradually over the 80s and 90s – towards more extreme, and less 
knowable, kinds of risks. At this point, the emblematic figure was climate 
change: global, long-term, both too dispersed or micro-level and too 
enormous to calculate adequately. In response to such dangers, major figures 
in risk studies, like François Ewald (1993) and Ulrich Beck (2009), developed a 
historical narrative about the rise of ‘catastrophic’ and otherwise exceptional 
risks: dangers which lie outside orthodox risk calculability, or even a society’s 
ability to know in general (O’Malley 2004). In his seminal best-seller Risk 
Society (1992, the original German published in 1986) Beck had depicted a 
modern attitude to risk defined by its establishment of a rigorous economy: a 
system of ‘acceptable levels’ (that is, acceptable failures, deaths, disasters) that 
colonises successive real-world problems as ‘known risks’ and thereby 
imposes a clear grid for calculating optimal decisions and practices. By 2009, 
near the end of his life, Beck (2009) was now arguing that societies are 
experiencing a swell of unknowns and unknowables, and that responses to 
climate change and terrorism characterise a ‘planetary state of exception’ to 
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the rule of risk calculability. As Dean (1998) and others point out, however, 
there is no firm proof of any quantitative or qualitative change in the 
dangerousness of our world in realist terms. In any case, risk has always been 
a question of how dangers are perceived and calculated by societies – and it is 
in this epistemic sense that the differences must be counted.  
 
In this regard, it is important to remember that risk in the former, classical 
sense itself developed out of a proliferation of data and widespread 
enthusiasm about its epistemic capacity. As “the world teemed with 
frequencies”, as Ian Hacking (1990, p97) put it, scholars of the 19th century 
(and some predecessors, like Condorcet and the ‘moral scientists’ in the 18th) 
rushed to establish laws and models that could leverage the new availability 
of data to produce new knowns and certainties. In an echo of contemporary 
pursuits for statistical predictors of lone wolf terrorists, this heyday of 
modern risk included both the expansion of actuarial calculations like 
predictors for sickness and efforts to identify ‘criminal’ faces or ‘inferior’ skull 
shapes (Sekula 1986, Gould 1996). Such rationalising work often swept away 
(though not completely) many older heuristics for danger, luck and chance 
(Lears 2003), but this conquest was itself achieved through a host of often 
arbitrary decisions. Hacking (1990) relates a striking example in the 1820s: the 
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British parliament, eager to establish actuarial laws to facilitate life insurance 
businesses, was challenged by John Finlaison that such a law was not 
calculable at the time. Finlaison, the first president of the Institute of 
Actuaries, had been summoned by MPs as an expert on the matter. Rather 
than heed his expertise, however, they cajoled and bullied Finlaison 
repeatedly until the man grudgingly produced some numbers. The 
normalisation of risk logic itself involved a set of heuristics and veridical 
objects for rationalising unknowns into knowns (or rather, probabilities). 
Early twenty-first century surveillance debates continued to invoke those 
high modern techniques – the language of statistics, probabilities, tradeoffs, 
equations – even as it threatened to unravel their promise of calculable 
‘economies’. 
 
The heuristics involved in the Snowden Affair thus might be described as a 
‘zero-degree risk’: a mode of knowing which intersects a veneer of statistical 
reasoning with a certain threshold of indeterminacy and negligibility, and 
defaults to a more speculative and pre-emptive kind of claim-making. Insofar 
as terrorist threat is conceptualised as a zero-tolerance event of incalculable 
harm, it defies mathematical calculations of value. If the risk of death from 
terrorism is lower than from a car crash, how low does it have to be to fall 
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under ‘acceptable levels’? If a given surveillance program violates the rights 
of several million citizens to catch a single terrorist (or, as is often more likely, 
pre-emptively apprehend a suspect), is it ‘worth it’? Instead of financial 
trading or gambling, where a certain ineliminable degree of uncertainty is 
accepted as the price for the benefits of risk and probabilistic reasoning84, the 
post-September 11 climate espoused the fantasy of total security and total pre-
emption. When the ‘what if’ side of the equation is as catastrophic as 
September 11, the ‘value’ that each rights violation holds on the opposite side 
of the equation doesn’t just decrease: it becomes unquantifiable. This is not to 
say that surveillance and New Terrorism is entirely ‘post-risk’. Actuarial 
reason might still declare a certain individual to be ‘worth’ a certain monetary 
premium, and the 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act indeed incentivised 
insurers to provide packages for terrorism (also see Aradau & van Munster 
2007). The effort to classify and predict the lone wolf, as witnessed in Chapter 
1, demonstrates the enduring attraction of correlational and probabilistic 
calculations of risk – if not its successes. Zero-degree risk expresses the ways 
                                                          
84 In other words, to be able to rely on risk as knowledge is to be able to live on as if the risk, 
sufficiently mitigated, simply did not exist. Thus we find, in the financial sector, the idea that 
subjects who thrive are those who are able to routinise and ‘handle’ risk, by which it is meant 
some subjective ability to ‘sleep with it at night’ (Martin 2002, p121). Another relatively 
extreme – and thus explicit – case is gambling: Schüll’s ethnography of Vegas’ machine 
gambling sees the industry speak of players “reclining on a math model” – a comfortable level 
of trust in calculable probabilities (2015, p109). 
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in which surveillance and terrorism – in public debate as much as its internal 
operations – struggle to establish a calculative reason, or at least a 
performance of such reason, over the incalculable. As a heuristic, its 
proliferation reflects the fact that even as the vision of data-driven predictivity 
and total archives articulates surveillance’s ideal form, both its practitioners 
and the public are faced with the practical need to make decisions and 
assessments.   
 
But if the instruments of calculative rationality are applied on material 
marked out as noncalculable, how is knowledge, certainty, to be established? 
In the Snowden Affair, and early twenty-first century debates over 
surveillance and terrorism in America more generally, the solution that 
emerged more or less took the sword to the Gordian knot: doing something 
must be better than doing nothing, and therefore ‘everything’ that can be 
done must be done. Matthew Hannah (2010) calls it ‘actionism’ – an 
intensification of a propensity for action and the performance of being 
‘proactive’ that is latent to modern politics (Schneier 2013; Moeckli 2008, p40). 
One oft-cited instance is UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s defense of the 
American invasion of Iraq, itself very much tied to the political fascination 
with terrorist threats in this period: 
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But sit in my seat. Here is the intelligence. Here is the advice. Do you 
ignore it? But, of course intelligence is precisely that: intelligence. It is 
not hard fact. It has its limitations. On each occasion the most careful 
judgement has to be made taking account of everything we know and 
the best assessment and advice available. But in making that 
judgement, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? 
Or not to act and hope it's OK? And suppose we don't act and the 
intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be? (Blair, 
2004; also see Aradau & van Munster 2007, p105) 
 
Here, we might usefully recall Philip Mudd’s words when he, from the 
position of a counter-terrorism specialist, explained to the families of a 
fabricated terrorist why such engineering of proof was necessary: 
 
People like me are in a difficult position. We cannot afford to let 
dozens of innocent people die because a youth makes a mistake […] If 
we switched roles, what would you do? What would you do? Would 
you let him go? (Barker 2016) 
 
The logic has been employed to justify everything from CCTVs in schools 
(Taylor 2013, p19) to counter-terrorism in general (Schneier 2013). And of 
course, the NSA’s post-September 11 strategy – to collect everything because 
anything might be important – is itself the clearest manifestation of actionism. 
The great contradiction between an absolutist, ‘zero tolerance’ politics and an 
uncertain world of ‘catastrophic risks’ is navigated through an ethics where 
one always opt to do, to save, to record, to arrest; an epistemology where the 
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known harms, or ‘side effects’, of surveillance is counted for less than the 
unknown harms of inaction (Daase & Kessler 2007). Beyond operational 
principles and specific legal cases, such a strategy also structures the public 
debate between privacy and security. As we have discussed previously, the 
problem of ‘balancing’ privacy has been a major frame for the Snowden Affair 
(e.g. Greenwald 2014b; Rusbridger et al. 2015) – even as it was frequently 
written off as ‘already lost’ and ‘old-fashioned’ (Yaverbaum 2014; Cohen 
2013). What was notable about the challenges to privacy in this debate was 
the extent to which they demanded a more traditional epistemology. Legal 
arguments insisting that privacy advocates prove ‘specific harm’ caused by 
surveillance – which we saw in Chapter 1 – requires of privacy a certain 
standard of proof that arguments for security have already excused 
themselves from. Similarly, the popular refrain that those who have ‘nothing 
to hide’ are safe from surveillance (e.g. Marlinspike 2013)85 misses the 
fabricated and anticipatory character of danger identification in the age of 
New Terrorism. Privacy’s struggles to assert itself as an important virtue in 
the Snowden Affair exemplifies how thresholds for what counts as sufficient 
                                                          
85 The ‘nothing to hide’ argument, in fact, has been more prominently aired by the critics of 
surveillance than its defenders. As we see with David Sirota earlier in this chapter, privacy 
advocates have tended to characterise or anticipate the public as needing to be educated out 
of such reasoning. Nevertheless, it is clear enough that state spokespersons make implicit 
references, typically by arguing that ‘ordinary Americans’ have nothing to fear from 
surveillance. 
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proof, sufficient knowledge, are being recalibrated in favour of an actionist 
and prescriptive strategy.  
 
Actionism completes the zero-degree equation, and rationalises a pathway 
from uncertain epistemology to concrete decisions. Here, the possibility of 
future harms is prioritised over (or rather, enters in place of) probability, 
completing the irony of the mathematical veneer; it is precisely the things that 
escape statistical knowability that are presented as a firm basis for ‘knowing 
enough’ to act. In this sense, the fictional scenario of Person of Interest plays 
out a fantasy already embedded in the real world aspirations for total 
surveillance and prediction. In the television show, the Machine doesn’t spit 
out correlations, simulations, probabilities; it simply provides, with absolute 
predictive certainty, the social security number belonging to the next victim 
or assailant. Alongside the practical strategies of fabrication, the invocations 
of zero-degree risk, and the actionist injunctions they are made to justify, the 
unerring tick-tock of the fictional Machine illustrates the actors’ relentless 
quest for sufficient knowledge, sufficient certainty.  
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JUST-IN-CASE POLITICS 
This array of heuristics for simulated and ‘sufficient’ forms of knowledge 
produces a specific epistemic terrain for more practical and directly 
politicised debates around the notions of privacy, of security, of freedom, of 
civil rights. Publicly presented as realistic and necessary instruments for the 
uncertain world of New Terrorism and dragnet surveillance, these heuristics 
legitimate and normalise an epistemic sensibility that largely maintains the 
official regime of rational and evidence-based reasoning, even as it provides 
ways for subjects to mobilise the uncertain and unknown for their public use 
of reason.  
 
It would not be difficult to condemn these heuristics for ‘cheating’ the 
principles of open and rational knowledge production. Yet such criticism 
would miss the practical exigencies of their context. Although I cannot agree 
with more realist conceptions of risk that say the world has become a more 
‘risky’ place than before, both surveillance and terrorism in the early twenty-
first century do produce a collective imaginary of a highly uncertain and 
speculative threat – for both insiders and outsiders, practitioners and the lay 
public. Mark Andrejevic and Brian Massumi have both identified, in the 
George W. Bush administration (2001-2008)’s counter-terrorist strategies, a 
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significant step towards this willingness to pre-empt the facts, to move on 
‘sufficient’ knowledge and to establish proof post facto. As Karl Rove, one of 
Bush’s key advisors, pointed out: 
 
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. 
And while you’re studying that reality… we’ll act again, creating other 
new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort 
out (Rove in Andrejevic 2013, p16-7). 
 
But this is not, as some have called it, a ‘post-truth politics’86, a politics that 
does not care about the truth or is willing to throw away the last vestiges of 
honesty. It is rather the development of a certain pragmatism, a rebalancing of 
what is considered necessary in the face of enduring uncertainties in a data-
saturated world. If Andrejevic and Massumi identify an affective turn 
towards a more dismissive relationship with facts, what I have sought to 
emphasise is the changing rules within the epistemic schema itself. And that 
change concerns evolving thresholds of what counts as ‘sufficiently’ known; 
what kinds of unknowns can still be used for consensus, action, decision; how 
‘rational choices’ are salvaged and cobbled together, even in the face of lone 
wolves and ubiquitous dragnets.  
  
                                                          
86 James Fallows, writing for The Atlantic, has given this term some traction throughout the 
2000s and 2010s (see Fallows n.d.; also Lepore 2016). 
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4. Honeymoon Objectivity. 
 
 
In 2014, then-22 year old entrepreneur James Proud successfully 
crowdfunded a sleep sensing device that would automatically monitor sleep 
patterns, provide a numerical score, and make recommendations. It did not 
escape Proud that such functions were already available. Beddit, the sleep 
sensor with which we began Chapter 2, had itself been crowdfunded a year 
before, and was already released to its backers. Proud chose to emphasise his 
device’s ‘simple, uncomplicated and useful’ qualities; he insisted that what 
matters is not technology that constantly reminds us to its technicity, but 
technology embedded into the everyday flow of attention and reflection. 
 
 
Figure 13. The ‘forgotten’ sensor. 
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With the rise of wearables, we’ve seen that people clearly care about 
their sleep. But to us, it felt so unnatural to be worrying about putting 
something on, charging it […] we believe technology needs to 
disappear […] everything in [our device] is just designed to fade away 
(Hello 2014). 
 
It is fitting that Proud should have named his device in a similarly 
naturalising fashion: Sense. It joins Sentio, makers of the ‘Feel’ wristband 
which surveils bio-feedback and alerts users recommending that they smile, 
laugh, and otherwise manage their emotions; Sen.se, the makers of the home 
monitoring system Mother that we examined in Chapter 2; and more besides. 
And it is also fitting that, ultimately, a small sphere fitted with several basic 
sensors87 and algorithms did not quite live up to either the fantasy of total 
seamlessness or the ideal of eliminating uncertainty in self-knowledge. While 
no sales figures are available, the Sense orb was panned by The New York 
Times (Manjoo 2015): the device may ‘work well enough, for what it is’, but it 
was condemned as part of a ‘little bit bogus’ genre of devices whose ‘reality 
come nowhere close to the promise’. Other media outlets, too, such as Fast 
Company (Barol 2015), were lukewarm; often, the rhetorical objective of new 
technologies were easier to support than their faltering, still immature 
                                                          
87 In this case, Sense advertised sensors for humidity, temperature, ambient light, noise 
(microphone), air particles, and acceleration. 
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implementations. Even as a specific sensing device might spill out garbled 
data, hopelessly ignorant of the snoring Labrador in the bedroom or the 
tossing and turning of the human partner in bed, self-tracking discourse 
projects a near future where machinic sensibility can be melded into the very 
sensory rhythms of user-subjects. This chapter critically examines this 
discourse of data-augmented sensibility – a rhetoric which I label data-sense. 
 
*** 
 
In previous chapters, we examined the ways in which claims of data-driven 
knowledge are consistently founded on the invocation of uncertainties 
(Chapters 1, 2). The veridical authority of data and surveillance-machines was 
asserted not only through the virtues like automation and intimacy (2), but a 
host of deferred and simulated practices of knowing (3). This relationship 
between knowledge and uncertainty was replicated even where surveillance 
technology was subject to criticism or breakdown – ranging from the 
incalculable thresholds of numbers and statistics (1, 3) to the ‘humanistic’ 
scepticism over machinic sensibility. (2)  
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This chapter picks back up the case of self-surveillance (2), as well as the 
question of how technological discourse seeks to reorganise what ‘counts’ as 
knowledge, or what is privileged as more ‘accurately’ true, that we had asked 
of state surveillance, terrorism and criminal intent (3). In Chapter 2, we saw 
how the promises of ‘better’ self-knowledge through automation and 
intimacy hinged on a certain binary: human intuition and experience as 
subjective and flawed, and quantitative, machinic sensibility as a privileged 
lens into objective reality. This chapter turns to the kinds of subjects and 
subjective qualities that self-tracking discourses projects as necessary and 
desirable for those developments in machinic sensibility. The human body, 
after all, is the ‘first instrument’ (Marcel Mauss in Peters 2015, p80-1); the 
medium which we inevitably mould whenever we reshape external objects 
into technological solutions. To lend this process legitimacy, self-tracking 
discourse specifically co-opted a broader, older modernist fantasy of objective 
knowledge and technological progress. Yet, as we will see, it is no coincidence 
that the way in which subjects are encouraged to adapt themselves to take 
advantage of new technological possibilities are exactly the way in which they 
are being made into voluntary producers of personal information for the new 
data economy – just as surely as the imperative of national security seeks to 
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routinise the subjection of American citizens into persistent and 
indiscriminate invasions of data privacy.  
 
Data-sense, then, the label I use to identify a subset of self-tracking discourse: 
a rhetoric, which urges the necessity and inevitability of user-subjects that 
internalise data-driven modes of self-knowledge and privilege machinic 
sensibility as a route to self-knowledge. I have picked data-sense out from a 
set of similar terms and slogans used in self-tracking discourse – playing, in 
particular, on practitioners’ frequent discussions of ‘new sensors and new 
senses’ (e.g. Lai & Forzani 2015). Primarily advanced by prominent thought 
leaders in self-tracking industry and the Quantified Self movement, this 
futurist rhetoric knitted together existing products, experimental solutions 
and futuristic prognoses into a mélange of rationalist, posthumanist, 
evolutionary ideals about how humans will and should learn to know 
themselves through machines. If machinic sensibility describes smart sensors’ 
much-vaunted ability to collect data that humans cannot, data-sense describes 
the ways in which humans are to be instructed to become interfaces and 
clearing houses for that data – and thus become digital natives of a self-
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tracking, data-driven society.88 Here, our use of ‘sense’ draws upon both 
Merleau-Ponty’s sens (meaning, sense, direction) and le sentir (sometimes 
translated as ‘sense experience’, involving ‘to sense’ and ‘to feel’), and indeed, 
the double meaning of ‘sense’ still latent in everyday English: a sense for 
feeling, and a sense for making meaningful.89 Data-sense describes the ways 
in which human subjects’ sensory access to their own bodies, and their 
equipment for making sense of the data at hand, are both reconfigured – 
rendering them suitable systems for the production of self-tracking 
knowledge.90 
 
This discourse thus forms the subjective half of the vision of data-driven 
knowledge we had witnessed in Chapter 2. Put together, they extend a 
modern history of ‘objectivity’, ‘technology’ and ‘data’ as regulatory ideals, as 
composites of collective fantasies. The second half of this chapter thus situates 
self-surveillance in a broader history of how ideas of objectivity and 
                                                          
88 Deborah Lupton has been developing a similar usage of the term (Lupton 2016). While her 
full analysis (in monograph form) remains unpublished at time of writing, Lupton too 
appears to speak of ‘sense’ both in terms of the biological senses and sense-making as 
meaning-making.  
89 Here I am using Donald Landes’ translation of Merleau-Ponty (2012).  
90 From this perspective, the advent of self-tracking technologies is oriented towards not only 
an outsourcing of human sense-making to machines, but a corresponding recalibration of 
human sens itself. As Heidegger had already seen, technology’s impact on human meaning 
[Sinn] is that of a displacement [Sinnverschiebung] and consequent reconstitution. The latter is 
fully achieved when technologies once new, noticeable, artificial, become equipment for 
sensing that human subjects take up habitually and/or tacitly (see Hörl 2015). 
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technology have shifted over time – and at each stage of that shift, helped 
organise and legitimate different strategies and virtues for the pursuit of 
progress and epistemic certainty. In that sense, the present moment is a kind 
of ‘honeymoon objectivity’: the buoyance of new promises about old 
problems, of ‘truth’, of ‘certainty’, that reprises older cycles of enthusiasm and 
pessimism (see Marvin 1988). The discourse of data-sense thus marks a 
contemporary site for the renewed projection of modernist fantasies, and for 
the advancing colonisation of everyday life and lived knowledge by the ideals 
of technological objectivity.  
 
DATA-SENSE 
Self-tracking’s effectiveness, both concretely deployed and publicly projected, 
revolved around what we have called machinic sensibility: the ability to 
extract the kinds of data that are denied to human intuition and experience. 
Chapter 2 examined how self-tracking’s convergence of ‘smart’ sensors, 
persistent wireless connectivity and predictive analytics claimed to bypass 
human error and deliver more accurate, precise, objective self-knowledge. 
The more users were prevented from ‘lying to themselves’, the closer to the 
truth they would get. Yet by the end of Chapter 2, we had identified a 
contradiction central to this promise: how can an epistemic production line 
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focused on bypassing the human subject be properly called self-knowledge? 
Insofar as human subjects’ more traditional access to their own data became 
identified with uncertainty and error, how could such ‘raw’ data be made 
intelligible for human subjects? It is this incommensurability between data-
driven knowledge and human sensibility that the rhetoric of data-sense seeks 
to bridge.  
 
We may begin by considering how self-tracking discourse articulated the 
problems and challenges of a data-saturated society, and thereby asserted the 
necessity and inevitability of data-sense. If the surveillance state articulated 
the dangers of ‘New Terrorism’ precisely to justify the advent of new forms 
and degrees of surveillance, self-tracking too is defined in terms of the 
problem it is meant to solve. In this case, that problem was a reprisal of some 
very familiar tropes that had percolated throughout the Internet age: the idea 
of data as flood, and as nonsense. First, self-tracking discourse commonly 
referenced alarms about the sheer proliferation of data, a flood. Some 
practitioners had characterised self-tracking as ‘small data’, a uniquely 
individual alternative to the broader emergence of ‘big data’ (e.g. Cornell 
2011). However, the new availability of persistent streams of data points – 
heart rates, galvanic skin responses, kinetic movements, measured multiple 
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times a second and constantly fed into local databases – soon meant that just 
like populational data, self-tracking would be beset by the problem of data 
overload (see Swan 2013; Fawcett 2016). Across state, corporate and self-
surveillance, the sheer comprehensiveness of this data supplied hopes for 
genuinely ‘representative’ datasets as well as anxieties about humans 
becoming overwhelmed by it. Media commentary on self-tracking – which 
itself included academics and industry insiders – spoke of ‘drowning in data’ 
(Peysakhovich & Stephens-Davidowitz 2015), or having ‘too much’ data 
(Brennan 2015), in ways that reprised the narratives of the ‘information flood’ 
in the 1990s that had themselves been a response to the public distribution of 
the World Wide Web. As John Durham Peters notes, sea and seafaring 
metaphors have always been a staple for cyberspace discourse (2015, p107); 
they, consistent with the far older history of seas, oceans and ships as 
metaphors and as media, illustrate the plenitude of data as a rich source of 
knowledge and control, and yet itself a vastness that defies full capture (p54).  
 
This narrative intersected with another (familiar) problem: data as nonsense. 
How to take a knowledge technique whose central value is in going beyond 
the human senses, and translate it into a human-friendly grid of intelligibility? 
In the mid-2010s, self-tracking was typically judged as emitting large streams 
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of data into the world, but still lacking a robust ‘action layer’ (Swan 2012, 
p235) that would allow it all to become meaningful to technological laymen. 
(Goetz 2011) More sceptical actors contended that for all the obsessive and 
indulgent counting of such ‘datasexuals’ (see Morozov 2013, Chapter 7; 
Matyszczyk 2012; Zandbergen 2013), making sense of the data still remains a 
major obstacle (Singer 2011; Wagstaff 2014; Waldman 2013). In a parallel 
problem to the enormity and inaccessibility of the Snowden files, QSers and 
sceptics alike wondered: what kind of knowledge is gained when the human 
subject gazes mystified at a conflagration of data? (Dancy 2015) It was the ‘Big 
Ass Graph’ problem all over again. This concern was situated in a broader set 
of anxieties about what I have called trace-bodies (Hong 2015); that is, the 
institutionalised production of identities or profiles on the basis of personal 
data. Self-tracking came into public awareness even as corporate data-mining 
was increasingly being criticised as a commercial exploitation of personal 
traces, an economy which deprived users of knowledge about the contents 
and production of their own data. At the same time that the Web 2.0 economy 
in general provoked concerns that “we are [becoming] strangers to our 
normatively aggregated selves” (Nyong’o 2015), self-tracking was seeking the 
translational tools it would need to deliver on its promise of empowerment 
through data and personalised control. Data as flood, as nonsense: both 
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problems reflected the practical need for a certain mediational structure 
between machine, data, and human.  
 
It was as a response to such problems that self-tracking discourse posed a 
‘low-friction’, atmospheric vision of sensing machines. In this view, machines 
and numbers would fade away – much like the wiring for our electricity or 
the algorithms behind the convenience of social media platforms – and offer a 
smooth, overarching experience of fast and accurate knowledge. This 
language itself was cobbled together by translating and popularising 
contemporary tropes in areas like microbiology and climate science, as well as 
the more familiar heritage of data metaphors within computing discourse. 
Gary Wolf (2009b), borrowing from climate scientist Jesse Ausubel of the 
Rockefeller University, speaks of a ‘macroscope’; massively scaled, computer-
driven data collection as a way to transcend singular correlations and develop 
new, data-driven common sense wisdoms about the self.91  
 
                                                          
91 In his personal blog, Wolf pegs the macroscope as a master metaphor for how he was 
making sense of the Quantified Self, even as he was involved as a co-founder. Wolf explains 
that his own book on QS initially began as part of a larger monograph on such ‘macroscopes’, 
a notion which he intended to link back to the enthusiasm for measurements and their 
aggregation into larger pictures of nature as early as the Royal Society (Wolf n.d.). Here, 
again, Wolf seeks to align contemporary developments in self-tracking with a longer history 
of scientific inquiry and technical evolution in knowledge production. We shall return to this 
leveraging of the virtues of scientific objectivity in the next section. 
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Figure 14. Smarr’s microbiome. 
 
One emblematic object in this regard was the human microbiome92: the 
ecosystem of bacteria, fungi, and other organisms that reside in the human 
body, especially the gut. Typically credited to molecular biologist and Nobel 
Prize winner Joshua Lederberg in the early 2000s93, it has since become a 
popular object of fascination and hope about new breakthroughs in human 
                                                          
92 While the actual scientific literature now distinguishes between microbiome (the genomes 
of microbes) and microbiota (the organisms themselves), we shall stick to the ‘microbiome’ – 
the term which originally described both, and has since been popularised as an image of the 
nebula of tiny lifeforms residing in the human gut and elsewhere.  
93 I say typically credited, because Lederberg himself did not coin the term in a discrete and 
explicit sense, and similar uses of the term was sporadically present since at least the 1980s. 
(For instance, see a basic genealogy performed by Jonathan Eisen (2015) of University of 
California, Davis). Nevertheless, Lederberg’s own promotion of the term in the early 2000s 
(e.g. Lederberg 2001; Hooper & Gordon 2001) is now understood as a useful origin point for 
the subsequent interest in the term and its referent, both inside and outside the scientific 
community, since then. 
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health, both inside and outside the scientific community. For self-tracking 
discourse, the microbiome was a particularly useful depiction of the necessity 
and potential of such ‘macroscopic’ technologies for self-knowledge. It is an 
entire system latent in every human, yet entirely inaccessible to human 
sensibility. Its composition is unique to every individual, favouring the “n=1” 
approach of self-trackers over populational norms or the Queteletian l’homme 
moyen. Self-tracking discourse thus latched onto – and amplified – the interest 
surrounding the microbiome, describing it as an untapped lode of a diverse 
wealth of new knowledge just waiting to be colonised by tracking tools. This 
narrative received an appropriately iconic protagonist in Larry Smarr, the 
physicist who masterminded the foundation of America’s Supercomputer 
Centers Program in the 1980s. Smarr’s personal efforts to track his health 
throughout the 2000s, it was claimed, allowed him to correctly diagnose the 
onset of Crohn’s disease (Ramirez 2013; Cohen 2012). By the early 2010s, he 
had constructed a chamber at his home institution, Calit2; there, the walls are 
lined with screens providing a walk-in 360 degree view of his gut and its 
microbiota (Bowden 2012). Meanwhile, Smarr’s experiments had led him to 
the QS movement, which found in Smarr a pioneering and ambitious example 
of where self-tracking could lead us to. Cases like Smarr’s provide self-
tracking discourse with convenient heroic myths. Although Smarr’s claim to 
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concrete, specific achievement in health knowledge required an extraordinary 
set of personal expertise, institutional backing and other resources, self-
tracking discourse could play up his ‘success’ as a way to bridge the relatively 
mundane and often failure-prone devices of self-tracking’s present with the 
rhetoric of its transformative future.  
 
And so, Smarr (2012) himself explicitly framed his experiments in terms of a 
prospective near future where subjects might enjoy a smooth and naturalised 
access to their own data. Smarr’s microbiome chamber, where he can literally 
move around and reach out towards his data, is a monument to the vision of 
data-sense: the hope that numbers and machines will soon disappear from the 
user’s experience.  
 
*** 
 
We now turn to the specific virtues, ideals, skills, that the discourse of data-
sense prescribes for the tracking/tracked subject. These prescriptions ranged 
from the relatively mundane to the outlandishly futuristic; tracing this range 
allows us to examine the ways in which the rhetoric of data-sense seeks to 
flesh out heady posthumanist fantasies in terms of relatively modest products 
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and experiments, and to bestow the latter in turn with the aura of the former. 
To begin at the most basic level, we find the idea of data-sense as a certain 
literacy. In 2012, Wired – ever the evangelist for new practices in computing, 
and the institution whose employees had co-founded QS – hosted Wired 
Health Conference: Living By Numbers. With a focus not only on self-tracking 
but more professional and institutional cases of health-related tracking, the 
conference gave QS another opportunity to present its vision to the public. 
Here, we can locate as a key example the words of Kevin Kelly: the co-
founder of the Quantified Self, a prominent opinion leader in self-tracking 
discourse – and one who, as we have previously noted, had also performed 
such a role in the utopian visions of the early Internet age. 
 
We’re horribly, I mean, we’re just not evolved to deal with numbers. 
Our brains aren’t really good with dealing with numbers, we don’t do 
statistics very well, we’re not really a number animal (Kelly in Wolf & 
Kelly 2012; also see Mortensen 2013). 
 
In this case, the narrative remains at a utilitarian and instrumental level: self-
tracking is described as requiring new skills, akin to the problem of learning 
the right grammar or typesetting. In this regard, QSers and the self-tracking 
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industry has long engaged with data visualisation techniques as a way to 
render those pesky numbers into patterns, juxtapositions, curves: objects 
which communicate a certain narrative form. Ironically, one example of such 
visualisation carries the name of Data Sense. Data Sense is a non-profit web 
tool developed principally by Intel Labs, including Dawn Nafus, a long-time 
researcher of and participant in the QS community. As a supporting tool, 
Data Sense measures nothing, but allows users to import, aggregate, visualise 
and manipulate their tracked data in everything from map overlays to bar 
graphs. Other projects, mainly artistic, have also drawn on the longer history 
of wearable computing; examples include a Microsoft Research vest filled 
with feather-like flaps that move and reshape based on mood metrics (Allen 
2014), or Nancy Dougherty (who, we saw earlier, espoused the term ‘QS 
mindset’)’s wearable lights that would shift colours as visual representations 
of her electromyography [EMG] readings (Finley 2013). Such tools aimed to 
“improve data literacy without making people into statisticians” (Data Sense 
n.d.), providing a supplementary set of communicative channels.  
 
Data-sense often went further, however. If Kevin Kelly spoke above in terms 
of a literacy or numeracy, he then went on to argue that machinic sensibility 
can and should be appropriated into subjects’ own sensory experience. In this 
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vision, users would no longer have to struggle with the ‘raw’ data or even the 
proliferation of graphs and tables, but become so used to having machinic 
communications all around them that they would intuitively and habitually 
reach for input from tracking devices to check whether they are hungry (and 
what they might be craving), where they are going, and whether they are 
properly rested.  
 
But what I think the long term direction of this is, is, we want to use 
these sensors we’re talking about to give us new senses. To equip us 
with new ways to hear our body […] right now we have to see the 
data, the charts, the curves, but in the long term where we want to go 
is, we want to be able to feel, or see, or hear them. (Kelly in Wolf & 
Kelly 2012) 
 
These ‘new senses’ are thus described as an internalisation of machinic 
temporalities, rhythms, patterns of communication, into user-subjects’ 
phenomenological equipment.94 The disjuncture between the rhetoric and its 
                                                          
94 Sharon and Zandbergen (2016, p6) describes another example of self-trackers’ use of the 
language of ‘new senses’, this time at a Quantified Self conference in 2014. “At a break-out 
session, one person told us how he used to take a picture each day at 08.36. For him, this was 
a way of “developing new senses.” He explains, “when I take a picture at 08.36 every day, I 
have a little better awareness of when it is 08.36.” Another tracker added, “when you do it 
long enough, you don’t need the tools anymore.” We encountered many more such 
testimonies to how tracking trained people to be able to “sense” things. In such examples, 
numerical data are not at all the end-goal of tracking; they are more like an unsophisticated, 
intermediate stage towards more augmented senses. For some self-trackers, the cultivation of 
this awareness is more significant than the actual data generated by tracking.” Again, there is 
a folk usage of the language of ‘new senses’ – one which rarely articulates a systematic theory 
or mechanism, but instead functions as a shortcut for communicating the transformative 
potentials of the new technology.  
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concrete instantiations is striking. For his part, Kelly provided the example of 
a simple experiment, of unknown provenance: a customised belt that would 
regularly vibrate in the direction pointing North. Soon enough, he claimed, 
the wearer had developed an ‘unconscious sense’ of cardinal directions. Of 
course, even the humans of the Internet age have not forgotten to read North 
and South by simply observing the sun. There is little here to prove the actual 
usefulness of such a ‘sense’, or any systemic description of ‘new senses’; yet 
such an example was seamlessly juxtaposed, in the discourse, with a far more 
ambitious vision.  
 
 
Figure 15. Ling Tan’s device. 
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Others beyond Kevin Kelly joined in juxtaposing the relatively modest 
commercial products and design experiments to lofty ideals of transformation 
– whether to advance their corporate appeal, out of genuine enthusiasm, or 
both. Haptics was a key frontier; if the visual and aural alerts common in 
personal computers and smartphones were designed to explicitly interrupt 
the user and enact ‘hard’ jolts on their attention (Wajcman & Rose 2011), 
haptic feedback was beginning to experiment with more persistent, 
backgrounded kinds of responsivity. Just as James Proud’s device sought to 
disappear into the lived environment, gently buzzing wristwatches were 
promoted as normalising ‘low-friction’ feedback that human subjects could 
learn to accommodate in the same way they, say, seamlessly receive 
information about temperature through their skin (Smith 2015). In another 
example, one London designer showcased a self-tracking device that would 
use discomforting or even punishing feedback, including a flare of intense 
heat (Peters 2013) – pointing towards the extended array of communicative 
channels between humans and machines that self-tracking devices are 
beginning to explore. The turn to haptics thus reprises the role played by 
skeuomorphic design elements throughout the history of personal computing.  
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Once again, such practices hardly add up to a posthumanist development of 
‘new senses for new sensors’. The rhetoric of data-sense, ultimately, is about 
overstepping the reality of existing achievements and attempting to orient 
public imagination towards the technological future that is apparently just 
around the corner. This is not to say that self-tracking of the early and mid-
2010s did nothing for human mechanisms of self-knowledge. Though 
relatively one-dimensional in their individual manifestations, self-tracking 
devices in this period were increasingly cultivating fresh channels for 
communicating machinic data to human subjects.95 These channels were being 
designed not to provoke discrete queries and deliberations, but a habituated 
and tacit receptivity to the continuous flow of machinic communications. 
Vision, Merleau-Ponty said, is “the means given me for being absent from 
myself” (1996, p146). Notwithstanding his complicity in the Western tendency 
to privilege vision over the other senses (which he acknowledged later in his 
career), we can apply this thinking to self-tracking’s efforts to augment the 
senses as a whole. To sense one’s own body is already for consciousness to 
direct itself towards something else, an object; self-knowledge, in other 
words, is to know the ‘me’ as an object distinct from the conscious ‘I’ 
                                                          
95 This process has alternatively been described as ‘biopedagogy’ (Fotopoulou & O’Riordan 
2015). 
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(Merleau-Ponty 2012). Self-tracking is designed precisely to intercede in this 
relation. And where concrete deployments often proved as capable of 
frustrating their users as revolutionising their senses, their mediated public 
presentation continued to mobilise subjects to consume, experiment, and 
produce ever more data about themselves.  
 
This imagined reconfiguration of the subjects’ sensory equipment, and the 
emergence of a pervasive communicative circuit between selves and their 
sensors, reached its rhetorical peak in claims of a broader, posthuman shift. 
Kevin Kelly elsewhere christened it exoself: an ‘extended connected self’ that 
constantly discharges data while receiving all kinds of machinic 
communications, both consciously and non-consciously (see Swan 2013, p95). 
Such language extends the long narrative of technological transcendence that 
had characterised utopian (and some dystopian) rhetoric about personal 
computing and the Internet in previous decades – and, indeed, the broad and 
powerful influence of cybernetics throughout the 20th century that defined the 
body and the selves as information systems (see Hayles 1999; Lupton 2014). 
One particularly relevant branch of that cybernetic imaginary had been the 
countercultural influence on personal computing and the Internet as a route 
to a technologically expanded consciousness – a vision that Kevin Kelly 
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himself had actively brokered in the 1980s and 90s (Turner 2006). It was in 
extension of this context that self-tracking enthusiasts across news media, 
internet technology industries and the Quantified Self movement spoke of 
exoselves and new senses. Such discourse promised not a future where users 
are turned into hyper-rational machines, but rather a more ‘authentic’ 
relationship to one’s own humanity.96 Thus we find ‘innovation design 
consultants’ claiming that self-tracking “technology will offer a level of self-
awareness that could make us more human than ever” (Brennan 2015) – or 
the founder of a self-tracking headset company proclaiming the advent of a 
‘humanising technology’ (Garten 2011).  
 
*** 
 
The rhetoric of data-sense, then, ran the full gamut: from more modest and 
practical descriptions of new skills and literacies, to futurist fantasies of the 
impending ‘exoself’. Such narratives focused on the transformations 
apparently affecting the human senses and the phenomenological self. At the 
same time, self-tracking discourse also featured a set of ideals and 
                                                          
96 For a discussion of such rhetoric of authenticity through self-tracking vis-à-vis health and 
well-being, see Sharon (2016).  
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expectations about how the practice could develop into a social/commercial 
structure. In other words, the perceived benefits of data-sense were not 
limited to individual satisfaction. Parallel to smart machines’ increasing 
tendency to share data and align their interventions across each other, a 
shared set of literacies and sensory configurations were already allowing self-
tracking communities like QS to communicate and coordinate. As Theodore 
Porter (1995) argues in his history of quantification, the intersection of 
quantification as method and objectivity as ideal often had the political 
consequence of facilitating the public sharing of information and consensus-
building – even as those actors remain strangers without other kinds of 
shared context. Although the Quantified Self community refused any 
dogmatic or standardised implementation of quantitative metrics, and 
encouraged highly personal forms of hacking / experimentation, familiar 
mainstays of the modern day scientific method were often recruited by QSers 
to discuss each other’s experiments. Discussions of how one QSer’s system for 
measuring mood could be replicated, or whether an experiment in the 
correlation between protein diets and bowel movements featured a control 
condition, worked to organise these eclectic practices into a broader program 
of inquiry and collective knowledge. Gary Wolf thus describes the 
community as a place where the roles of consumer, user, developer, expert 
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become entangled, allowing every participant to contribute to this process 
from  
 
a position of equality with the experts who design that stuff […] And 
nobody stands higher than them on that passage of discovery […] So 
that, for me, is sort of the magic. Where the experts interact more 
personally, and the people interact more expertly. That underlies my 
sense of what’s different about Quantified Self from just, some kind of 
lifestyle trend where people pick a gadget, and put it on. 
 
So it’s kind of an idea about how to make knowledge together, or how 
to reason together, that I think is, it’s interesting to talk about now 
because the tools exist to make it easier for us to reason together this 
way, and I think it’s this style of reasoning that I [...] is the Quantified 
Self (Wolf 2015, personal communication). 
 
In other words, QS functions as a kind of Fleckian (1979) thought collective: a 
social space where the repeated exchange of ideas produces emergent norms 
regarding what counts as sufficiently reliable data, rigorous test, and valid 
conclusion; for instance, one finds a widespread scepticism of ‘one size fits all’ 
solutions, from over-the-counter pills to the body mass index (not to mention 
attempts to generalise findings of any singular self-tracking experiment). 
Although QS’ founders and voluntary meetup organisers tended to shy away 
from explicitly defining ‘best practices’ in self-tracking, seeking instead to 
promote an inclusive, decentralised atmosphere, the QS meetups, websites 
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and conferences served as a social space for curating attitudes towards self-
tracking. 
 
The Quantified Self, of course, only accounted for a specific subset of the 
growing self-tracking market; hence I described the former as a connoisseur 
community, and the latter as a population of laypeople, in the Introduction. 
Just as virtual communities of the 1990s represented a larger and increasingly 
commercialised uptake of earlier, experimental communities like the 
Homebrew Computer Club and the WELL, the tinkering enthusiasts that 
made up the Quantified Self communities is increasingly being dwarfed in 
population by what is sometimes labelled the Quantified Us: a vast network 
of publicly shared personal data that allows intersubjective and populational 
patterns to be drawn (e.g. Jordan & Pfarr 2014; Cha 2015). And therein is the 
irony. As we noted in Chapter 2, self-tracking discourse in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s tended to position the practice as the personal, empowering ‘n=1’ 
alternative to state and corporate surveillance; that is, as a DIY solution 
whereby savvy users could take control of the personal data that new 
technologies were already extracting and exploiting for profit. When Gary 
Wolf (2010a) advised the globally distributed QS meetups on best practices, 
one of them was to ‘avoid business pitches’; the many ‘show and tells’ I 
 
 
 
271 
 
 
observed, both in person and via video recordings, similarly emphasised 
personal narratives of discovery and experimentation over sleek product 
promotions or marketing rhetoric about monetisation or target audiences 
(even when the ‘personal’ show and tell was by an entrepreneur and about 
his/her new tracking product!). Yet as self-tracking devices and practices 
began to reach the wider, lay population through the success of devices like 
Fitbit, the massive production of new kinds of personal data by these eager 
consumers began to open up new horizons for big data, populational norms 
and corporate profiteering. Although the latter has typically been (noticeably) 
absent from the public presentation of self-tracking, we can witness an 
example of the industry logic from a public relations trade magazine’s 
coverage on the matter. In the below excerpt, the said coverage quotes a 
London-based digital PR professional: 
 
The opportunity for brands now is to tap into the data the new wave of 
connected consumers are happy to broadcast so that they can learn 
more and engage […] What this all means for the PR person is a more 
tech-savvy approach to understanding consumer behaviour and 
figuring out how to capture and capitalise on a new kind of attention 
(Benvie in Moore 2013). 
 
If on the object side there is an effort to knit the many tracking systems into a 
more comprehensive ecosystem, the subjects of self-tracking are also being 
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enjoined to develop an ethic of voluntary sharing for the ‘greater good’. In the 
context of health tracking, one Wired article proclaimed that sharing your 
intimate details “may be the best decision of your life”: 
 
But if we truly want to enable the breakthroughs and behaviour 
changes that will transform our health, we must be willing to share our 
most personal asset: the data about our lifestyle, state of health, and 
disease (Seidenberg 2014). 
 
Imagine a future where self-tracking harnesses a whole population’s 
data to identify patterns and make meaningful recommendations. 
Imagine a future where we can see into the data of people just like us, 
to help us live better, and where we willingly give up a bit of privacy 
in exchange for vast benefits (Jordan & Pfarr 2014). 
 
Such discourse presents the Quantified Us is presented as an unproblematic 
upgrade – a smooth ‘scaling’ that will bring the benefits of self-tracking 
technologies to more people, and thereby amplify their positive effects. Yet 
this injunction to share your data for your own good exhibits striking 
similarities to how corporate data-mining mobilised Web 2.0 users for their 
own exploitation in the personal data economy. José van Dijck (2013) calls it 
the culture of connectivity: how social media platforms like Facebook 
achieved widespread adoption by offering human connectedness without a 
monetary price, and subsequently began extracting and selling this very 
network of (inter)personal connectivity and its vast troves of voluntarily 
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submitted data. This bargain of apparently ‘free’ sociability and convenience 
for our ‘free’ production of data for others’ profit is a defining feature of 
digital economies in the early twenty-first century. For instance, finds 
formally analogous structures in the ‘free labour’ (Terranova 2000) that 
produces cultural and informational goods in the Web 2.0 economy, from 
Wikipedia content to maintaining virtual communities. It is no coincidence, 
therefore, that self-tracking’s vision of empowerment through data 
production dovetails seamlessly with the industry’s hopes of tracking 
individuals as data producers, whose output can then be harvested and 
commercialised. Neither is it accidental that issues of data privacy, so central 
to the debates around state surveillance, have tended to remain on the 
periphery of self-tracking discourse. This is not to suggest a conspiratorial 
explanation, where QS founders or self-tracking entrepreneurs harbour secret 
plans to steal users’ data. The correlational epistemology underlying big 
data’s favoured techniques – like machine learning and Bayesian inferences – 
are designed to benefit from as much data as possible. Just as state 
surveillance systems’ ‘collect ‘em all’ strategies were born out of an epistemic 
data hunger, the developers of self-tracking solutions often end up 
advocating that sharing is ‘worth’ the cost in privacy by virtue of their own 
methodologies. 
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Even leaving aside the commercial aspect, it would still be naïve to consider 
the rhetoric of data-sense as a manual in self-empowerment and control. 
Data-sense seeks to instill in self-tracking’s subjects a strong orientation 
towards efficiency and optimisation in the most mundane and private aspects 
of their lived experience; hence, the very principles that govern technological 
development are transposed onto a set of ethical ‘best practices’ for the 
subject. Taking the example of Bob Troia, an entrepreneur and QSer who had 
tracked everything from diet to glucose levels and physical location, Deborah 
Lupton (2014) suggests that self-tracking instils a more or less neoliberal ethic 
of ceaseless self-management, through which subjects sign up onto an 
indefinite cycle of quantified progress; in Troia’s own words, “an optimal 
human being in every aspect of [one’s] life” (Troia in Lupton 2014). Indeed, 
this is a narrative for which there is no shortage of spokespersons amongst 
self-trackers themselves. Elsewhere, Troia claims:  
 
You track all those issues, and you’re like, ‘Wow!’ I thought I felt great, 
and then you realise that you’ve sort of been going through life for a 
while with the parking brake on,’ Troia said. ‘And when you start 
fixing all of those areas, you’re like, ‘Wow! I didn’t realise.’ It wasn’t 
that I felt bad, I just didn’t realize I could, I should be feeling better 
(Troia in CBS News 2014). 
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It is not difficult to find even more bullish statements that more or less equate 
self-tracking with the mythical elixir of life: 
 
Indeed, why not give yourself an ‘upgrade’, says Dave Asprey, a ‘bio-
hacker’ who takes self-quantification to the extreme of self-
experimentation. He claims to have shaved 20 years off his 
biochemistry and increased his IQ by as much as 40 points through 
‘smart pills’, diet and biology-enhancing gadgets (Dembosky 2011). 
 
To be sure, rhetoric like Asprey’s would count as outlandish, if not downright 
dishonest, for many self-trackers. Yet it is only an extreme rendition of the 
same kinds of objectives that individuals like Troia also orient themselves by.  
 
Self-tracking discourse’s exhortations towards data sharing and relentless 
self-improvement attracted a host of criticisms – just as its promise of 
automated and intimate self-knowledge prompted the backlashes described 
in Chapter 2. The very aspects of self-tracking that the rhetoric of data-sense 
described as virtues became targets of criticism and sometimes ridicule. First, 
the language of optimisation and improvement was criticised in those very 
terms, and decried as a dehumanising obsession: 
 
It’s often easier to understand what to do with data than to evaluate 
how you feel, and devices that can quantify your walking or blood 
pressure or vaginal strength let you take advantage of that […] But the 
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pitfall of data devices – and the external sharing of information that 
they encourage or require – is that they hijack your reward pathways. 
Instead of walking because it makes you feel good, or because it gets 
you out in the air or (my personal favourite reason) because sometimes 
there is bonkers stuff to see in between point A and point B, you walk 
in order to improve your stats (Zimmerman 2014). 
 
Similarly, self-tracking’s promise of personalised knowledge and exhaustive 
attention to the well-being of the individual self was targeted with 
accusations of narcissism – a trope so commonly voiced in media 
representations of self-tracking, that Gary Wolf (e.g. 2010b) acknowledged it 
in his own pieces defending and promoting the Quantified Self. (In a self-
deprecating nod to such criticism, Wolf (2009a) in fact ran psychological 
assessment surveys on a sample of QSers – to quantify the narcissism of self-
trackers!) Although most accusations of narcissism were directed literally at 
the psychological profile of individuals willing to devote large chunks of their 
daily life to such tracking activities, it also reflects a key difference between 
self-tracking as an ethic and the utopian visions of its predecessors in the 
countercultural influence upon personal computing. If virtual communities of 
the early 1990s were defined by a technological optimism about building new 
forms of social organisation and spreading information to the far corners of 
the earth, the talk of ‘new senses’ or the vision of the Quantified Us is 
squarely focused on each individual’s betterment of themselves. The 
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transcendent revolution promised by the rhetoric of data-sense is thus 
literally narcissistic – and in ways that extend the Web 2.0 era’s economic 
model of leveraging subjects as voluntary producers of ‘free’ personal data 
that can be used to sell new products back to them.  
 
We should be careful, however, not to cleave the landscape into a neat binary 
division of oblivious trackers and their critics. We find a certain tension 
between the mass market, populational principles emblematised by the idea 
of the Quantified Us, and the more eclectic and experimental values often 
expressed by QSers. At the 2015 Quantified Self Conference, Dawn Nafus – 
who had built the Data Sense tool with Intel Labs – and Anne Wright, a QS 
community (‘meetup’) organiser in Pittsburgh, spoke in no uncertain terms 
about the ‘tyranny of the norm’. Gary Wolf, who was chairing the session, 
commented that he had recently seen a tracking service advertise, ‘compare 
yourself to the global norm’ – a vision which he later told me is “severely 
perilous”: 
 
I quoted that advertisement, compare yourself to the global norm, and 
I questioned it a little bit […] The reason I questioned it a little bit isn't 
because I think it’s a little bit questionable [laughs] um, but because I 
think it’s severely perilous […] Because I think that when you think 
about being in a world where you’re constantly comparing yourself to 
global norms, like, comparing yourself, right there is a problem for 
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people […] When you hear this, ask yourself, is that what you want? 
Or is that what you want to make? Tools that take people and compare 
them to global norms? (Wolf 2015, personal communication) 
 
The various actors across QS and self-tracking thus overlap messily across 
different kinds of values, benefits, principles of practice and commercial 
interests. These struggles, whether amongst self-tracking practitioners 
themselves or with its critics, show that visions of data-sense, and the 
publicisation of self-tracking in general, have strong moral and ethical stakes 
for their subjects.  
 
*** 
 
All in all, the rhetoric of data-sense presents a broad array of skills, sensory 
interfaces, moral virtues, and forms of communal organisation – all of which 
demarcate the role and identity of the ideal self-tracking subject.  
 
Early twenty-first century citizens were told that to track, and to get ‘the best’ 
out of your tracking, they had to develop a new subjective position and ethic 
– just as previous generations had done with the advent of the Internet and 
other technologies of knowledge production. Such a narrative enlisted a 
highly celebratory history of computing technologies in the 20th century; there 
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is no room for the military-industrial complex, or worries about relentless 
commercialisation of what was once called ‘virtual communities’, in this 
storyboard. In this way, self-tracking was presented to the public as a next 
step on the march of technological progress – a new epistemic reality that 
subjects simply had to get used to by accumulating new senses: 
 
One of the mantras around Quantified Self is that obsessive self-
trackers may look outrageously geeky now, but they will soon be the 
new normal […] we all will be living in an ocean of data in the near 
future, whether we are self-tracking or not, and learning how to read, 
manage, retrieve, understand, digest, parse, and selectively ignore this 
flood of data will be an essential skill – for individuals and for 
organizations. Self-trackers are there first (Kelly 2011; also see Lupton 
2013). 
 
The new normal, of course, is exactly the label that contemporaries of 
September 11 attached to “signify a world destabilised by terrorism, economic 
fluctuations, and contagion prevention” (Bratich 2006, p493). Like ‘new 
media’, the new normal was a presentist description of what early twenty-
first century commentators experienced as radically disruptive. And both 
New Terrorism that is the NSA’s bogeyman, and Kelly’s ‘new normal’ of data 
plenitude, argued that a new set of epistemic practices were simply necessary 
to keep up with the objective reality of our worldly environment. The 
parallels across the two cases here run deep. The watchers of the state 
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projected a post-September 11 geopolitical reality that was argued to be 
unprecedented in dangerousness and unpredictability; such states of affairs, 
they could then say, necessitated their decisions towards powerful and 
indiscriminate electronic surveillance. In self-tracking’s case, such necessary 
‘reality’ took the form of ‘obligatory technologies’ (Chandler 2012); the likes of 
Kevin Kelly (Wolf & Kelly 2012) insisted that “something is happening with 
this new ability” – that is, the new availability of cloud-connected smart 
sensors – and that subjects must keep up with it to thrive in the technological 
future. In the case of state surveillance, uncertainty was the rapidly growing 
spectre that threatened national security, and thereby required ever more 
data-hungry forms of surveillance; in the case of self-tracking, uncertainty is 
that old enemy of self-knowledge and self-realisation that might finally be 
vanquished through the newest sensors. And for that, the vanguards of self-
tracking argued, the users too needed to upgrade.  
 
Upgrade. In keeping with the computational metaphors, the human subject is 
seen to provide an underlying set of functions and frameworks; memory, 
vision, cognition, reason… and these capabilities, it is argued, can be newly 
programmed and augmented in order to stay compatible with increasingly 
sophisticated technological prostheses. Data-sense is thus what Peter Freund 
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calls – mixing metaphors across Elias and Bourdieu – a technological habitus: 
the social tempering of the body that allows individuals to internalise the 
virtues, senses and knowhow necessary to prosper in that technological 
society (Freund 2004). It is through this process that subjects achieve the kind 
of efficacy or competency that ‘counts’ in the new regime of knowledge, 
whether it be the savvy social media user that extracts reputational and 
monetary rewards through the network, or the self-tracking connoisseur who 
can skilfully comprehend and manipulate the new wealth of personal data. 
And just as state surveillance seeks unprecedented transparency on the part 
of the population in order to read its criminal intent, self-tracking’s ability to 
make one’s own body more transparent to oneself produces its own grid of 
legibility for a broader set of actors: from employers interested in optimising 
the biopower of its human resources, to insurance companies which are 
already offering discounts in exchange for access to ratepayers’ Fitbit data 
(Mearian 2015), and more besides. The project of knowing more about and 
optimising the self enrols many different commercial, business and 
government interests.  
 
In short, data-sense describes the widespread discourse that exhorted the 
necessity of a new kind of user-subject. Analogous to the creation of the user 
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(Hu 2015), the netizen, and other subject figures in recent decades, this 
interpellation was a sustained effort at codifying and organising the masses to 
adapt their epistemic processes, their ways of seeing, in ways that would 
facilitate the normalisation of self-tracking technology as epistemic schema 
and marketing foothold. In tandem with the design, function and rhetorical 
presentation of the technological objects in Chapter 2, data-sense thus 
constituted a comprehensive vision of a posthumanist subject – one that 
would eradicate, or at least minimise, long-standing uncertainties in self-
knowledge. Where electricity’s contemporaries dreamed of ghostly 
communication and the annihilation of space and time (Marvin 1988, Peters 
1999), and the Internet’s contemporaries dreamed the end of state divisions or 
physical distance (Flichy 2007), data-sense articulates the presentist 
imaginaries that give buoyance to an emerging technology. And just like 
those earlier cases, many of self-tracking’s most ambitious visions are unlikely 
to be realised in such purity. Their significance is not in their prophetic value, 
but their current role in interpreting, circulating and framing the 
technological deployment. Data-sense thus helps organise not only what 
counts as knowledge and the uncertain, but how subjects themselves should 
become adequate receivers, users, circulators of that epistemic regime.  
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HONEYMOON OBJECTIVITY 
Data-sense as a programme for self-tracking subjects derived its veridical 
authority and epistemic structure by relying on an existing set of metaphors 
and narratives, of prescriptive norms and ontological presumptions. In doing 
so, they extend a history of ideas that stretches back not only to the language 
of the cloud, the user, cyberspace and virtual communities (e.g. Hu 2015, 
Turner 2006, Chun 2006, Flichy 2007) but to the very birth of the terms 
‘technology’ and ‘objectivity’ in their modern form. Objectivity, technology, 
and data, especially ‘raw’ data: these concepts serve as bedrocks for self-
tracking’s claims towards ‘humanising technology’ or better self-knowledge. 
This section thus situates data-sense in the history of those very concepts and 
the epistemic visions they had previously endorsed. Data-sense is ‘new’ in its 
specific mélange of posthumanist ideals, machinic sensibility and data-driven 
environments, but the kind of role it plays in the social life of new media 
technologies reprises previous historical shifts under the name of objective 
truth and technological progress. In this context, we might characterise the 
epistemic promises of data-driven surveillance as a kind of ‘honeymoon 
objectivity’: a fascination with nascent technologies as the skeleton key to 
truth that exhibits a certain cultural amnesia, reinforcing a binary narrative 
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between an idyllic ‘pre-technical’ subject and an equally fantastically 
posthumanist one.  
 
Objectivity, as extensively chronicled by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
(2007), had older renditions like the scholastic obiectivus/obiective, but 
generally enjoyed definitions starkly different from the modern. Even in Kant, 
objective validity meant general ‘forms of sensibility’ that prepare experience, 
while it was the ‘subjective’ that referred to specific and concretely empirical 
sensations. They argue that it is only during the 19th century that develops the 
now familiar juxtaposition: a neutral, ‘aperspectival’ objectivity as the 
privileged instrument towards truth and scientific inquiry, and biased, 
unreliable subjectivity as its nemesis (also see Daston 1992). Most relevantly 
for our analysis, these movements produce by the late 19th century what 
Daston and Galison call ‘mechanical objectivity’: a regulative ideal which 
called for the excision of the human observer from the process of data 
visualisation (in this context, scientific atlases). In this case, it was the 
technological development of photography that spurred new linkages 
between automation and objectivity, producing the ideal where “machines 
[would be] paragons of certain human virtues” (Daston & Galison 2007, 
p123), and the most truthful representations of natural data would be the least 
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subjective, ‘entirely artless’ (p133). The rhetoric of data-sense thus leveraged a 
far older historical value of objectivity, with the cultural capital it had 
accumulated through traditions of scientific inquiry. 
 
Mechanical objectivity does not, of course, encompass the many different 
renditions of the ideals of objectivity in Western societies since the 19th 
century. It does exemplify how much contemporary uses of the concept – 
including within self-tracking discourse – owes to these developments in 
scientific inquiry. The rhetoric of data-sense is thus literally parasitic: its 
combination of tinkering ethic, technological enthusiasm and consumer 
market ambitions latches onto the lexicon, epistemic assumptions, and social 
authority of what had originally been part of the effort to define ‘good 
science’ and the truth of nature. Self-surveillance – and, indeed, in many 
ways, state and corporate surveillance – thus expounds the virtues of 
automation, quantification, machinic sensibility, ‘bigger’ data, all in the name 
of achieving greater objectivity, understood here as an unchanging and 
factual knowledge of reality purged of human bias. If Emotion Sense 
quantifies ‘mood’ onto a scatter plot graph, an intrepid individual embarks on 
a quest to inventory every single possession and index them by market 
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price97, and even pelvic floor muscles are subject to real-time tracking and 
haptic feedback (kGoal), it is repeatedly stated that all this is for the sake of a 
more objective – sometimes ‘scientific’, ‘accurate’ – knowledge. We thus find, 
amongst self-tracking practitioners and enthusiasts, the argument that self-
tracking can provide new degrees of objectivity formerly denied by 
inadequate technologies. Consider the following examples, the first by a 
technology reporter, the second by Joseph Kvedar, the Director of the Centre 
for Connected Health at Harvard Medical School (also see Swan 2013, p92; 
Crawford et al. 2015, p492)98: 
 
The way it is measured right now requires episodic periodic visits to a 
neurologist, who puts patients through fairly subjective and coarse 
clinical tests—there are many 1-2-3-4 scales. What we need to advance 
is research that is a much more consistent and objective measure of the 
disease (Ungerleider 2014). 
 
On weekends when I had to do yard work instead of cycle, I resented it 
as a waste of time. This all changed about a year ago when I was 
looking at the stats from my Bodymedia armband. I discovered that I 
                                                          
97 Such was the self-tracking project of Matt Russell, which was shared with a New York QS 
meetup in 2015. He had compiled a database of every type of possession, from perishable 
groceries to furniture and sentimental keepsakes, analysing them primarily as a way to 
optimise and ‘get in front of’ his consumption rhythm.  
98 Sometimes, researchers and professionals in health and information technologies also 
helped circulate a confident rhetoric of progress towards objectivity. For instance, consider a 
2014 article published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE], one of 
the largest such associations globally, and authored by two computer science researchers at 
University of California, Irvine: “Historically, we have gone through the following phases of 
understanding the self: anecdotal, subjective diary, and quantified self. Lately, there has been 
a lot of talk about the quantified self. Soon we will enter the most scientific stage: the objective 
self.” (Jain & Jalali 2014) 
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burn about 1.5X the amount of calories per hour of yard work as I do 
cycling […] The result of that insight is that I welcome my days of yard 
work now […] This is a perfect example of how objective, quantified 
information can lead to insights that prompt behavior change. We are 
in the midst of a real movement around the collection of data and the 
use of that data to gain insight about health and affect behavior 
change… (Kvedar 2011) 
 
Such language leans on objectivity as a venerable, reliable quality, one whose 
virtues and authority is hardly in question. Yet as we have mentioned above, 
to invoke objectivity is to leverage a regulative ideal that is itself a composite 
of different virtues and epistemological claims – and a composite whose 
organisation has itself changed constantly over its history. Accordingly, the 
rhetoric of data-sense also performed a degree of conceptual localisation. For 
his part, Gary Wolf stresses that objectivity should not be understood as a 
rigid, dogmatic commitment to numbers, but an intelligent leveraging of 
machinic virtues like regularity, precision, reliability. In this articulation, 
objectivity is a way to formally standardise what is also, paradoxically 
enough, a personal and eclectic practice. In our interview, asked about QSers’ 
discussions about ‘subjective measurements’, Wolf offered an ad hoc schema 
of objectivity vis-à-vis tracking practice: 
  
One is objective means explicit. And you could say formal, in that 
sense. Numerical. So if you think of it in terms of representation, you 
could classify types of representation from formal to informal […] and 
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on the formal side you have, you know, logic, numerals, and things 
like that, and somewhere in the middle you have words, and maybe all 
the way on the right hand side, if we're doing it that way, you have 
music, or, you know, colour fields painted in […]  
 
Another is social versus individual, in which individual perception 
would be considered subjective, and social – an idea, a perception, an 
observation that entailed agreement of more people, whether that be 
expert observers or everybody, would be objective. So there’s an 
interesting history of that word, you know, and the way in which the 
formality of expressions and the sociality – the formality of expressions 
has a sociality, a credibility – became so tightly tangled together under 
the term objectivity. I think that they probably have to come apart to 
understand the Quantified Self, and the objectivity of the Quantified 
Self really refers to the way it’s actually used. It refers to formality of 
expression. And not so much to a kind of social validity (Wolf 2015, 
personal communication). 
 
A ‘subjective’ measure like self-reported mood scores may never attain 
‘objectivity’ as an ontological quality, objectivity as a faithfulness to 
aperspectival reality; but, Wolf argues, “what you can do is work with them 
and think with them” (ibid.) precisely insofar as they are ‘formal’. Such an 
articulation seeks to square QS’ commitment to personalised control over data 
and self-knowledge, with the legitimation of that knowledge through its 
demonstration of a formal objectivity. Such folk theorisation hardly adds up 
to a comprehensive philosophy. The attempt at making sense of objectivity 
vis-à-vis self-tracking, however, reflects the continuing movements at 
bridging scientific objectivity and the tinkering ethic, and a bid to establish 
the wider epistemic legitimacy of the practice. One part of this effort has been 
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the gradual weaning of the self-nominated ‘Quantified’ prefix; an effort to 
preserve the virtues of formal, standardised, machinic objectivity beyond the 
stereotypes of inhumanly hyper-rational number geeks. Indeed, Gary Wolf’s 
‘state of the movement’ piece in the New York Times (2010b) was keen to 
differentiate self-trackers from the figures like Charles Dickens’ Mr. 
Gradgrind. Where Gradgrind was an insufferably ‘obstinate’ stiff who 
insisted his pupils chant ‘Fact, fact, fact!’, Wolf insisted, “it is normal to seek 
data”. In this vision, self-tracking pursues objectivity not as a dry and 
scholarly insistence on precise factuality, but a practical virtue that seeks the 
eradication of biases, errors, and other forms of epistemic uncertainty when it 
comes to self-knowledge. If state surveillance relied on its simulationist 
heuristics for ‘actionable’ knowledge, Wolf’s QS seeks to produce everyday 
reality in forms that can be compared, tabulated, manipulated, optimised – 
that is, “amenable to computing” (Wolf 2015, personal communication). 
 
Wolf’s description matches much of what I have witnessed in my own 
participation at meetups and conferences. Still, no single definition applies 
dogmatically across the many different invocations of objectivity in the self-
tracking context. It is not even necessary for every practitioner to subscribe to 
the same definition in order to participate in the vision. Terms like 
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‘objectivity’ encompass a certain range of uses and interpretations, and 
indeed, the great advantage of this ‘strategic ambiguity’ is to provide a 
linguistic space where many variant positions can congregate and 
communicate (Eisenberg 1984). Within this ‘range’, the common language of 
objectivity, and its accumulated historical gravitas, provides a space for some 
flexibility, some hybridisation, in navigating the tensions between the grand 
narrative and local epistemic processes.  
 
This transposition of the virtues and legitimacy of objectivity also extended to 
the figure of the ideal knowing subject. If objectivity in many contexts 
developed a suspicion of subjective claims, and often sought to inoculate its 
procedures from human tampering, this also meant that ideals of objectivity 
had to strictly regulate the kinds of subjective virtues and practices that are 
necessary to secure the former. The rhetoric of data-sense thus extends and 
leverages not only posthuman fantasies of the digital age, but the idea that 
objective knowledge requires corresponding discipline in its subjects. Daston 
and Galison describe, in terms of mechanical objectivity, an injunction to ‘self-
surveillance’ on the part of scientists; a deliberate curbing of the temptation to 
subjective bias and projection. The ideal subject of this epistemic regime 
would transcribe, illustrate, and interpret exactly what the mechanisms of 
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photography and later microscopy would yield; a patient and diligent work 
of suppressing the subjective that they compare to Schopenhauer’s ‘will to 
willessness’ (2007, p174-6, 203). The subjective virtues of objective 
epistemology was not limited to a disappearing act. Theodore Porter (2014) 
points out that the human champions of mechanical objectivity were also 
expected to exhibit a set of moral traits – traits that ironically included the 
ability to confidently imagine a utopian future for such science. And at a 
practical level, where the work of machines is inevitably handled, interpreted, 
regulated by human hands and eyes, the ideals of objectivity translated – at 
least in the increasingly institutionalised and professionalised halls of 
‘normal’ science99 – into the valorisation of qualities like reliable and 
dependable personalities (Daston 1992, Shapin 2008). To articulate the virtues 
                                                          
99 This historical shift has elsewhere been described as the passage from science as the early 
modern pursuit by individual, often polymath amateurs to professional specialists as part of 
larger and more rigorously regulated institutions. For instance, the early members of the 
Royal Society were associated with and contemporaneous with the English adoption of the 
term virtuoso / virtuosi – which designated amateur dilettantes whose inquiries into nature 
were less regulated, highly personal, and driven by the pleasure of knowledge (e.g. Houghton 
Jr. 1942, p61; Musson & Robinson 1969, p20; Eamon 1994). This is in stark contrast to what 
Steven Shapin (2008) calls the ‘industrial scientist’ of Cold War America; a system of funding, 
organisation, and often state sponsorship that would emphasise the scientist as a ‘honest, 
sober, dependable’ professional employee of the larger system. And of course, the very 
founding of the Royal Society, including its Baconian influence, was part of a concerted effort 
towards a more systematic and methodical production of scientific knowledge (Hunter 1989; 
Rossi 1970, x-xi; Zilsel 2000, p5). To be sure, such a narrative applies more or less to what 
Kuhn (1962) called ‘normal science’, which itself continued to be formed and reshaped 
through transgressive ‘revolutions’. Hence, historically, the rise of objectivity and 
professionalised science over the 19th and 20th centuries also saw a parallel ‘track’ where 
figures of heroic genius, with their exceptional subjective touch on the passage of science, 
could be interrogated (e.g. MacLeod 2007). 
 
 
 
292 
 
 
of objective knowledge is to specify a subjective ethic that cultivates 
sufficiently disciplined practitioners. It is in this context that the rhetoric of 
data-sense leveraged self-tracking’s embrace of objectivity towards its own 
ideals of data literacy, exoselves, and the ‘new normal’. 
 
*** 
 
If data-sense piggybacks objectivity’s authority as an epistemic virtue to 
instruct a set of subjective ethics, this relation is itself brokered through 
‘technology’ as a complex of different visions and ideals. This again reprises a 
longer historical pattern. In the case of mechanical objectivity in the 19th 
century, Daston and Galison (2007) specifically linked its rise in the practice of 
scientific atlases with the development of new photographic technologies. 
More importantly, technology as an idea itself brings to the table a host of 
narratives about the virtues of such epistemic projects. The term technology in 
its modern sense was only introduced in the mid-19th century, when earlier 
designations of the practical arts and crafts was disrupted by the 
breakthrough of industrial machinery. Just as many contemporaries of data-
driven surveillance and ‘big data’ today speak of the coming ubiquity of new 
technologies, commentators in this period perceived a proliferation of 
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machines that reflected an unprecedented rate of invention and progress – a 
perception which, given the extraordinary expansion of material wealth and 
mechanical infrastructure Europe and America achieved during the Industrial 
Revolution, was hardly groundless (Landes 1969). If the ‘mechanical arts’ 
referred to specific practices of tinkering and craftsmanship, the accession of 
‘technology’ as a term marked a new belief in, well, technology as a broad, 
hyperobjective system – the iconic object being the railroad networks (Marx 
1994, 2010). These imaginations of technology as a universal system and an 
engine for progress would become steadily normalised over the ensuing 
decades. The mid-20th century critical rhetoric of ‘autonomous technology’ 
(Winner 1977), ‘technics’ (Mumford 1963) and the technological society (Ellul 
1964) serves as a way to recognise the kind of authority the term had accrued 
by cold war America.100 In other words, it was through specific waves of 
sociotechnical transformation – emblematised by the railway, electrical 
power, the industrial factory, the atom bomb, and now the Internet / the 
Internet of Things – that technology aggregated its modern vision of progress, 
innovation, and optimisation. Technology, in comparable ways to objectivity, 
drew together a set of normative assumptions about the virtuous (and/or 
                                                          
100 It has been claimed that technological advancement was specifically adopted as a key 
marker of progress for America as a nation, succeeding the vision of Manifest Destiny as 
settlers – and railroads – completed the journey West by the late 19th century (see Smith 1994; 
Sarewitz 1996). 
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dangerous) power of machines and their role in the passage of history. Self-
tracking’s futuristic vision of automated self-knowledge rode the coattails of 
this long historical wave, a long maturing set of fantasies – and leveraged 
those tropes to full effect.  
 
Self-tracking, as a promise of technological advancement in objective truth, 
exemplifies the mutual exchange of legitimacy and norms across objectivity 
and technology. Here, we must understand the function of ‘technology’ as a 
concept, as an image, as distinct from the deployment of actual and specific 
technologies. One consequence of the increasing complexity in technological 
systems was that “the public increasingly had to rely on images” – that is, 
narratives and emblems for popular consumption and imagination – “of 
technology for its understanding of both technology and progress” (Smith 
1994, p40). It is at this level that data-sense profits from the ‘image’ of 
technology as a ‘neutral’ solution or optimiser that can be applied to every 
problem (see Edgerton 2010; Kline 2001). Once again, corporate data-mining 
plays the vanguard and engine to self-tracking. Between mid-2000s and the 
mid-2010s, social media platforms built up a powerful position of authority as 
institutions for the circulation of both human sociability and commercial sales 
of personal data based on that sociability. They did so precisely through a 
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politics of neutrality – a discursive strategy that relied on the common 
understanding of technology as a neutral and impartial solution to route 
massive social and commercial influence unto a select few corporations (e.g. 
Gillespie 2010). Here, it was the claims of empowerment and popular 
sovereignty that became the unwitting dummy for the surveillance and 
exploitation of personal data (e.g. Van Dijck 2013). Consistent with these 
earlier developments, self-tracking’s vision of personal control has tended to 
encourage a vision of what Evgeny Morozov (2013) calls ‘solutionism’: that 
any and every problem can benefit from technological optimisation, that 
technology can insert itself as a neutral booster to almost any kind of 
knowledge problem. 
 
Anything that is trackable is being tracked. Heart rate, also heart rate 
variability […] EMG off the muscles, EEG, ECG. You know. Steps, of 
course, with digital pedometers. Activity level in general. Sleep. Phases 
of sleep. Location. Social relationships. Mood. Really, almost anything 
people care about is being turned into something that can be 
interrogated, using numbers in the broadest sense (Wolf in Wolf & 
Kelly 2012). 
 
Combined, the vision of data-driven surveillance as a neutral optimiser, a 
next step in society’s ineluctable progress towards objective truth, was 
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christened through its own set of metaphors and images.101 In the mid-20th 
century, the Whole Earth Catalog adopted the first image of the whole earth 
from space as an emblem for its vision of technological transcendence (Turner 
2006), even as Marshall McLuhan spoke of the ‘global village’ (1962, 1964). By 
the 1990s, the popularisation of the Internet occasioned metaphors of 
cyberspace, virtual communities (Rheingold 2000), and the ‘information 
superhighway’ (see Hu 2015, pxxiv). Self-tracking itself tapped into a set of 
metaphors governing the broader fascination with (big) data and its wireless 
circulation. This included the ‘cloud’ – a vision of smooth, immaterial 
technology, free of political and physical obstacles, and also the vision of a 
certain epistemic proliferation, all of which forms a “topography or 
architecture of our own desire” (ibid., pxvii).102 Personal data itself received 
new and often grandiose descriptions: “data is the new oil” was the 
buzzword in the mid-2010s, expressing again the universalist idea that every 
phenomenon in our society was an opportunity for ‘datafication’ to derive 
new commercial value (e.g. Watson 2015). Most relevantly for self-tracking’s 
specific vision, personal data has been compared to an identity, a body, a 
                                                          
101 The organising role played by metaphors was comprehensively covered in (Lakoff & 
Johnson 1980). 
102 If the technological achievements of earlier eras produced imposing physical monuments 
to their transformative ambitions, producing a collective awe and recognition that has been 
called ‘the technological sublime’ (Nye 1994), it is such immaterial and hyperobjective 
symbols that fulfil a similar role in the new media society.   
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double, a dopplegänger, a profile, a DNA (Cheney-Lippold 2011; Raley 2013; 
Bauman & Lyon 2013; Haggerty & Ericson 2000; Watson 2014). In this 
language, data is an ubiquitous, amorphous good whose discovery and 
extraction can be engineered through new technologies. And for self-tracking, 
too, it is this datafication – the conversion to ‘formal’ material – that is at the 
crux of the promise of technological objectivity (also see Steyerl 2016).  
 
In short, self-tracking discourse leverages the historically accumulated virtues 
of objectivity and technology in order to buttress a vision of neutral 
optimisation and data-driven truth. Alongside its positioning in the broader 
(and utopian) history of personal computing, self-tracking discourse’s 
parasitic and derivative relationship to these older values allow them to 
invest a great deal of transformative capacity in the tracking machines of the 
present (and the allegedly-near future). In other words, self-tracking not only 
repeats earlier waves of hyperbole surrounding new technologies from 
electricity to the Internet, it deliberately reproduces it as part of its bid for social 
significance and public uptake. Of course, such promises of technological 
transformation are rarely fulfilled in exactly the ways foreseen by its pioneers. 
Self-tracking is unlikely to eliminate uncertainty in self-knowledge any more 
than mechanical objectivity could eradicate the scientist from science. And so, 
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we may look forward to a time when today’s ‘new media’, filled with such 
hopes and fears, itself becomes the stepping stone for the next sociotechnical 
revelation; as if this time, the Hegelian dialectic will come to a conclusion, and 
pure objectivity might finally be at hand. We may repeat what we have said 
of data-sense: honeymoon objectivity is no prophecy, but works very much in 
the present, legitimising new power relations and systems of veridical 
authority demanded by new technological practices.  
 
OF FORKING PATHS 
The promise of self-tracking is outwardly a simple one: use new technologies 
to know yourself better. Undergirding this smooth narrative, and lending it a 
historically accumulated veridical authority, are old and venerable regulative 
ideals, themselves knitted together into mutually amplify their legitimacy. 
Insofar as the values of technology, objectivity, and ‘raw’ data pass 
themselves off as ‘givens’, they attempt to depict the human adoption of data-
sense as natural and inevitable. Yet when we peel away the presentist 
fantasies of the revolution that always seems just around the corner, it is 
possible to understand data-sense not as an ‘upgrade’, but a question for the 
subjects of data-driven surveillance: what kind of relationship will we broker 
with this technology, with what kind of consequences? What are the many 
 
 
 
299 
 
 
paths that are available for those who live in the midst of ‘new’ technologies, 
especially if their deployment in some form often seems irresistible?  
 
In 2014, a design consultant named Dan Saffer wrote for Wired to make the 
point rather creatively: we need to tame our algorithms, he argued, like 
humans tamed animals (Saffer 2014). As we domesticated wolves into dogs, 
we also evolved to render ourselves compatible with them; the same must 
now happen, Saffer suggested, with a nonhuman ‘species’ that we have let 
loose into our lived environments – algorithms. Saffer’s jaunt into this von 
Uexküllian – not to mention Deleuzian – territory exemplifies a minoritarian 
discourse within self-tracking that has begun to question what different kinds 
of data-sense might be possible. If self-tracking’s sceptics, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, tended to revert to a binary between pre-technical humanity and a 
cyborg abomination, commentary like Saffer’s attempts to consider ways in 
which self-tracking might not present society with a set of choices about the 
virtues it could embrace: 
 
One way of speeding up this evolution [of humans and algorithms] is 
providing a means of telling [algorithms] what we need and value. We 
need to insert an awareness of human feelings and human limitations 
into the code. 
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I will end by raising one further example. Perhaps the best known critic of 
self-tracking as a relationship is, ironically, also one of its iconic practitioners. 
In the early 2010s, Chris Dancy’s apparatus of “between 300 and 700 tracking 
and lifelogging systems at all times” (Kelly 2014) earned him the label ‘the 
most connected man on earth’. Since then, he has maintained his involvement 
in the practice, but as a strong proponent of self-tracking as an aid to 
‘nonjudgmental living’.  
 
We have a choice when we design software to […] design for 
contemplation, to design for perspective. Perspective should be a 
platform […] it’s ironic that your phones are fully charged, and you’re 
constantly worried about how far you are away from an outlet, but you 
are worn out, you get no sleep […] if you cared for you as much as you 
cared for your phone, you’d be amazingly happy (Dancy 2015). 
 
Dancy argues that when self-tracking practices seek to organise subjects into 
the machinic virtues of standardisation, optimisation, and quantification, this 
risks ‘weaponising’ the technology (Dancy, 2015, personal communication) – 
that is, betraying the empowering or liberating possibilities of the new 
technology and instead subjecting its users to debilitating anxiety. Such 
criticism reprises the fear of technology that we also found in the ‘humanist’ 
sceptics of Chapter 2, and indeed, earlier warnings about sociotechnical 
systems like the figure of Charlie Chaplin in Modern Times: the human 
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reduced to a biological copy of the machine, toiling each moment to keep the 
numbers afloat. More significant is the point of intersection between Dancy’s 
complaint and the earlier example of ‘training’ algorithms: an emphasis on 
the possibility, and indeed, responsibility, to redirect the developing 
relationship between self-tracking and the subjective virtues it becomes 
conduit for. At a moment when the tinkerers’ hopes of technological 
empowerment in the Quantified Self movement is being overwhelmed by the 
fast-growing commercial interest in consumerist/technological solutionism 
and looks forward to an economy based on the harvesting of yet more 
personal data, these kinds of concerns reflect the acute need for a wider public 
conversation about what how these new technologies are understood, and 
what fantasies of objectivity, progress and ‘raw data’ they subscribe to. Data 
epistemology is a moral question, and insofar as it is socially engineered, a 
political question.  
 
These concerns over the human-machine relationship thus reflect the 
seductive danger of honeymoon objectivity. In the latter, the authoritative 
force of machinic sensibility and epistemic certainty threatens to evacuate the 
discursive space for public reflection on the biases of data-driven knowledge. 
After all, if technology delivers a ‘neutral’ objectivity, what need is there for 
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philosophical, critical-theoretical, and moral regulation? (see boyd & 
Crawford 2012, p666) Gilbert Simondon’s work shows that the instrumental 
dream of technology actually minorises technology, downplaying and 
concealing its influence and stakes (see Hörl 2015). The insistent invocations 
of ‘raw data’ constantly publicises a technological fantasy of something pure, 
untainted, but also something that reduces and standardises every kind of 
phenomenon to a countable and recordable mass. What is at stake in self-
tracking’s fantasies of ‘better knowledge’ is precisely this opportunity to 
cultivate a relationship with technology that is not reducible to the old 
modernist projects of progress and objectivity. 
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Postscript.  
 
The present work sought to understand the advent of new surveillance 
technologies in early twenty-first century America in epistemic terms; that is, 
a social and political struggle over accepted forms of producing and 
validating ‘knowledge’. It has tried to show how claims to knowledge are so 
often intertwined with projections of uncertainties and unknowns, analogous 
to the ways in which identity is defined through its Others. The objects, 
material and figurative, whose social life we have traced – from recessive 
objects (Chapter 1) to ‘raw’ data (4), from the objective ‘me’ (2) to the 
invocation of risk (3) – are sites where the production of knowns and 
unknowns intersect, and through which actors seek to establish desired 
epistemic configurations. Throughout, I have argued that uncertainty – as 
distinct from claims to knowledge, and from rationalised forms like risk – is 
subject to production and management as much as its more positive 
counterparts, and deserving of further analysis in those terms. I also sought to 
depict electronic surveillance in terms that are compatible with, but distinct 
from, the currently dominant frames of security and privacy, control and 
emancipation. This was not to deny the importance of the latter, but to 
provide another kind of analytical lens – one which examines the wider 
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public debate, organised through broad imaginaries of terrorism, technology, 
posthumanism, self-optimisation.  
 
In the Introduction, I suggested that the Snowden Affair and the Quantified 
Self constitute two emergent sites for the ongoing efforts to datafy the world 
around us through new surveillance technologies. These cases tell two 
parallel aspects of the same, larger story; they share and perpetuate 
fundamental fantasies about technological progress and objective knowledge, 
about the steady colonisation of the world through calculation, about the 
primacy of machinic sensibility, about the mythical figure of ‘raw’ data. Yet 
within this larger story, there are differences. While driven by technological 
inventions and procedures, the data epistemologies they seek to deploy is a 
social and political process by which veridical authority over the ‘self’ is 
transferred, distributed, bureaucratised, sold for consumption. As 
surveillance technology and data hunger encounters different interests and 
affordances at social, political, material, institutional, economic levels, we find 
varying distributions of epistemic authority across state and self-surveillance. 
Where the former derives its legitimacy against the projected uncertainty of 
New Terrorism, the latter plays itself up through the tropes of liberal 
freedoms and posthumanist evolution. Where one plays out through the 
 
 
 
305 
 
 
consumer market, the other does so through secret and invisibilised circuits of 
adoption and deployment.  
 
These differences help us think through the less visible dimensions and 
possibilities latent in each context. Debates on surveillance are typically 
parsed through the frames of privacy, control and top-down power. In this 
light, self-surveillance has been able to present itself as an emancipatory 
endeavour. Just as critics of corporate data-mining call for allowing 
individuals to ‘own’ their data and to know ‘transparently’ how it is being 
used, the spectre of the rational, informed individual holds together the idea 
that subjects can take charge of their own datafication to know, improve and 
control themselves. Yet the perils of voluntary self-datafication in the tracking 
context demonstrates how surveillance is not simply a problem of ownership 
and transparency. Rather, it is a question of what epistemic processes and 
standards gain the right to speak for the self. Conversely, the heuristics and 
simulations in play vis-à-vis state surveillance disrupt the simple narrative of 
technological evolution towards objectivity, and draw attention to the 
institutionalisation of epistemic processes that are marketed to be the epitome 
of personalisation. To be sure, there is a clear difference between surveillance 
that no ordinary citizen has any say over, and one that depends on voluntary 
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engagement through consumption. One lines the edges of everyday 
experience and knowability, while the other saturates it. But it is not so simple 
as saying that one is forced and the another is voluntary, that one can be 
known and the other cannot, or even that ‘knowing’ and ‘having’ my own 
data always amounts to control over the epistemic process.  The entanglement 
of surveillance and uncertainty is about establishing sociotechnical systems 
whereby the ordinary subject – the citizen, the consumer, member of the 
‘public’ – becomes the ingredient, the raw material, the object, the target, for 
the production of truths and judgments about themselves.  
 
The concepts raised across the four chapters pin down key aspects of such a 
process. Recessive objects (Chapter 1) demonstrate how information and 
certainty are not necessary couplings, and how the social presence of things – 
whether potential, remote, secret, speculative – drives their distribution and 
problematisation in the epistemic register. The presentation of apparent ‘facts’ 
and ‘realities’ – from the evidence of dragnets to the advent of New 
Terrorism, from the figure of ‘raw’ data to the promise of data’s intimacy – 
modulates the boundaries and standards governing what is considered 
knowable, unknowable, must-be-known, negligible, random, predictable. For 
new surveillance technologies, the basic assertion underlying its particular 
 
 
 
307 
 
 
configuration of knowledge and uncertainty is the primacy of machinic 
sensibility (Chapters 1, 2). Within this broader frame of data-driven 
knowledge, we see how practical strategies are developed in the form of 
deferring and simulating heuristics (Chapter 3), and rationalised through the 
old modernist imaginaries – in particular, of a honeymoon objectivity (Chapter 
4). If heuristics like subjunctivity and interpassivity are the everyday practices 
through which we navigate the presence of uncertainties (a presence itself 
generated through surveillance discourse), then fantasies like honeymoon 
objectivity provide a trajectory that justifies collective investment in such 
imperfect technologies and speculative processes. Although each concept is 
introduced here through specific phenomena belonging to one of the two 
empirical cases, when knitted together, they reflect the broader trends in 
datafication and the corresponding redistribution of epistemic authority in 
the ‘new’ media society.    
 
And so, there is much more to be said. It is perhaps the fate of any scholarly 
endeavour to paint its own boundaries – and the lines of flight it hopes the 
readers will take up – as much as what it can adequately claim to have 
addressed. To conclude, I briefly sketch out the boundaries of the present 
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work: the central questions it raises, the fundamental problems which it 
sought to address in its own partial and specific way.  
 
*** 
 
John Durham Peters (2015) once said that “all recorded media enable an 
interaction between the living and the dead.” New media technologies don’t 
just connect us to each other, but also to nonexistent Others, to imagined 
strangers, to black-boxed machinic systems, to secrets nestled deep within the 
unknown and unknowable. The fantasies of knowing the other, knowing 
through others, knowing the self through machines, beget – and are 
themselves concretised – through new technologies and their attendant 
rhetoric. But just as electricity could not fulfil the hopes of erasing temporal 
and spatial distance (Marvin 1988; Peters 1999), and the Internet did not 
exactly ‘overthrow matter’103 in a ‘Digital Revolution’ (the term aired in the 
inaugural issue of Wired claimed), data-driven surveillance is hardly the 
arrival of clean, machinic objectivity. Instead, we might think of these claims 
                                                          
103 ‘Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age’ (Dyson et 
al. 1994), a manifesto whose writers included the futurist Alvin Toffler, not only dovetailed 
with the wider utopian visions of the Internet, but also translated – via Newt Gingrich, in 
attendance at the conference that birthed the document – into a state policy of deregulation 
(Turner 1996, Chapter 7).  
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as part of a game of musical chairs in the regimes of knowledge: a social 
redistribution of what is considered known/knowable (or not), who (or what) 
does the knowing, what kind of veridical authority is granted the subject. 
Peters, responding to an early rendition of the present work, suggested: so 
much of the world has always been phenomenologically inaccessible to the 
human subject, before and after modern technology. Yet at each point, what 
changes is the specific “allocation of ignorance” – and the corresponding 
relations of power and veridical authority (2015, personal communication).  
 
To claim something is ‘known’, ‘proven’, ‘revealed’, is a powerful speech act; 
it establishes the referent material as a given upon which other decisions, 
rationales, truth claims, can be built. And when technologies, institutions, and 
social norms converge upon a regular system of knowledge claims, this 
organises a corresponding set of subject positions and the labour they are 
motivated towards. When the promise of surveillance knowledge hits claims 
about the unpredictability of New Terrorism like hammer and anvil, the 
pressure point is the political clamour for ‘zero tolerance’ on terrorism; and it 
is such pressure that yields what we have called fabrication (Chapter 3), 
whereby the ambiguous mental and social struggles of certain American 
youths are reified into signs of the enemy. When trackers like Thync and 
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Muse promise to resolve the amorphous experiences of ‘energy’ or ‘calm’ 
through the twenty-first century magic of sensor technologies (Chapter 2), 
they similarly seek a society where subjects’ everyday life is organised by 
micro-scale quantification and best behaviour as dictated by the numbers. 
While neither strategy is intended by its practitioners to be absolutely 
exhaustive, they indicate the ways in which new standards for declaring the 
truth of individuals may emerge. The stakes of fantasies about technology 
and knowledge thus concern what kinds of acts, beliefs, dependencies, formal 
standards, subjects are enrolled into in the name of better knowledge.  
 
*** 
 
In “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1991), Donna Haraway writes: “our best machines 
are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean”, or rather, they are often 
believed to be. Surveillance technologies are today wired into ‘clouds’ – a term 
which names as much the expanding network of machines hidden from 
ordinary human perception as much as the collective fantasy of a smooth and 
ethereal connectivity (Hu 2015). This imaginary corresponds to the fantasies 
of ‘pure’ and frictionless knowledge, emblematised in the mythical object that 
we call ‘raw data’ (Chapter 4). As old (and so often criticised) as they are, the 
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ideals of objective knowledge and technological progress continue to operate 
as the ‘givens’ of new claims about new technologies – from the ‘collect ‘em 
all’ strategies of state surveillance systems (Chapter 1), to the attempts at 
measuring and quantifying sleep, sex, and everything in-between (Chapter 2). 
Unravelling these knotted claims upon which surveillance asserts its validity 
is to ask: what do people mean by objectivity, by technology, by knowledge, 
in this context? And what other kinds of social significance could surveillance 
technologies have, if they were not bound up by this dominant narrative?  
 
Here, we might make an ironic usage of none other than Kevin Kelly’s 
discourse. In a book titled ‘What Technology Wants’ (2010), Kelly insists that 
technology has inbuilt tendencies towards perpetual progress. Yet he also 
provides a rather different way of thinking in his observations of the Amish. 
Kelly explains that in the communities he visited, technology was not banned 
outright; instead, enthusiastic early adopters might make a case for a specific 
object to the community, after which they would be permitted to use it for a 
trial period. Having carefully observed its impact on everything from the 
adopter’s social life to daily habits, the elders would make a ruling. 
Contemporary America writ large has no such pilot test. It simply asks: is it 
technologically feasible? And can the public be seduced into buying it? The 
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public presentation of surveillance technologies reify this reductive picture of 
the meaning of technology, where the value and meaning of technologies are 
defined by criteria like accuracy and efficiency. Honeymoon objectivity is a 
direct consequence of such ‘minorising’ of technology – the reduction of 
technology to mere instrument (see Hörl 2015). As the very concept of 
technology has grown into an enormous sprawl, covering seemingly every 
imaginable human work, our resources for thinking and talking about it have 
often been narrowed.  
 
Scholars of technology have variously attempted to address this problem. 
Andrew Feenberg (1991) wrote of ‘another technology’: that the question is 
not whether a given technology is good or bad, but how the objects and 
processes in question can be turned into a different set of virtues and ideals. 
More practically, the influential philosopher of existential risk Nick Bostrom 
(2002) has suggested institutionalising ‘differential’ technological 
development; a distribution of monetary incentives by which, as the Amish 
attempt, more holistic and moral standards can be used to accelerate or slow 
the development of new technologies.  
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Yet the problem may run deeper, towards the very concept of ‘technology’ as 
an object for thinking and categorising. Since its modern inception in the 
1840s, technology has described – and in doing so, reified – the idea that 
mechanical inventions are expanding quickly and constantly; that they 
colonise each aspect of human life they touch with a consistent set of 
principles, from temporal regularity to quantification. Honeymoon 
objectivity, of course, is itself a truth-claim, one which is then taken as a given 
by secondary assertions and decisions. The cultural capital commanded by 
the modern concept of technology thus undergirds surveillance’s claims to 
technological solutionism – even as individual tracking devices often splutter 
and fail at providing genuine ‘insights’, and vast, costly state surveillance 
apparatuses struggle to point to concrete evidence of their efficacy. To speak 
of knowledge and technology is, so often, to bestow present failures and 
injustices with an aura of inevitable progress and ultimate good. To perceive 
such struggles clearly, and to truly speak about ‘another technology’, it may 
take jettisoning the very word – and the centuries of accumulated conceptual 
baggage it now serves as carrier for (Carolyn Marvin, 2016, personal 
communication). 
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Surveillance, whether of the state or self variety, is unlikely to vanquish 
uncertainty to any significant degree. What it is attempting – and marking 
some early successes –is establishing new systems for capturing the private 
activities, personal communications, daily habits – the little spaces which had 
remained ‘free’: free from the ordering and organising devices of knowledge 
production, from the devices by which subjects are turned into things other 
than what they themselves think, say, and experience. As fantasies of 
technologically augmented knowledge continue to accrue cultural capital and 
achieve material deployment, we should regard with suspicion the common 
sense linkages between knowledge and virtues like empowerment or justice – 
and critically evaluate the structural changes that are made in the name of 
better knowing.  
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